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To see a World in a Grain of Sand
And a Heaven in a Wild Flower,
Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand
and Eternity in an hour.
—William Blake

Philosophy and the passions ultimately provide the same structures of
our existence, the one reinforcing the other; and the meaning of life is not a problem created
by philosophy but rather that problem which gives rise to philosophy. And that problem is
precisely the lack of harmony between the intellect and the passions.
—Robert C. Solomon

To all seekers, wanderers, and believers.
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ABSTRACT
Gregory Steel
THE SUBLIME: AN EXISTENTIAL AND ONTOLOGICAL ALLIANCE
WITH MYSTERY
This dissertation traces the phenomenon we call the sublime as it relates to the lived
experience. Not fully understood, this mystery, much like human existence, obscures any
possible telos. The experience of the sublime shifts our perspective and focuses our attention
on our being. The wonderings inspired by the experience of the sublime stimulates and
directs our ontological viewpoint and our existential potentials.
This examination intends to reveal the necessity of sublime experiences in realizing
our humanity and in plotting a course for a more just future. Tracing the genealogy of the
sublime through foundational thinkers like Longinus, Edmund Burke, and Immanuel Kant
will establish the early interpretations of the experience. Examining the sublime through the
shifting attitudes of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Martin Heidegger, Friedrich Nietzsche,
Jean-Paul Sartre, and Jacques Lacan will display a sense of uncertainty which will destabilize
the sublime as integral to being human. Leaning upon thinkers like Richard Rorty, Nicholas
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Rescher, Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari, and Kendall Walton, this work attempts to recover
the sense of wonder inherent in experiences of the sublime. This exploration will examine the
uncertain nature of the sublime and how it can be accessed in the contemporary world.
Contemporary cinema facilitates accessing the sublime in the modern world. Via our
imaginations, we can, through engaging with creative and well-crafted stories, experience the
sublime connections to our authentic being. Contemporary ideologies mediate interpretive
associations of the sublime and create a cul-de-sac for the meanings of the experience and
stifle the possibilities of the sublime. This exploration intends to re-establish the significance
of the sublime experience as part of humanities ongoing evolution.

Keywords: Sublime, Imagination, Cinema, Enhanced Imagination, Gregory Steel, IDSVA.
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INTRODUCTION
The Sublime: An Existential and Ontological Alliance with Mystery
The encounter with the incomprehensible is fundamental to being human. That which is
just outside of our multisensory capacities to see, taste, smell, hear, or touch is a tenacious part of
existence. Because it is indefinable, the experience of the sublime enables us to transcend our
ordinary way of being. This transcendence comes in multiple forms, for the experience of the
sublime is not the same for everyone. Emotions, imagination, intellect, social structures, cultural
norms, art, faith, and beliefs can all color how we experience and understand the experience we
call the sublime. However, if we merely accept universal descriptions and ideas of the sublime
rather than make an exploration of our experience of the sublime, we are in danger of eliminating
that part of our being that may be essential for being qua being. Though in the contemporary
moment—buffered by materialism, scientism, and organized religion—an authentic experience
of the sublime often eludes us, this dissertation explores how the imagination through cinema is a
relevant and potent location for experiencing the sublime.
In the contemporary world, we find the term sublime assigned to all manner of things, to
everything from religious experiences to tasting a beer. Though these designations belie our
desire for things to be sublime, we also use the term sublime because we lack any consistent
conventional or everyday language to apply to these experiences. Simply put, what we
commonly call sublime is an encounter with something that transcends our everyday knowledge
and experience of our lives. We refer to this mysterious encounter as sublime because the
experience has characteristics of greatness or immensity that overwhelms us in a particular way.
Our emotional reactions to these experiences are dynamic, changing as we change with
experience. To better understand this relationship and how it has evolved, this dissertation will
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begin with a genealogical look at the main philosophical strands in Western thought that have
had a significant impact on the understanding of the sublime. Further, it will examine the
intellectual and social components that have substantially influenced the interpretation, use, and
meaning of the sublime over time.
The motivation for this inquiry comes from a long-held interest in the philosophies of the
East. Most Eastern philosophy does not make the hard distinctions that Western philosophy does,
especially in relationship to dualisms. One of the more popular understandings of Eastern
philosophy comes to the West through the concept of Yin and Yang. The familiar image of the
two shapes in one, usually in the form of the circle, embodies the Eastern principle of balance.
Neither Yin nor Yang takes a privileged place; both are equally valuable. In contrast, intellectual
attitudes in the West have created stark divisions based on dualisms. These divisions privilege
certain terms over others; they reinforce intellectual ideas and preferences. The redefining of
words to create privileged positions mediates their meaning and influence within the cultural
milieu. The sublime, however, is similar to an Eastern concept in the way it tends to fall outside
of the use and process of dualisms and does not find its meanings in language in the same way as
other terms. Because the sublime is challenging to put into words and something we consider
undefinable, the sublime naturally defeats attempts to place it within a dualism. Thus, in the
West, the uncertain relationship we have with the sublime remains.
Because it denies the operations of dualistic thinking and opens a pathway to the
transcendent, the sublime creates access to a more meaningful and fuller experience of being a
human. It presents a greater sense of what the possibilities of being human may be. In short, the
experience of the sublime can give us hope that we can move beyond what is to what may be.
The choices, of course, of what may be are still unanswered, but having such choices is an
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important realization. The culture of the West allows us the possibility to defer responsibility as
much as we desire. We let the culture take care of us, watch out for us, legislate protections and
systems that save us from ourselves. But the experience of the sublime is different. Because no
one ideology, social, or cultural entity can manage, legislate, or mandate the sublime, we are
forced to offer our own explanations and meanings for the experience.
This is the value of the experience of the sublime. It gives us a shove, shakes us out of the
comfort of our illusions, presents us with a challenge and shows us how we can move beyond
what conventional thinking suggests.

THE SUBLIME UNSPOKEN
We often struggle and fail miserably to wrap words around experiences. The experience
of the sublime has been located at the center of this problem since it was first noticed by
philosophers and others. But the inadequacy of the language to encapsulate the meaning of the
sublime has made the sublime no less important. The experiences of the sublime are often
marked as the most meaningful and influential we have in our lives. The suspicion that language
is inadequate leaves us space to deal with other aspects of our humanity. Feelings, emotions, and
passions are primary among the things that seem to exist outside of our language. We do have
words we use to communicate identified emotions to others—such as, I’m angry, sad, or
depressed, etc. However, we all know that these words do little to describe the emotion in any
real way. It is hoped that a word will convey a sense of emotion that others have had so they can
begin to understand what we are trying to communicate. Emotions are a good example of how
language has fuzzy edges and depends upon many contingencies. Least of which is the fact we
must trust that the things pointed at by language are similar enough for others to understand what
it is we are saying.
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METHODOLOGY
This dissertation's methodology is phenomenological, and genealogical tracing the
experience of the sublime via historical accounts and examining the way it evolved and was
interpreted over time. By tracing the experience as it was articulated through time, we can more
fully understand its possibilities in the contemporary moment. The diversity of interpretations
and methods used by those attempting to articulate the sublime include the social, historical,
cultural, intellectual, and linguistic. These various approaches, touched on in this exploration, are
the result of the discursive and inchoate nature of the sublime. But, ultimately, the experience of
the sublime makes it difficult to articulate past references as well as current understandings. In
other words, the experience of the sublime reflects our cultural attitudes and our individual
relationship to the mystery of being human. As the title of this dissertation suggests, it is our
existential and ontological alliance with mystery that is embodied in the experience we call the
sublime. Because the contention is that the sublime exists outside language, taking a
phenomenological look at the experience seems the most pragmatic and practical approach.
The word sublime has remained a part of the lexicon in the West because we continue to
have experiences that can only be described as sublime. The West’s seeming dependence on
dualisms sets in motion an inquiry of the sublime that must explore our relationship with the
transcendent. The diverse perspectives on our relationship to the sublime are useful in the
construction and understanding of any ontological outlook. For these reasons, it was necessary to
examine the processes that the culture has used to create the dualistic divisions that have existed
since the Enlightenment. The Western preference for dualistic thinking through language has
constrained meanings and concepts in ways that may have been less than optimal. We can feel
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the effects of these privileged terms in today’s cultural discourse; dualistic thinking has led to
many cultural and social issues. For example, feminism has revealed the gender issues
surrounding the language and the words woman and man. Even today, language
compartmentalizes the other through dualisms. We still use language to marginalize those who
are “not like us,” to place ourselves—whoever “we” are—in a privileged relationship to the
other. This use of language interferes with the possibility of social progress. The use of dualisms
problematizes our thinking, closing us off from possibilities for development.
One particularly interesting dualism that has been debated for centuries is the dualism
that was created around faith and reason (Honderich 288). The split between the rational and the
religious has always been a point of fascination and interest to philosophers, clergy, and the
layperson. Many have tried to resolve the split between the two with mixed results. One point
this exploration will attempt to make is that there is no real dilemma: the rational and the
irrational can and do coexist. The idea that one must choose either faith or reason to be able to
find a truth is really just an illusion created by dualisms. The experience of the sublime offers a
void, gap, space, or opening that might be able to bridge our understanding of how faith and
reason operate together. The word sublime and the language used to define its meaning have a
great intellectual, emotional, and social weight. For its cultural impact alone, the experience of
the sublime as it defines our relationship to the mysterious warrants an in-depth investigation.
The concept of the sublime has historically been co-opted by ideologies seeking to
capture the power of the sublime to further their own agendas. For instance, the co-option by
religions, whose interpretations of experiences in sacred texts are almost always described as
sublime, take a kind of ownership over the experience of the sublime as somehow only coming
under divine intervention. Eastern yogic and tantric teachings and texts are also filled with
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experiences that are described as sublime in nature. An early example of this can be found in the
Bhagavad Gita in the description of the Hindu God Krishna (Arnold and Srimati 72-84).This can
also be an example of the epiphanic in literature which lays claim to the sublime. The diversity
of claims and connections to the experience of the sublime makes it central to the existential
ideas of being a human. The sublime has been used in the West as a point of mediation and to
empower privileged terms in particular ideologies. These ideological terms are just arguing for
one perspective over another; they make the privileged term a preference that reinforces
particular ideological leanings. However, choosing one perspective over another does not change
reality; it only colors it in a particular way. The illusions that arise from the myriad of deceptions
available in the West are still illusions in the end. The reality of what a human life is still
underlies all that we do and can do in this world. The distraction of ideological engagements
does not diminish the possibility of the fruitfulness of the experience we call sublime.
Ultimately, the experience we call the sublime cannot be codified by an ideology; it
demands contemplation and often a shift in our understanding. Many of our mundane
experiences go virtually unnoticed. Experiences, like the opening of a door, are executed almost
as if done by some automatic process that exists outside of us. However, even a mundane
experience can become a sublime experience given the proper attention and attitude.
In the West, the concept of the sublime has been disseminated so broadly that its meaning
has become diluted and uninteresting. But this overuse does not necessarily mean that the
experience of the sublime has lost its potential power. The sublime still has the power to stop us
and move us into a space where we must confront the uncertain, the unknown, the mysterious,
and the transcendent. This space is rife with possibilities; it is, in Gilles Deleuze’s words, the
space of “pure immanence” (Deleuze and Boyman 27). Deleuze elaborates, "We will say of pure

7
immanence that it is A LIFE, and nothing else. It is not immanence to life, but the immanent that
is in nothing is itself a life. A life is the immanence of immanence, absolute immanence: it is
complete power, complete bliss" (Deleuze and Boyman 27). The sublime is a place where this
“pure immanence”1 is made manifest to our consciousness. The sublime shows us the possibility
of the immanence we have within the human experience. Both the sublime and immanence also
represent great possibility for change. Possibility is usually seen in a positive light, but change is
often something we resist in the West.
Change in the West is a challenge and there is still significant resistance to progress even
when it is possible that the transformation is in our best interest. Conservative political attitudes
are an example of such resistance. This is why there has been an ongoing divide between the
conservatives and the progressives. Progressives who are traditionally the political party of
progress and change seem to always be at odds with conservatives who want things to remain the
same and consistent. The psychologies that have developed in relation to the sublime can also be
viewed from the progressive or conservative perspective. To understand the reasons for how we
understand the sublime today, it was necessary to lay out a genealogical background looking at
the intellectual and social structures that formed the ideas and relationships to the sublime and
the unknown. We have a strong preference for certainty rather than the chaos of uncertainty
which is why we fear change and prefer stability. The experience of the sublime has often been
defined as an encounter with uncertainty. Because the experience of the sublime has been
considered at times instrumental to personal and societal changes, we must examine how the
experience of the sublime has been considered. The taking of a genealogical approach intends to
connect the differing attitudes toward and interpretations of the experience of the sublime, so we
can see it more clearly in all its cultural complexity.
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The genealogy section uncovers the reasons for some of the shifting attitudes in the
evolving relationship to the experience of the sublime. There is a series of essential distinctions
to be made in attitudes, emotions, and psychologies as they relate to the experience of the
sublime. The acceptance of the experience of the sublime is not accidental; certain accepted
ideologies have been instrumental in reinforcing the value of the experience of the sublime in the
culture of the West. Central to these ideologies is the language they use to interpret and assign
meaning. The experience of the sublime continues to be understood through the language we use
to attempt to encapsulate its meaning. This dissertation explores the central and problematic
influence of language in our understanding of the sublime. Language remains insufficient to
describe, define, and understand things sublime. This has not convinced us, however, that we
should abandon the sublime. Things we identify as sublime continue to show up in the cultural
discourse and in everyday discussions.
Language has significantly influenced our relationship with the experience of the
sublime. A large portion of this dissertation examines language and its effects on meaning and
interpretation. Jacques Lacan’s language-based theories were of particular importance; Lacan
powerfully connects language and psychology (Fink 9). Language is intended to describe our
experiences and emotions but often fails in the attempt. Trying to describe emotions, such as
love or anguish, is an excellent example of this failure. There is also an emotional element in the
experience of the sublime, but emotions are often disregarded in the rationalist, materialist world
of the West. However, emotions, particularly emotions like the ones we choose in relation to the
sublime, are important elements of our being and necessary for our understanding. In The
Passions, Robert Solomon regards the passions as analogous with our emotions: “Rather than
disturbances or intrusions, these emotions, and the passions in general, are the very core of our
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existence, the system of meanings and values within which our lives either develop and grow or
stagnate” (Solomon xvii). Examining the emotions and the language we use to describe and
communicate the experience of the sublime becomes a critical factor in our attempt to understand
our relationship to the experience of the sublime.
This dissertation intends to reestablish an essential relationship to the experience of the
sublime. One advantage to having a better relationship to the experience of the sublime is that
the experience of the sublime is non-reductive and complex. It is an inclusive examination,
because the sublime, in its inchoate conceptual nature, resists the reductive tendencies of
materialism. The experience of the sublime pushes our ontological perspectives off-center
requiring a refocusing of our perspectives on the horizon we intend to use to guide our existence.
Many thinkers have influenced these conclusions. A short list includes William James,
Friedrich Nietzsche, Robert Solomon, Immanuel Kant, John Paul Sartre, Jacques Lacan,
Nicholas Rescher, Hannah Arendt, Richard Rorty, and Jean-François Lyotard. There are, of
course, more thinkers who have investigated the sublime, and many of them are also discussed in
the course of this text.
In sum, the experience of the sublime as it has been treated in the West reveals the results
of the practice of reductionism and the privileging of dualistic thinking. The sublime has become
a marketing line and a one liner for sports broadcasters. The West has used the sublime to
leverage profits. But, thankfully, the sublime resists this takeover by not standing still long
enough for it to be identified and captured by the system. The sublime is dynamic. It moves as
we and the world move; always there to remind us that we do not know all there is to know.
When we think all is settled and resolved, something arises in the experience of the sublime to
show us that there is more to consider and strive for; we can become more intelligent and
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compassionate. We are not at the top of the mountain and may never be, but the experience of
the sublime reminds us that we should keep climbing. This reminder of our still evolving
possibilities is the value of the experience of the sublime and the primary claim of this text.
Other cultures, particularly the cultures of the East, have an inclusive ontological outlook
developed by not compartmentalizing experiences like the sublime as secondary to the praxis of
being human. The experience of the sublime is an important ontological and existential
benchmark upon which we can plot a course for our lives.

CHAPTER ONE: GENEALOGY OF THE SUBLIME
The genealogy of the sublime begins with an examination of the perspective of the
subject. Whatever position one holds on the idea of the subject or of subject-hood, the sublime is
being experienced by a human in some guise or other. The subject functions as a point of
contrast with the changing expressions and interpretations of the sublime over time. This chapter
examines the sublime through the lens of the subject in three different ways: the subject in the
world, the subject as central in the world, and the subject as contingent in the world.
The chapter explores the sublime from its earliest known reference in the work of
Longinus, whose writings center on the effects of the sublime on language. In early Greek
culture, the use of the oral tradition was the preferred method for the dissemination of all types of
information. Therefore, Longinus’s emphasis on the experience of the sublime through the use of
language is not surprising. Language and the sublime continue to have associations throughout
the Western mindset because of our adoption of the early Greeks’ thinking.
The first chapter charts the thinking of scholars like Edmund Burke, Immanuel Kant,
Arthur Schopenhauer, Sigmund Freud, Karl Marx and others who have formed our mental
picture of the Western world. Though these thinkers have various opinions, the sublime has been

11
a consistent concept. Martin Heidegger will serve as the bridge between the early and the modern
understandings of the experience of the sublime and how it would evolve in the thinking of the
West.

CHAPTER TWO: GENEALOGY OF THE SUBLIME II
The second chapter of the genealogy looks at the experience of the sublime in
relationship to the changing dynamics of the quickly evolving modern world. Beginning with
modernism and its neo-platonic worldview, the relationship to the sublime would further change
but not be removed from the culture. Modernism was considered a triumph of the intellect: the
power of the human mind could transcend the mundane world. This thought is still dominant in
many areas of the West and colors our relationship to the sublime.
Historical forces—the turmoil of two world wars and the rise of globalism and
industrialization—have dramatically changed our relationship with the world. In the midst of all
these changes, the relationship to the sublime also changed. Looking at the world through the
eyes of Heidegger and the other existentialists, things seemed less stable and more futile than
they had perhaps since the Dark Ages. The philosophies of Sartre, and Nietzsche—and the
questions they asked—would gain in popularity alongside the drastic changes in the social and
cultural fabric of the West.
Social reform movements—such as the civil rights and peace movements, as well as
feminism—began to challenge existing structures and cultural mythologies. Philosophy was
taking a much more pragmatic look at real-life situations, and concepts like the sublime had to
take a back seat to the cultural chaos that people were facing. The mysterious just did not seem
to be as urgent as the pressing social and cultural circumstances at the time. Beneath the turmoil
of the cultural changes, however, the sublime was still present.
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CHAPTER THREE: LANGUAGE
Of the mediating structures we find in the West, language is the most powerful. An indepth examination of language itself is necessary to understand the meanings bestowed on the
sublime. The use and constructs of language, as well as the critical scrutiny that language
underwent in the twentieth century, continue to play a critical role in the human relationship to
the sublime. In the West, this relationship comes out of the myriad of discourses on the subject.
Through an examination of the language surrounding the sublime, this chapter reveals the levels
of uncertainty surrounding issues like the experience of the sublime in the intellectual life of the
West. Lacan and Derrida will serve as examples of the problematic relationship we have with
language.

CHAPTER FOUR: LACAN
Jacques Lacan, one of the most quoted philosophers of the twentieth century, was also
one of the most notable language theorists. Mixing philosophy, psychology, and language theory,
Lacan created a powerful theoretical platform that is still very active to this day. This chapter
will apply Lacan's theories to the experience of the sublime. These theories inform almost every
modern intellectual discourse. The purpose of using Lacan's psychological perspective is that it
opens a unique landscape for thinking about and understanding our relationships to the sublime.
Also, this perspective can reveal the fault lines and pathways forward in the human relationship
to the sublime.
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CHAPTER FIVE: FAITH AND REASON
This chapter outlines the problem of duality in relation to concepts like the sublime. The
West's long preoccupation with privileged terms and the construction of an ontology of power
through language is manifest in the rift between faith and reason. These constructs have become
a foundational problem in the West and other parts of the world. Dualisms lead to radicalization
and ideological inflexibility. This chapter reviews the historical background in which the sublime
has operated and in which the relationship to the unknown has developed with a particular
concentration on the divisions between faith and reason. This gap has direct bearing on the
interpretation and understanding of the experience of the sublime and so is crucial in this
examination. Leaning upon the ideas of William James, Herbert Dreyfus, Martin Heidegger,
Immanuel Kant, F.S.C. Northrup, Jamie Holmes, Nicholas Rescher and others, this exploration
will demonstrate the complexities created by bifurcations like faith and reason.

CHAPTER SIX: CINEMA, CONTEMPORARY ACCESS TO THE EXPERIENCE OF THE
SUBLIME
Because of its accessibility, the cinema has had an enormous influence on our culture as a
whole. This chapter explores the idea that cinema has become self-critical in the understanding
of its ability to influence the building of culture and society. Further, this chapter will challenge
Walter Benjamin's seminal work on cinema. Walter Benjamin, in The Age of Mechanical
Reproduction, (Benjamin 520) examines the audience’s role in this art for the masses: “The film
with its shock effect meets this mode of reception halfway. The film makes the cult value2 recede
into the background not only by putting the public in the position of the critic, but also by the
fact that at the movies this position requires no attention. The public is an examiner, but an
absent-minded one" (Benjamin 526). Benjamin’s contention that the cinema is a form of
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distraction reveals a determinism upon the type of attention people have while watching movies.
Technology has further exacerbated the ubiquitous problem of distraction in the West. Benjamin
is both correct and incorrect in his assessment of the cinema. Moving from Benjamin to Walton
and to the idea of the imagination and the fictional as active parts in human experience, I argue
that the cinema is a place for experiencing the sublime and that both distraction and
contemplation are embodied in that experience.

CONCLUSION
This text examines the genealogy and philosophy of, as well as our ongoing relationship
with the sublime. The practices surrounding the experiences of the sublime that we encounter
have been clouded by intellectual and social constructs. We often look for some entity or
intellectual concept to define the sublime and provide us with a fixed interpretation. Our thinking
takes the path of least resistance. We look for a quick and easy solution to experiences that are
too problematic for us to consider in the rush of living. Science and religion are two of the most
common interpretative methods of the sublime in the West. These interpretative methods reduce
one’s encounter with the sublime to an either/or choice between reason or belief. This either/or
approach subverts and deadens the inherent complexity and possibility of discovering novelty in
the sublime experience. It is, however, through our ability to negotiate chaos and the experience
of the sublime that we are better prepared to build an authentic life and an equitable future that
provides peace, justice, and possibilities for all people.
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CHAPTER ONE
A Genealogy of the Sublime
Heraclitus, the pre-Socratic Greek philosopher, claimed that you could not step into the
same river twice. (Oxford Companion to Philosophy 378) The sublime, like that river, is an
always changing, out-of-reach concept. Heraclitus’s questions and observations set the course for
philosophies to come and for the relationship we have to the sublime. The sublime, specter-like,
can be traced in the footsteps of Western ontology, and it continues to confound us today.
As we trace the sublime through various historical periods, the ways in which it is
mediated through the particular cultural, intellectual, and social aspects of each period becomes
clear. When viewed in this light, the sublime is not necessarily seen as a common experience, but
instead it manifests itself as our relationship with mystery and functions as a mirror reflecting an
inner self. As Jean-Paul Sartre declares, “Consciousness is consciousness of something. This
means that transcendence is the constitutive structure of consciousness; that is, the consciousness
is born supported by a being which is not itself” (Sartre and Barnes 23).
This genealogy relies heavily upon the current skepticism of Western metaphysics and
the shifting and dynamic nature of the historical discourses surrounding the sublime.
Additionally, an admitted awareness of the failure of materialism to resolve the problems of
metaphysics is also present. Building on this discursive foundation in the following chapters, the
potentials of the sublime are examined. The “spirit,” as Martin Heidegger describes it, or the
zeitgeist of an era is closely related to notions of the sublime in any given cultural dialogue or
proposed ontology.3
The genealogy that follows examines the sublime in order to establish, in part, it’s
possible misreading, and to reveal the sublime as something both necessary and sufficient in the
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formation of the ontological, phenomenal, and existential understandings and interpretations of
“being.” As a matter of intellectual organization, I will look at the sublime through three lenses,
focusing on the ways in which the sublime is experienced by 1) a Subject in the world, 2) a
Subject as central and becoming, and 3) a Subject as contingent. By examining the sublime from
each of these three perspectives, I intend to reveal its import and perhaps why it remains a
significant philosophical figure today.

THE SUBJECT IN THE WORLD
As I am addressing a person so accomplished in literature, I need only state,
without enlarging further on the matter, that the Sublime, wherever it occurs,
consists in a certain loftiness and excellence of language, and that it is by this, and
this only, that the greatest poets and prose-writers have gained eminence, and won
themselves a lasting place in the Temple of Fame.
—Longinus4
Longinus associated the sublime with the skill great rhetoricians had in utilizing language
to affect the masses. In the days of Longinus, the Subject, or self, was considered separate from
the world. Things in the world, acting independent, could affect people in ways they did not fully
understand. For example, the gods of ancient times had a particular set of characteristics and held
specific positions and meanings within the understanding of the Greeks. Worship of these gods
was based on the characteristics and powers of each god. The Subject would pray or make an
offering to the god based on the god’s power to fulfill the Subject’s desired result. At the mercy
of the natural world and the gods, the Subject was surrounded by the unknown. The loftiness
suggested by Longinus’s discourse on the sublime fits neatly into the world of ancient Greece.
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This heightened language assisted in establishing the relationship to being (ontology) in which
the common was insufficient and alludes to the idea that some things existed out of reach of the
everyday lives of the Greeks.
The establishment of these early ideas and relationships, as well as the distinct favoritism
for language and the language-based arts, contributed to the confusion surrounding the sublime.
If we model our intellectual, social, and cultural expressions on the belief systems handed down
to us, then these systems and genealogy, as well as their histories, should be subject to a critical
analysis. The sublime, as mystery, is a partner in the ontological framework we may use to plot a
direction in life. To summarize, the instrumentality as exhibited via the experience of the sublime
from antiquity to contemporary times has always been part of the developmental structures of the
social, intellectual, and ontological. In other words, the sublime as the unknown has always been
categorized by particular cultural and intellectual agendas.
Longinus presented the first discourse focused on the sublime. Although his true identity
is still in question, his treatise On the Sublime (Longinus) remains a hallmark of the topic. In
beginning his discourse of the sublime, Longinus focused on the use of language, specifically
rhetoric and oratory. In ancient Greece, rhetoric and oratory were the pinnacle of what we now
call ‘art;’ to be able to speak and sway the crowds conferred upon an individual an almost
demigod status. In that light, Longinus associated feelings of the sublime with rhetoric and the
effects that language has on the recipients. Longinus saw the sublime as an unreachable,
untouchable, transcendent experience that language was able to bring forth. In section one of On
the Sublime, Longinus writes,
A lofty passage does not convince the reason of the reader, but takes him out of
himself. That which is admirable ever confounds our judgment, and eclipses that
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which is merely reasonable or agreeable. To believe or not is usually in our own
power; but the Sublime, acting with an imperious and irresistible force, sways
every reader whether he will or no. Skill in invention, lucid arrangement and
disposition of facts, are appreciated not by one passage, or by two, but gradually
manifest themselves in the general structure of a work; but a sublime thought, if
happily timed, illumines an entire subject with the vividness of a lightning-flash,
and exhibits the whole power of the orator in a moment of time. (Longinus sec.
1.3)
For Longinus, to wield language in this way was to have great power. This power could
transform listeners and transport them out of their normal state and into the sublime. The
subjective here is understood as the Subject being in the world and the world having a
conditioning efficacy and power over them. Longinus suggested that the sublime was something
that imposed itself on the Subject, taking over the Subject. But in order for a Subject to be taken
over, there first must exist a Subject. In unpacking this idea, we could agree that the sublime, as
Longinus noted, did not exist in the speaker; the speaker’s skill in understanding his time,
language, and the social tendencies of Subjects allowed the sublime to manifest itself through the
speaker’s powerful use of language. The sublime was not some mysterious entity existing
outside the Greek culture but was expected to exist in the lives of the Greeks.
Longinus established the relationship to the sublime by aligning it with the developing
ontology of the subject/object dualism that existed in early Greek culture. In doing so, he also
assisted in establishing the logo and phallocentric hierarchies that existed in Greek culture. The
sublime was subjected to these logocentricities and hierarchies. The relationship of the Subject to
the sublime via these interpretations shaded the sublime and conditions the subject and object
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relationship. To state simply, the sublime is and was necessary for the particular ontology the
Greek’s adopted and continues to be a necessary precursor to our ontological horizons. But what
does the sublime provide in the creation or adoption of the particular ontology?
The psychology of a Subject in ancient Greece would be established and determined by
the relationship his subjective consciousness had to the ideologies and ontologies of Greece at
the time. This kind of perspective is one in which the world, judged through the interpretive
strategies of ancient Greece, would naturally tend to support Greek culture and ideologies. This
point leads to the following question: Does the culture define its objects, do the objects define
the culture, or does the idea suggest a dynamic system in which both are required? Further, what
are the implications of these perspectives? The use of the sublime in Greek culture, as it was
defined by Longinus and understood by the Greeks, was stimulated by language, in practice,
through great rhetoric. It is also interesting to note that the use of language, particularly the
language used to articulate the sublime experience described as transcendental, relates to the idea
that language, as it is commonly agreed to, is what allowed humans to transcend animals.
Conceptually, the idea of transcendence operates as part of a structured ontological framework.
In this way, the culture established itself through particular existential and ontological
perspectives and a subjectivity that constructed and supported the interpretive strategies for the
sublime and for life in ancient Greece. The idea that humans are special and that they have
transcended animals extends through ideas of the sublime and subsequently to the language used
to communicate and drive the ontology of ancient Greece.
Beginning with Longinus, there was a desperate attempt to describe the sublime by using
language that refers to something beyond, outside of, and foreign to the normal conditions of
being human—in essence, to describe something that is outside of language. Longinus states, “It
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is natural in us to feel our souls lifted up by the true sublime” (sec. 1.3), thereby revealing that
feeling is an important element of an encounter with the sublime. To summarize, Longinus, in
ancient Greece, described the sublime as something outside of the everyday. Longinus revealed
that language as experienced by subjects in the world had influence over them. The sublime,
standing in for this unknown powerful force that Longinus associated with rhetoric, was used by
the culture as a concept and an interpretation of the process of having a certain kind of
experience.
Greek culture was as much responsible for the understanding and disposition of the
sublime as the sublime was for the influence it had over the Greeks. In the time of Longinus, the
cultural forces and the interpretative strategies utilized to construct the society that was ancient
Greece filled the emptiness of the sublime with culturally efficacious notions that would sustain
and promote the ideologies of ancient Greece. Ancient Greek ontology and its meanings still
hold much power in the world today, and, as we will see, those echoes have reverberated with
subsequent cultures and interpretations of the sublime. The next point of intertest for the sublime
would be the Age of Enlightenment with Edmund Burke’s famous text on the sublime. Burke’s
text marks a landmark moment in the genealogy of the sublime.
In the late 1700s, Edmund Burke wrote A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origins of Our
Feelings of the Sublime and Beautiful, (Burke) which continued the support of a logocentric idea
of the sublime, much like Longinus before him. However, Burke moves the sublime into a nexus
with feelings, which suggests a shifting of consciousness in the percipient. He states, “Whatever
is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain, and danger, that is to say, whatever is in any sort
terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects, or operates in a manner analogous to terror, is a
source of the sublime; that is, it is productive of the strongest emotion which the mind is capable
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of feeling” (Burke 66). Burke suggests that the mind is doing the feeling, but it can also be said
that the mind is performing an interpretation of the feelings. We can begin an interrogation of
Burke’s assessment of the sublime with some questions: Why terror? Why place the sublime in
this association with something that does such violence to our senses? Associating the sublime
with feelings provides a potential way out of that paradox. The sublime seems always able to
expand to meet the expectations of the percipient, no matter the culture or conditions in which
she or he is immersed. Magnitudes that are associated with the sublime are always the greatest
imaginable. But is this because of the sublime or because of the lack of sensitivity in the one
undergoing the sublime? Our relationship to the sublime is a dynamic one, in which the
sublime’s purpose, although shrouded in mystery, is a central characteristic of the value of the
experience itself.
In the pre-psychological times in which Burke and Longinus lived, emotions were the
clearest way to describe and understand the state of mind of an individual. The fact that
Longinus and Burke both associate the sublime with emotions will become more important as
this investigation proceeds. Language, as it attempts to articulate and understand the sublime,
still leaves the sublime bound in a paradoxical relationship. This structure, however it is
envisioned, shapes the sublime and, in turn, is shaped by the sublime. Once again there is a
change, not in the sublime, but in the ontological structures that intend to use the sublime for
developing its meanings.
Burke’s characterization of the sublime, similar to Longinus’s, is one in which the
Subject is separated from objects in the world. As such, Burke situates the sublime in the
physiological effect centered in the emotions and the body. By positioning the sublime in this
way, Burke pre-contextualizes the sublime for the mind, making a conclusion or understanding
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of the functions or purposes of the sublime outside Burke’s vision difficult. Burke suggests the
origin of the sublime is in the mind via strong emotion of the one who is experiencing. This shift
of focus regarding the location of the sublime from an object of nature outside the Subject to that
of one in the mind of the Subject is the point at which Immanuel Kant begins his discussion of
the sublime. Burke associates the sublime and its locus within the subjective self. Kant also will
take this position in his discourse during the Enlightenment and will reinforce the Subject’s mind
as central to the experience of being. The isolating properties of this idea would lead to
materialism in the coming centuries, as well as change the horizons and meaning of the sublime.
Longinus and Burke lived in times of great change. The sublime—its interpretation and
its meanings—changed along with the shifting political, ontological, and cultural tendencies. The
perspective of a Subject in the world determined in large part the interpretation of the sublime
and of the mysterious. In ancient Greece, there were a myriad of mysteries that could be
interpreted through the ideological tendencies of the Greeks and could be called ‘sublime.’ The
way mysteries and the sublime have been interpreted by different cultures tends to position the
sublime experience as an empty container, ready to be filled with whatever prevailing ideas are
in service of the cultural and social structures of any given moment. The Enlightenment period
would shift the prevailing ideas surrounding our relationship to the world in ways that would
impact the sublime and thoughts of the self, as well as our relationship to the mysterious.

THE SUBJECT AS CENTER OF EVERYTHING
The eighteenth century and the Enlightenment changed the way we understood our own
thoughts and our relationships to the world and the objects in it. New ideas about our way of
being in the world caused a radical shift in the platforms of knowledge and understanding. The
idea that our minds create and are responsible for the sublime helped shape the foundations of
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existing cultural and intellectual platforms. Longinus and Burke may disagree on the factors that
produce the sublime, but they do agree that the sublime is an important part of the human
experience. Immanuel Kant’s shift of perspective, from a purely experiential one to a world in
which the individual subjective self becomes the center of discourse, became known as Kant’s
Copernican Revolution5 and informed the Enlightenment on into the late twentieth century. With
Kant’s thoughts, we see a return to the Platonic world of the mind as the locus for the
experiences of the sublime and beauty.6 This shift reforms the ideas of the sublime as relative to
our perceptions and to our subjective interpretations. Kant’s Copernican Revolution would stand,
and still stands, as a hallmark of the sublime in the ongoing discourses.
In the West, the sublime remains a mysterious object that the Subject cannot fully
understand, either intellectually, psychologically, or emotionally. The sublime remains a
confusing and ongoing mysterious object because of the interpretations we use in its
descriptions. Phenomenology7 will take the sublime in a different direction by making
experience of the sublime a central element in how we view being in the world. The changes
made by Phenomenology created a shift in the emphasis we place on objects in the world and our
experiences of them. This would also change how we understand and interpret the meaning of
the sublime. If the objects in the world conform to the mind, as Kant suggests, then the mind is
indeed in control of the world and of what we see and how we see it. In phenomenology we need
an object existing apart from us to experience. If we are, in part, responsible for the creation of
the sublime, then what is it we are creating, and why?
Kant, like Burke, identifies terror and the sense of being overwhelmed as introducing or
inducing the sublime. (Kant Kant's Critique of Aesthetic Judgement 91) For Burke, the idea of
the sublime was much more about sensation than a cognitive process examined via experience,
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as Kant claims. For Kant, the experience activates a capacity in the Subject, and the sublime
becomes not the experience but the realization of the Subject’s own capacity, the “supersensible”
ability to overcome terror through the power of reason and the imagination. (Kant Kant's
Critique of Aesthetic Judgement 92) The ontology of the Enlightenment was one in which the
importance of the Subject as individual self was paramount. By leveraging the sublime in the
way he did, Kant directs our attention to the one place that, for him, was the universal center: the
power of the reasoning mind.
For Burke, the sublime was more of a physiological problem. In contrast, Kant separates
the beautiful and the sublime in his discourse in order to establish the power of the mind in his
conclusions of the beautiful and the sublime, bestowing upon the sublime a power to elevate the
mind to a higher power, a power he calls the ‘supersensible.’8 Kant defines the sublime in this
way: “The sublime is that, the mere capacity of thinking which evidences a faculty of mind
transcending every standard of the senses” (Kant Kant's Critique of Aesthetic Judgement 81).
Kant is indicating something phenomenologically and epistemologically important about the
sublime: it can be more than merely a phenomenal or purely physiological experience. In The
Kantian Sublime, Paul Crowther clarifies, “Kant, in other words, implicitly construes the sublime
as occasioned by powers which transcend the self, in some specifiable way” (Crowther 15).
Given Kant’s predilections for reason and clear thinking, one would imagine that he had more
interest in the sublime based on its capacities as he saw them. Indeed, he states, “On the other
hand, the feeling of the sublime is a pleasure that only arises indirectly, being brought about by
the feeling of a momentary check to the vital forces followed at once by a discharge all the more
powerful, and so it is an emotion that seems to be not play, but a serious matter in the exercise of
imagination” (Kant Kant's Critique of Aesthetic Judgement 75-76). For Kant, the sublime is
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something more than beauty; it is a unique experience that indicated unique characteristics in the
individual.
In Kant’s transcendental idealism, the sublime experience allows us access to a
transcendent state, the idea that within the Subject exists something greater than the object of
nature that prompts the feelings of the sublime to arise. Reason, for Kant, can be thought of as
having a synonymous relationship with the sublime; it is the power of reason that we confront
when the feelings of the sublime arise, and it is through reason that we are introduced to the
transcendent state of the “supersensible.” Therefore, it is the “supersensible” abilities of the mind
that are sublime and not something external. Unlike Burke’s analysis of the sublime as empirical,
for Kant the sublime can provide both an immanent and transcendental function that reminds us
of our greater abilities, our freedom, and, in turn, our greater moral responsibilities. He explains,
“The sublime may be described in this way: it is an object [of nature] the representation of which
determines the mind to regard the elevation of nature beyond our reach as equivalent to the
presentation of ideas” (Kant Kant's Critique of Aesthetic Judgement 98).
Kant’s philosophy would highlight the metaphysical problem of the split between objects
in the world and the observing subject, otherwise understood as the Western metaphysical
tradition. In essence, the intellectual rift between the subject and object can be traced to the preSocratics and then to Plato, who inferred that the world of the forms as concepts was the real
truth and that the objects we see are merely imitations of the true forms. Kant responded to
David Hume’s philosophy of radical skepticism by creating a new metaphysical platform
centered on the human ability to reason.9
Questions about the subject/subjectivity have been a focus of philosophy since its
beginnings. Kant’s discourse, seen as failing to ground philosophy in subjectivity, created an
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aporia,10 which the idealists and romantics of the eighteenth century utilized for their own
purposes. In Kant’s and Burke’s discourses, we could say that, for both, the activities of the
sublime helped to initiate the subject-centered relationship to objects in similar ways and opened
the door to further examination by the coming philosophical and social changes. The perspective
offered by Kant is one in which a subject has an instrumental relationship to things in the world.
The suggestion of the Subject evolving, or “being,” as Heidegger will state, (Heidegger Being
and Time 236-241) establishes a slightly different horizon for being. The response demonstrated
by the Romantic Movement11 will become one branch of the tree of possibility offered by Kant’s
ideas.
Romanticism and the sublime are similar in the fact that both present a vision of what can
be as not necessarily a determinable fact; the future is something which the Subject can envision
and create. German Romanticist Arthur Schopenhauer defines the sublime as the following:
Yet, as long as her personal plight does not predominate, but we continue an
aesthetic contemplation, the pure subject of knowing, unshaken and unconcerned,
looks beyond that strife in nature, beyond that image of the broken well, and
quietly comprehends the ideas even in those very objects which are threatening
and terrible for the will. It is in this contrast that the sense of the sublime lives.
(Schopenhauer, Haldane and Kemp 128)
Schopenhauer, like Kant, places the sublime between two opposite and paradoxical
psychological objects, between disaster and recovery via reason. For the Romantics, the sublime
was a touchstone of utility, a catchall for psychology and ontology, and an escape from the
commonplace.
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With the rise of industrialization and its movement of people and commerce, as well as
the shifting ways of life for many, the perspectives and feelings surrounding the Romantic also
changed. The relationship between the subject and the object came under the scrutiny of a
scientific materialist perspective. In the early twentieth century, the world turned toward the
writings and thinking of scholars such as Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud, who saw the world as a
place of order, structured in a scientific way. The perspectives on the relationship between the
subject and object and the sublime were changing, turning to what would be called ‘materialism,’
which would dominate the discourse for many years and have a privileged place over the
metaphysical and the sublime. Materialism is an intellectual framework based on the scientific
method and through which causality and material connections become the primary determining
factors for progress and understanding.
After World War I and World War II, the world lost its innocence and subsequently the
taste for the Romantic. Prior to the Industrial Age, the subject and object relationship, or the
nature of subjectivity, was one in which the subject was secure in the ideas of the self and yet
uncertain of its position in the world at large. Unlike the ancient Greeks, Enlightenment
philosophers placed in question the solid relationships that had grounded the subject and the
sublime. Enlightenment thinking presented people with a drastic change in perspective from
beings that were at the whims of the gods or God to beings that were responsible for and had
mental powers that could create gods. New ontologies and cultural manifestations arising from
the Industrial Age would also take the Subject into a much different relationship with the world.
This shifting of perspective changed many things including our relationship with the unknown
and with the sublime.
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Neither Marx nor Freud would mention ideas of the sublime in their writings or
teachings. In Freud’s later writings, he included in Civilization and Its Discontents what he
called the “feeling of the oceanic” (Freud and Gay 723,), a notion suspiciously similar to
concepts of the sublime. Freud seemed to deny the sublime by using the term ‘oceanic,’ but it is
difficult to read his discourse without considering the association. For example, he writes, “I can
imagine that the oceanic feeling became connected with religion later on. The ‘oneness with the
universe’ which constitutes its ideational content sounds like a first attempt at a religious
consolation, as though it were another way of disclaiming the danger which the ego recognizes
as threatening it from the external world” (Freud and Gay 727). Perhaps, Freud, in his
eliminating the use of the word ‘sublime,’ can illuminate some pathways on how the sublime
may be seen and be traced to the contemporary moment. Scientism and materialism had no use
for the type of metaphysics present in Romanticism. Things had to be proven through scientific
method and have real evidence in order to have value in this new culture.
Seeing the sciences as an appropriate path to communicate his ideas, Freud utilized
materialism to further his theories within the culture at large. Things like the sublime, as
previously defined and used, would not have fit into the scientific schema necessary for Freud’s
audience and may have interrupted his discourse disadvantageously. Science in general does not
use terms like ‘sublime’ because of the uncertainty and fluidity the word embodies. Science and
materialism need to freeze ideas and concepts in order to make progress through the scientific
method.12 The difficulty lies in the fact that once a system is created and takes hold (as systems
are prone to do) cultures tend to see the world through the lens of that certain system. Freud’s
orderly exposition of the human psyche is a clear example of this phenomenon. His theory fit
nicely into the Industrial Age and would continue to have an influence into the present. The

29
unconscious, even as Freud attempted to understand and explicate it, is disorderly and reckless in
its manifestations. Freud’s research helped to increase understanding of human psychology and
revealed that the human psyche has many more facets that could come under scrutiny. There
were many critics of materialism and industrialism’s singular perspectives; significant among
them was Friedrich Nietzsche.
In the late nineteenth century, Nietzsche would write The Birth of Tragedy and The Gay
Science as a warning against accepting the monocular point of view promoted by science and
materialism (Nietzsche; Nietzsche et al.). In The Birth of Tragedy and The Gay Science,
Nietzsche describes an ontology that includes both reason and the passions as integral parts of
the human experience and consciousness. Nietzsche, “to look at science through the prism of the
artist, but also to look at art through the prism of life.” (Nietzsche The Birth of Tragedy 5) He
warns against emphasis of one over the other, since the denial of the passions can cause much
suffering and pain and so, too, might the denial of reason. There are echoes of Kant here as we
can recall that the sublime is the nexus of emotion and reason. Kant emphasizes reason, but it is
the overwhelming experience and emotion of the sublime that facilitates the return to the
reasoning mind. Although Kant does not suggest this idea, without the overwhelming, emotional,
transcendent shock of the experience, there is no sublime. Just as with many of the original
philosophical ideas throughout history, no clear position on the sublime exists today; in the
sublime it is not a case of failure to define but an impossibility to define. Like the claim from
Nietzsche that both the rational and the passionate are necessary, (Nietzsche The Birth of
Tragedy 5) The sublime also suggests that both reason and emotion are necessary. If we were
able to access the inaccessible, such as the unconscious, and resolve complex psychoanalytic
conditions, which according to Freud make up our psyches, what would our resulting way of
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being be like? The potential answers to such a question are both comforting and frightening to
imagine.
The ontology of the twentieth century was colored by the promises of materialism and
industrialism. As a boy, living with the threat of nuclear annihilation and practicing hiding under
my wooden school desk during nuclear drills set the stage for my outlook concerning life. It is
not surprising that the social consciousness of the 1960s arose from this chaos as well. The
sublime idea of total annihilation affected me as a child and continues to affect me today. My
subjective self was colored by this idea and by a Catholic upbringing. Both the possibility of
complete horrific and total destruction of humanity and the proposition of an angry and vengeful
God immersed my subjectivity into the unknown and unknowable. The terror of nuclear
annihilation and religious damnation was enough to convince me that existence was torture; I
was born into the existentialist dilemma.
The ontological outlook I developed through this social and religious milieu was one in
which the sublime was the answer and not a question. As the twentieth century closed and we
entered the twenty-first century, the nature of the “subject” as revealed by the postmodern lens
became something much less stable and secure than previously conceived. Uncertainty
surrounding the authority of language and patriarchal structures laid bare by postmodernism
problematized the “subject” in relation to the world. These new understandings and realities
radically challenged the existing ontological and existential structures and forced phenomenal
and metaphysical questions to be reasserted with fresh perspectives. In this new world, the
“subject” becomes contingent, existing in a dynamic ontology that is itself uncertain in its
possible horizons. The sublime has followed us through time and through the differing
ontological settings constructed by the situations and conditions of any period; it is an ever-
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present and yet mystifying part of the human experience. This mystery deserves scrutiny as one
of the most lasting and tenacious of partners in the phenomenal, ontological, existential
conditions we find ourselves confronting. In essence, the ‘sublime’ is the name we have given to
the unknown, unknowable, or things outside of our current ability to capture through reason. The
ontology of any moment may color and constrict the sublime, but the sublime continues to
present alternate possibilities to what exists as the ontological perspective.
Questions about human existence continued to develop alongside various perspectives.
Phenomenology would establish philosophy as productive in the act of ontological becoming.
Martin Heidegger, primary among the philosophers who established this idea, would challenge
the existing cultural ideas and the way of being for the subject-self. Heidegger, “That entity
which in its Being has this very Being aa an issue, comports itself towards its Being as its
ownmost possibility.” (Heidegger Being and Time 68) The notions of being and of becoming
have changed over time and shifted the possibilities of our ontological horizons. The ‘subject as
becoming,’ as defined by Heidegger through what is called ‘existential phenomenology,’ was a
new and developing idea in the world. Heidegger puts it this way, “Understanding the existential
Being of Dasein’s own potential-for-Being; and it is so in such a way that this Being discloses
itself what its Being is capable of.” (Heidegger Being and Time 184) Heidegger’s ideas would
lead to the critique of other structures that had been built upon previous ontologies and
ideologies. Heidegger posited the contingency of becoming and set in motion suspicions of
existing ideas of the self and subjectivity; he, ultimately, pointed a new way to a possible future.
The sublime, through this period, was relegated to the background of the culture, while the world
looked for the possibilities in “becoming.” However, the experience, discourse, and
interpretations of the sublime never seemed more necessary.
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THE SUBJECT AS CONTINGENT
In Being and Time, Martin Heidegger suggests that the Subject is in a state of
“thrownness”13 and being in the world. (Heidegger Being and Time 321) Through this being, the
Subject is forever evolving toward existential and ontological horizons. Heidegger’s idea is in
direct contrast to Hegel’s dialectic materialism, which supposes that we exist within an inherent
dualism framed by history and a specific teleology. (Inwood A Hegel Dictionary 81-82) In other
words, Hegel suggests that our ontology is conditioned by our relationship to a history. Michael
Inwood in A Hegel Dictionary explains, “The implication of the doctrine for the study of politics
and history is that it should not criticize present or past states of affairs or recommend changes,
but solely to understand them and discern their rationality, that is both their intelligibility and
their ultimate justification.” (A Hegel Dictionary 35) The subjective uncertainty created by
Heidegger’s dynamic becoming would hinge upon becoming as central to being, or Dasein,14 and
would shift the ontological perspective’s questions about the sublime to more existential and
phenomenological concerns. The questions about the foundations of thinking and being in the
West were changing through the developing discourses of phenomenology and existentialism.
The awareness and understanding of the Subject was also changed by these critical discourses.
This challenge to our understanding of the Subject would, of course, also alter our relationship to
the sublime and the unknown.
Understandably, Heidegger wanted to disregard things that were not useful in our
becoming in the world, and the sublime, as defined at the time, was not useful to the
Heideggerian moment. Heidegger and existential phenomenology would change the centrality of
the subjective self and the subject’s relationship to the sublime by creating a suspicious attitude
and decentering the Subject’s fixed position in the system. By focusing our attention on “being”
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and “becoming,” Heidegger suggests a powerful process by which the Subject can be developed.
(Heidegger 68) It seems possible then that the sublime would have an enormous set of potentials
in this process, as the sublime presents nothing but possibility.
Structuralism15 established a link between language and function in the social roles of
culture and would prompt the responding theories of poststructuralism and deconstruction. Both
poststructuralism and deconstruction would look upon language with suspicion. Jacques Lacan’s
theories would also bring into question society’s relationship to language in ways that will affect
ideas of the sublime. Bruce Fink explains the use of language and Lacan’s theories like this, “the
unconscious is nothing but a ‘chain’ of signifying elements, such as words, phonemes, and
letters, which ‘unfolds’ in accordance with very precise rules over which the ego or self has no
control whatsoever.” (Fink The Lacanian Subject 9) These theories changed the relationship to
the sublime and the way we might explore and even question the sublime experience. What
remains is the possibility that the sublime could be fertile ground for becoming under certain
ontological possibilities.
Thinkers in the twentieth century continued to be critical of language and of many
societal and cultural apparatuses and ideologies. The sublime, however, remains the perpetual
question without answer, the unknown.
In The Postmodern Explained, Jean-François Lyotard associates the sublime with the
unpresentable: “But how do we show something that cannot be seen? Kant himself suggests the
direction to follow when he calls formlessness, the absence of form, a possible index to the
unpresentable” (Lyotard 11). The idea of an index of the unpresentable having efficacy is
interesting and would suggest that the sublime and the unpresentable are cohabitants.
Presentability, of course, depends on what and how the idea of the presentable works within the
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perspective position one takes. The idea of the unseen or unpresentable becomes, in the
contingent self/Subject of the twentieth century, an ongoing discourse of the sublime of the
Subject. The Subject becomes contingent, and contingency is also a characteristic of the sublime
experience.
Michel Foucault in The Archaeology of Knowledge would reveal the failings of
knowledge as constructed by the existing intellectual system in the West and, in turn, bring
notions of the understanding of the sublime under the same type of scrutiny. (Foucault 113)
Similarly, Jacques Derrida, the founder of the discourse on deconstruction, would highlight the
fundamental questions existing at the base of our way of being, our ontological outlook—
questions that also exist at the heart of the relationship we have with the sublime. Likewise, JeanLuc Nancy would also not address the sublime in a direct fashion but would write a great deal
about ‘the negative’ and about ‘difference.’ Both these concepts, used by Nancy, resituate the
relationship of the Subject into a different kind of intersection with what we know about the
sublime. Deconstruction, postmodernism, feminism, post-humanism are all inquiries that place
us very close to the conditions we find in our relationship to the sublime. One might suggest that
the sublime itself is the motivating function of all of these theories and provides the ground from
which such thinking can arise. I would suggest that the sublime has been a perennial concept
because of its ability in assisting the framing of the ontological horizon of any given time.
Meaning that the unknown, as presented by the sublime, offers a dynamic system of possibilities
that can open paths toward multiple ways of being.

TOWARD THE CONTMEPORARY SUBLIME
If we can suppose a sublime in the contemporary moment, what would it be? The current
conditions of the world have placed much of what we thought was solid into flux. The art
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historian James Elkins takes a position on the sublime unlike any other. In Against the Sublime,
Elkins frames the challenge in the following way: “In the end, the sublime is damaged goods. It
has been asked to do too much work for too many reasons, and it has become weak” (Elkins 88).
He suggests that if the sublime were indeed still as powerful as one might suspect, then the
resulting effects in the discourse would be obvious. However, as he points out, the sublime has
continued to lose its impetus, efficacy, and power and is, therefore, merely an old worn-out
concept that has lived long past its necessity and now needs to be set aside.
But, we can ask, if what Elkins proposes about the sublime is true, why even bother to
write about it? What could be gained from something so pointless? What can we take away from
the challenge Elkins presents? The sublime has been part of the philosophical discourse
historically; it arises at times when we find it necessity to seek answers for questions motivated
by the sublime or the unknown. Uncertainty requires a discourse with the sublime to navigate
through challenges arising in times of chaos. The fact that the sublime is again under scrutiny
should come as no surprise as we face a time of great change and uncertainty. I would argue that
the sublime still holds a powerful conceptual efficacy in the changing and dynamic nature of
discourse. Elkins’s essay and interest in the sublime are perhaps an indication that the concept of
the sublime is just reemerging and the culture is once again asking questions about the sublime
and the unknown by necessity.
Elkins, perhaps in indicating the problems with language, observes, “‘He threw the
porcelain plate onto the slate floor’ reads better than ‘He was very irritated.’ The same strategy—
preferring the particular, focusing on the event rather than the emotion—can convey many
nuances of the sublime” (Elkins 88). This observation clearly comes from an understanding of
Burke’s separation of the beautiful and sublime and from the way Burke described the sublime
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as having reference to pleasure and pain. By inverting Burke’s argument, Elkins shines some
light on the problematic nature of the sublime and how its use has been affected by a purely
emotional interpretation. If we examine the problem of the sublime from a rational perspective,
the sublime becomes something much different and potentially more useful. Yet, Elkins suggests
that the discourse surrounding the sublime has in some way been disempowered and sapped of
any usefulness. (Elkins 75)
Although Elkins does not directly offer any suggestions on how to repair the sublime, he
does offer an introduction to a discourse that may lead to a better understanding of the sublime
and how it may function in the contemporary world. Elkins may be attempting to open up the
discourse of the sublime in a way that would include more contemporary thinking. If one
interprets Elkins’s text as an interrogation of the language used around the sublime, then it seems
confusing that we continue to attempt to express things like the sublime through this language.
Elkins argues that there is no way to prove the sublime’s existence without any historical
qualification. However, if one is stuck in one of the historical definitions of the sublime, it seems
unlikely that the interpretations of the sublime that were useful in that historic period would be
useful to us living in the present. (Elkins 78)
Elkins next argues that the experience of the sublime is impossible to understand, yet at
the same time we attach the concept to seemingly more and more experiences and even create
these experiences more readily in the contemporary moment. (Elkins 75) For example, in the
preface to Beyond the Finite, Roald Hoffman and Ian Boyd Whyte write, “The chosen vehicle—
the sublime—is broad enough in its many definitions to stimulate new thinking both in the arts
and in the sciences. The sublime has meant many things over its long history as it has been
applied to the emotional impact of that which is beyond beautiful” (vii). This text, which the
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editors admit is intended to look at the sublime as it relates to science, is yet another expression
of the sublime doing the kind of work necessary to discover the questions to move a discourse
forward. If the sublime is something that is useful, we must seek out that usefulness and
understand the possibility of the sublime. Perhaps, the sublime can stimulate new ideas and
concepts that will move the cultural and intellectual discourse and the sciences to formulate new
questions upon which to frame the world.
The question remains: In what ways does the sublime continue to function in
contemporary culture and philosophy? Conceptually, the sublime is a unique and thoughtprovoking tool that can position the discourse of the Subject in unique ways. This unique
positioning, facilitated by the sublime, is a necessary and powerful epistemological tool that
allows for continued discourse without restriction. Historically, the sublime has been associated
with a psychological state—call it emotion, call it terror, call it a mental state. The sublime, as
Kant stated so long ago, depends upon the mind.(The Critique of Judgement 92) If Kant is
correct that the sublime is dependent on our minds then our psychology will also have bearing on
how the sublime appears to us. Utilizing a psychoanalytic perspective will give us a chance to
unpack the sublime in a way that can perhaps lead to new insights on why the sublime is so
tenacious in its refusal to depart.
Some would argue that the notion of the sublime is merely an unknown or that it
represents something that cannot be known or understood. But for something to be unknown,
there must be something known, and it is the necessity of both that drives the process and the
understanding or misunderstanding of the sublime. What can the epistemological efficacy of the
sublime be? What is it to attempt to know something when the concept itself is considered
always unknowable? What can the process of ideation of the concept of the sublime reveal to us?
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The vibrant activity of the known/unknown, often manifesting in the experience of the sublime,
is necessary for a Subject to take any position in the world.
The sublime is, in essence, the transcendental not-knowing, that conceptual object that
we have burdened with the intellectual weight of carrying the perpetually mysterious. But why is
something like this necessary? What efficacy can a concept such as the perpetual unknown
provide? The unknown is not an unfamiliar concept even in the sciences. Variables, as they are
called in science, are very useful in areas where an unknown needs to be considered in
relationship to some knowns. An area of intertest concerning the sublime is the historical
connection to the mystical and religious aspects of the human experience. It is not likely that, in
describing religious and mystical experience, a symbol or a mathematical expression would
serve the flourishing linguistic traditions inspired by the sublime. What is it about these
particular experiences that make necessary such poetic and expressive displays? Could it be that
the human story requires that the language and the concepts surrounding it be given greater
significance than the language has the ability to provide? Is it also possible that the stories about
the human experience we attempt to convey through language need to display greater importance
than the story a scientist tells of genetic mutation under some experimental exposure to radiation
or a chemical compound? We certainly are not as willing to accept a scientific description
framed in poetic flourishing as we are to accept such descriptions of the sublime.
In his discourse on the unseen, William James describes the way in which we lean upon
abstract, conceptual notions in order not to slip into the void of the unavailable, the realm of an
inability to clearly consider and express what is around us. In his essay “The Reality of the
Unseen,” James states, “Such ideas, and others equally abstract, form the background for all our
facts, the fountain-head of all possibilities we can conceive of” (James and Kuklick 57). Lacan
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expresses a similar notion via his complex triadic association of the “real, imaginary, and
symbolic” (Wake and Malpas 246). Through Lacan’s framework we can challenge the current
perspectives of the sublime. For Lacan, the sublime is an important element in the discourse of
the function and understanding of the psychological event. Though he does not directly
interrogate the concept, in his triadic notion the unknown is a crucial element in understanding
how consciousness works. Like Kant’s notion of the “thing in itself,” (Stang) Lacan’s “real”
remains beyond our reach. These notions suggest that part of our very being is a sense of being
lost in some way, and we often operate with the feelings of being lost. The sublime reminds us
that we are, indeed, in a certain way, lost. The question is what is it to be lost, to have the
feelings of being lost. And how does being lost operate within our consciousness and within our
abilities to understand? How does the phenomenology of being lost play upon our psychology?
We use words like ‘lost’ to indicate a feeling, a certain sense about a situational totality in
which we find ourselves. We have the sense of something present in the darkness, hidden from
our view, making us aware of a challenge to our being. Maurice Merleau-Ponty describes the
experience of the invisible the following way:
[T]he “great unpenetrated and discouraging night of our soul” is not empty, is not
“nothingness”; but these entities, these domains, these worlds that line it, people
it, and whose presence it feels like the presence of someone in the dark, have been
acquired only through its commerce with the visible, to which they remain
attached. (Merleau-Ponty and Lefort liii)
Lacan’s theory of identity formation is helpful in further unpacking this sensation of
groundlessness. The feeling of a shift during what he calls the mirror stage, in which a Subject
comes into contact with itself as separate, can be an original sublime moment. (Evans 114-116)
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The Subject is at first introduced to itself as other, thrust into subjectivity, and forever influenced
by subjectivity.16 An interesting question in relation to Lacan and the mirror stage might be: Are
we living as sublime prior to understanding ourselves as a self? Being or feeling lost sends the
mind and body into primal activities in which the heartrate quickens and the mind sharpens and
focuses; this feeling may only be the remnant of the primordial brain, an instinctual reaction left
over from our animal past, but it is something we experience nonetheless. The sublime is similar
to an experience of being lost. This effort to be lost is a form of seeking the sublime; A look into
the mirror of existence, so to speak, in order to test and reset ourselves in ways that I will explore
in more depth in the following chapters.
The sublime has a long history, a history that has been associated with many different
ideas, concepts, philosophic positions, and creative and religious movements. Yet, the basis for
the sublime remains a mystery. In the transition to industrialization and materialism, the sublime
was characterized as purely romantic and part of a mystical metaphysics in contrast to the
practical and productive tenets of capitalism. In this initial explication of the genealogy of the
sublime, it seems fair to posit that an intertextual, interdisciplinary interrogation of the sublime in
the context of the contemporary moment may yield a clearer perspective of its potential. The
notion of the sublime as being something beyond is, for better or worse, part of our “being in the
world,” our presence, and it is not understandable from a singularly unique perspective. Thus, we
must take a meta-perspective and meta-philosophical look at the sublime.
The following chapters will work to establish a ground upon which this interrogation can
take place and provide an inquiry that opens the way to an understanding of the sublime as a
fundamental part of our perspective on forming an ontological landscape. The sublime, as the
unknown, can moderate and condition the understanding of our ontological possibilities,
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epistemological outlook, and existential/phenomenal reflections. This moderating function
provides the ontological operation lost by the split between reason and faith, and this function,
though beleaguered by history, still has importance in present and future ontological platforms. If
the history of the sublime could be isolated, it would indeed be only an idea. However, the
impossibility of this isolation is obvious; even though attempts have been made at regular
intervals, the sublime remains. That is because the sublime is not merely a concept or idea. It is
something we reference from the deepest parts of our minds and emotions and use to measure the
facts of our existence. The sublime is a necessary reference point upon which our being rests,
even if it is only a distant reference. Without the sublime, or without the knowledge or
experience of the sublime our being would not be able to construct itself via existential
conditions.
Therefore, in the coming chapters, a discourse of the sublime is constructed from the
perspective within which it arises: the developing state of being itself. However, these renderings
and interpretations have been delivered through the lens of the times in which they functioned
and in a way that the times desired or found useful. The sublime is a universal, functional
concept that can serve to explicate and resonate with a multitude of intellectual, emotional, and
spiritual attitudes and expressions. To state it simply, the sublime stands in for our ontological
awareness in a world where our existence is a mystery to us. The sublime, as we find it, gives us
a moment’s contact with an original ontological horizon. The sublime provides a clear space
outside of all of the structures built by humans in the world. The sublime stands in for this
original moment that we will meet again at the moment of death.
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CHAPTER TWO
Genealogy of the Sublime II
The sublime has become the placeholder for the unknown, for mystery, and the yet to be
discovered. In the previous chapter, we looked at some earlier thinkers and the ways in which
they interpreted the experience of the sublime in their particular historic periods. Longinus and
Burke explored the effects that language and the emotions had in contributing to a sublime
experience. Later, Kant would also look at strong emotions as having deep connections to the
sublime. Kant would associate the sublime with the emotion of terror, one of the strongest
emotions humans can experience. For the Romantics, the sublime was the epitome of utility. The
concept of the sublime provided the framework by which the Romantics could argue, according
to their idealism, for a transcendent way of being. Concepts such as ‘love,’ ‘despair,’ and ‘the
spiritual nature of humans’ became central to the Romantic perspective. The twentieth century
moved away from the sublime and Romantic idealism to a more pragmatic approach. Freud and
others wanted to understand human existence as a science. Things like the sublime lay outside
any possible proof that science could muster and therefore became less valued. Changing social
and philosophical perspectives would also shift our attitudes and feelings toward concepts such
as the sublime. Turning now to these ideas, we can explore how the sublime has been treated in
more recent times.
Considering Heidegger’s discourse on being, we may obtain a fresh perspective on the
sublime. A perspective that will reflect a more contemporary and open ended understanding of
the concept and experience of the sublime. Heidegger, in his existential focus, used the term
“angst” to describe a state of being in the world associated with a feeling of nothingness.
(Inwood 16-17) Heidegger also compares “fear” to angst by making fear into something that is
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intraworldly: meaning it has involvement with the world. Whereas angst creates and entirely
different experience and mood. Michael Inwood puts it this way, “Angst strips the world of its
involvement-totality, its significance, making the world as such all the more obtrusive.” (Inwood
17) This is how Inwood relates Heidegger’s “angst” with the nothing. Inwood further articulates
“angst” like this, “In Angst we find everything ‘uncanny’ (unheimlich, lit. ‘unhomely” and feel
‘not at home [Un-zuhause]’ in the world.” (Inwood 17) This is how I believe the sublime
operates for us after Heidegger. It takes us outside the world for a time; into a void. In other
words, “angst” pushes us to a limit of what we understand as our world, beyond which exist only
the unknown. After Heidegger, the world and our place in it becomes something new, something
different, something rich with possibilities. This chapter will examine some of the new ideas and
approaches to the world. It will also alter our understanding and relationship with the sublime.

HEIDEGGER
Best known for his text Being and Time, Heidegger, like Kant, defines our relationship to
the world, our being in the world, through the elements of time and space. (Inwood A Heidegger
Dictionary 222) Also, like Kant, Heidegger sees our way of being as a temporal chain with a
beginning, a middle, and, eventually, an end. For Heidegger our end comes at our death. He
suggests an ontology of living toward death as a way of getting us to have an authentic existence
of being in the world. He describes this way of being as having “care,” which means simply that
we are beings that care about our being. (Being and Time 322) In other words, we are selfreflexive and aware of our circumstances. The ontology Heidegger promotes is that being is
always in a state of dynamic becoming. (Being and Time 68) We choose the things that in
essence create our being and the world around us; the idea of living toward death can give us the
kind of perspective necessary to formulate authenticity in our being and becoming. The best
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possible way of becoming, for Heidegger, is to be “authentic.” (Being and Time 354) By this he
means living as close as possible to who we really are and what we truly want to be, rather than
adopting the pretenses of “Das Man.” (Being and Time 154) Heidegger uses the term ‘Das Man’
to describe the mindless masses, the manipulated and predetermined beings who, according to
him, are not living an authentic life.
Heidegger’s discourse, including his proposed ontology of becoming, sets up a kind of
relationship to the world and a relationship to the epistemological, ethical, and metaphysical that
enhances the possibilities for establishing novel connections. This ontology of becoming and
moving in unknown directions operates in the dynamic flux of existence. Heidegger provides
only a cursory set of markers on our path to becoming. Ideas of authenticity are uncertain in the
world of “Dasein,”17 and to be, as Heidegger suggests, places uncertainty directly in our path. All
we can do is trust our own capacities, follow the guidance he provides, and move forward, with
authenticity as a goal for the future. The openness proposed by Heidegger’s philosophy can be
considered sublime: an openness toward the world, an entrance to immanence, an invitation to
become, without a clear horizon or predetermined ultimate arrival point.
If any telos can be identified in Heidegger, it would be the realization that we are finite
beings, who, at a point in the future, will cease to exist in this life as we know it. The premise
that we have the potential for becoming through the realization of our mortality is an intriguing
one that contains a certain set of assumptions. This idea also correlates with some Buddhist
teachings. For example, a challenge given to a new disciple of Buddhism by his guru is to
meditate on the disciple's moment of death. To have a perspective on the end of one’s life can
help in living and making meaningful decisions about our lives.
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Evolution is not a certain or clear process. Unlike Hegel who proposed an ultimate end or
telos (Inwood A Hegel Dictionary 174-5), Heidegger does not suppose a particular and definite
end. He concludes that the process of becoming is an endless one (Being and Time 435).
Evolution, as a part of any dynamic whole, has levels of uncertainty and is contingent in many
aspects, including points of departure and possible proposed directions. All these, of course, are
tempered by the stark realization that the destination is neither clear nor certain. To adopt
Heidegger’s ontological propositions is to embrace the unknown and trust in the process of
becoming itself as the only motivating factor necessary.
Heidegger’s ontology, extending what Hegel began, continually addresses what Hegel
called the Negative (Maybee Oct. 14, 2019). The Negative is the idea that, in order to exist as a
conscious being in the world, we must posit our being and our not being in a simultaneous and
dynamic order. We can think of this process of becoming as, Heidegger describes, reaching a
limit and moving beyond it to yet another limit. In this continual and dynamic process, the role
of human existence is in an ongoing process moving toward something, moving beyond what is.
The sublime represents this kind of limit or, if you prefer, it presents an experience that reveals
our limits.
During the time that Heidegger lived, a growing doubt about metaphysics18 was
developing and a preference for materialism and the scientific outlook was being established. To
save metaphysics, philosophy had to create a method by which metaphysics could continue
outside scientific structures. Heidegger’s philosophy of becoming removed the emphasis from
naturalism, materialism, and belief in science as the only way to understanding and instead
placed the process of becoming at the epicenter of the experience of being human. Criticism of
Heidegger came from philosophers like Carnap and the Positivists who desired to promote a
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philosophy without metaphysics (Honderich 742-3). These philosophers desired to have
philosophy be considered a science and was motivated by the scientific revolution and the idea
that a fundamental understanding of everything could be produced through scientific method.
Heidegger and others saw the positivist approach as a refusal to acknowledge the complexities of
human existence and the dynamic, changing nature of the world and of us as participants in it. To
concretize the human experience in the way science proposes would suggest that humans and the
human experience are simply another category of things that science continues to study and that
humans are perhaps only a type of biological machine. However, the fact is that we also have an
emotional side, in addition to our reason, and to dismiss those parts of our experience that are not
considered as rational would be to interfere, potentially, with any possible progress for an
authentic becoming.
Other ways of knowing have just as much impetus as science does in preparing us to
participate as beings in a world of becoming. Concretizing meanings is attractive to beings
seeking stability and answers, but, at the same time, it is troubling in that it denies the dynamic
nature of being as Heidegger saw it. We can say that becoming, for Heidegger, is a search for
knowledge: to identify any kind of truth or to establish any kind of knowledge that is currently
unknown and can lead to a better understanding of the human experience. Kant pointed out that
our ability to reason will continue to focus on and ask questions of a metaphysical nature
forever.19 That is what our reason’s purpose is and we must accept, even if we can never know or
suspect we can never know, these things. Heidegger presents us with another possibility:
perhaps, there are no absolute underlying foundations other than becoming itself.
How might the ideas of the sublime fit into the ontology that Heidegger formulates?
Quite simply, the sublime and this ontology are, and operate through, the same functions.
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Heidegger’s ontology opens the discourse for an understanding of the contingent nature of the
world, of being, and of what any possible future can hold. The sublime is an experience that has
a similar nature, one we have sustained through language, religion, and even science. The idea
that there is uncertainty in the world is an ongoing issue for both philosophy and science. The
basis of scientific inquiry is to discover the reasons behind our own existence and that of the
universe we inhabit. One cannot deny that the reality we see is held together by slender threads
of agreement between participants. Behind the facade of reality is chaos, the unknowable.
The limits that the sublime experience reveals to us are our own limits. These limits
pertain to the very things we feel incapable of at any given time, place, or circumstance. To
know our limits is to better understand our position in the great metaphysical chain. To know our
position to vision a new horizon and to find opportunities for the future. Heidegger writes, “The
concept of being is undefinable” (Heidegger and Krell 43,). In Heidegger’s philosophy, “being”
is the most sublime concept: uncertain and unable to be defined through being itself. The
uncertain and yet dynamic nature of existence as Heidegger outlines it is a very sublime notion.
Both Heidegger’s ideas and what we know of the sublime present the same type of opportunities.
These opportunities motivate a series of inquiries that have the potential to remake us in a new
way. At the very least, this set of inquiries allows us to see that we could consider other
possibilities. Neither the edifying nature of Heidegger’s discourse nor the edifying nature of the
sublime provides a path to an ultimate foundation, but rather they establish a foundation for the
process of forever becoming.
In any new research project or practical process, there is always what is called ‘the
leading edge.’ This “edge” is filled with uncertainty and chaos. Whenever we set out to find
something or do something that no one has done before, we are enmeshed in mystery. Success
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can only be a matter of speculation. No exact end or certainty exists, only the speculative
contingency of ideas of the individual or individuals involved. We often think of these projects in
terms of a belief system. A belief system may not have any real rights or legal grounds to stand
on but simply puts forth a belief in something. Heidegger’s ontology of being also requires a
belief in the idea that being and becoming are existentially central to the human experience. To
understand what Heidegger wants from us, we need to abandon the old ideas of risk and reward
created through the patriarchal and religious structures of the past. Heidegger, like other
existentialists, wants us to demand and to lay claim to the responsibility for our own being and to
accept that part of what is demanded is the possible conclusion that the end is no end at all.
Heidegger proposes that the idea of an ongoing process of becoming can and must be the nexus
for the human experience. Rather than there being any ultimate metaphysical end, we must
realize that being and becoming are the end in itself; there is nothing else; it continues forever.
The sublime experience acts as an integral partner to Heidegger’s concept of “being.” If
we accept the fact that many of our experiences are outside religious or significant scientific
disclosures, are we then limited to experiences of the sublime through nature? Why not through
music, food, sex, or dishwashing? Or could it be that the ontological outlook adopted at any
given time creates a limited perspective of the experiences we define as sublime?
Heidegger approved of cultural understanding of becoming through art. As he saw it, art
had a revealing nature, which expressed the qualities and characteristics of any given period or,
in Heidegger's terminology, ‘Geist.’20 For Heidegger, seeing the world in this way was an
important part of the motivation for “becoming” and the possibility of a greater community for
and of beings.
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While the philosophical questions Heidegger posed do not necessarily seem new to us,
for his time, they offered an important alternative to the dominant cultural and intellectual ideas.
Between industrialization and two world wars, the cultural landscape, with its newly mediated
ideas of what being human in an industrialized society had come to mean, had shifted the
ontological outlook in significant ways. Heidegger presented this important perspective by
placing an emphasis on the human experience and on how that experience can and perhaps
should evolve. Heidegger’s philosophy of becoming can be an edifying practice; the positive
ways in which his ideas can be used make these ideas a sustainable and powerful force. His
philosophy is useful in the production of the self—in becoming—but also in creating a critical,
ongoing assessment of the culture in which the becoming is intended. Heidegger’s philosophy
made the claim that our philosophical outlook should be useful and that we can envision
existence to be about creating life in the way that seems best. This is a very pragmatic and
encouraging outlook.
Pragmatism,21 which was and still is a popular philosophic perspective, found its footing
in the United States with philosophers like William James. As William James states,
“Pragmatism, on the other hand, asks the usual question. ‘Grant the idea or belief to the true,’ it
says, ‘what concrete difference will its being true make in any one’s actual life?’” (James and
Kuklick 573, ). James summarizes, “What, in short, is truth’s cash-value in experiential terms?”
(James and Kuklick 573, ). The idea that philosophy should be useful took hold with the
pragmatists, but Heidegger’s temporal ontology seems to also be a model of usefulness. The idea
of being and becoming that operates in the temporal flux Heidegger argues for is a dynamic,
practical process of what can be useful in existence. For if being is not becoming, then we are not
evolving toward something, and then the question follows: What is living?
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The ontology Heidegger presented us still seems valid today, as we struggle to find
reasons for our place in the world. In the contemporary world, we create, find, and identify more
sublime experiences. Perhaps, we are seeking this engagement with the sublime precisely
because it brings our consciousness to the idea of being and becoming. Entertainment in the form
of video, television, phones, computers, and video games—visual creation of all types—offers a
possibility to activate consciousness and place us in a sublime experience. It could be said we are
looking to create sublime experiences through seeking something beyond our normal capacities.
Heidegger suggests each of us should be seeking an authentic way of being in this world as a
creature that is always becoming. This is, of course, an interpretation of what Heidegger is
saying. The power of interpretation has been an issue for philosophy and many other structures
in the world, such as theology and politics. The ideas arising from interpretations can create a
critical examination of any set of questions, ideologies, or systems. Hans-Georg Gadamer is the
preeminent scholar for the discourse on hermeneutics or the practices of interpretation.

GADAMER
At the start of the twentieth century, Hans-Georg Gadamer examined the way in which
we understand and assign truth to the things in the world. Gadamer opened the discussion around
the idea of hermeneutics to be used as a strategy for the understanding of things outside its
traditional role in theology.(Honderich 327) Hans-Georg Gadamer re-envisioned hermeneutics as
a way to find a deeper meaning in philosophy through the kind of analysis applied to theology.
I mention Gadamer here to emphasize the changes occurring in philosophy, particularly
the philosophy of language. The use of language and its role in the development of meaning are
central to questions surrounding the sublime. Hermeneutics is a method of interpretation,
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originally used in reference to biblical texts, that has come to be applied to philosophy, the social
sciences, and other areas of the humanities.
A particular interpretation or a method for interpretation can have a serious effect on the
epistemological, ethical, and metaphysical underpinnings of many aspects of human endeavor.
The sublime is described and formulated by the language and history of the culture of any
particular period. The question of interpretation weighs heavily on the sublime, primarily
because of the ambiguous nature of the experience. Gadamer’s work adds to the many different
perspectives we have discussed. The sublime has been and continues to be interpreted through
the diverse ideologies and theories present in the contemporary West. This makes Gadamer’s
work a significant partner in our understanding of the sublime and the language we use to
attempt to capture its meanings.
Gadamer’s work highlights the issues of using interpretive strategies in understanding
things in the world. Gadamer writes, “The hermeneutical problem only emerges clearly when
there is no powerful tradition present to absorb one’s own attitude into itself and when one is
aware of confronting an alien tradition to which he has never belonged or one he no longer
unquestioningly accepts” (Philosophical Hermeneutics 46). The hermeneutic problem has the
same kind of experiential outcome as our encounter with the sublime. The uncertainty of
meaning in the flow of language can be associated with an experience of the sublime. In
Gadamer’s discourse, the problems with language and interpretation, as well as the structures
used in those interpretations, also raise suspicions surrounding the past interpretations of things.
Gadamer’s philosophy and the early twentieth century changed the way of being for many and
changes would continue as philosophy and the critical examination of the structures of the

52
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were interrogated by new questions concerning our
intellectual, social, and political conditions.

SARTRE
Jean-Paul Sartre, one of the most important philosophers of the existentialist movement of
the early 1900s, following Heidegger, thought that human beings in the world need to accept
complete responsibility for their lives and not make excuses.(Sartre and Barnes 89) The
existentialist movement, begun by Kierkegaard and resulting in its more modern manifestation
with Sartre, had everything to do with taking responsibility for our existence in the most
complete possible way. Existentialism represents a tearing away of the structures of the past,
structures which provided a metaphysical stability and comfort in a world of chaos.
One reason for the lack of support for existentialism, particularly for Sartre’s version, is
that it clearly revealed common existence for what it was and hence became the cause of an
overwhelming sense of existentialist angst. Sartre's major text, Being and Nothingness, presented
an ontology similar to Heidegger’s. Like Heidegger and Hegel before him, Sartre stated that in
order to understand our being we must posit a not being, or nothingness. Unlike Hegel, who
suggested we posit our being in the being of others, Sartre suggested that nothingness would
provide a better reflection for being and becoming. Nothingness is an absence, a void, and a
thing not existing. This concept is similar to Heidegger’s “living towards death” (BT 277): a
supremely absent (or loss of) existence is the same as a supremely dead human. If we can
conceptually begin to understand the intellectual location from which Sartre builds a foundation
for an ontology, then we can also see the connection that Heidegger was arguing for concerning
our conceptual relationship to our finite human existence. Both of these concepts provide us with

53
a platform for considering our way of being in the world in which we posit ourselves as not
being in the world.
Do the ideas that arise from the mystery of death, outside the theological, have any
special characteristics other than that of absolute nothingness? Language creates a framework
within which we can attempt to build our understanding of things in the world. And, as we often
find, a language framework that is established at any given moment is insufficient to fully
describe the thing it is attempting to describe. Nothingness is a terrifying concept in relationship
to our existence. To entertain the idea that when we die there is absolute nothingness continues
to be a source of great anxiety in humans.
Facing the possibilities Sartre suggested was and still is too much for people to bear.
Imagining a world like the one Sartre says exists is truly terrifying for many—so much so that
we could say Sartre’s ideas create for the reader a sublime experience. The notion of nothingness
is a sublime concept, a philosophical prompt of such magnitude that the imaginer nears a
breaking point. We do not call this breaking point the sublime, of course, because the sublime
has been interpreted in modern culture to mean something positive in the religious or spiritual
encounter in which the experiencer is shown something interpreted as mystical. But the positive
interpretation of the experience is false in that one can have a very similar experience in the
negative sense, both in attitude and in activity. Kant used the overwhelming power of nature to
express the sublime and used the phrase “negative pleasure”22 in reference to the experience of
the sublime. Why cannot or should not we call the overwhelming negative experience of
imagining the idea of nothingness sublime? And what conditions, what arguments, might deny
us the right to call this the sublime?
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Existentialism made the sublime experience an ontological necessity that manifested
itself in the angst produced by the revelation of the truth of our situation. As a result, the
language surrounding the sublime and its activity in the world shifted, was misdirected, and
changed as a premise in the philosophical conversation. Sartre’s existential angst or anguish,
which he associated with freedom, was vilified for revealing to modern culture an alternative to
the existing style of life (Sartre and Barnes 799). Sartre’s view was interpreted as a negative and
a hopeless view of the possibilities of existence. However, the ontological outlooks provided by
both existentialism and the sublime set up similar outcomes. One important question is why is it
so very difficult to accept other ways of being like the one suggested by existentialism. The facts
of existence have a certain brutality, just as the encounter with the sublime is brutal to many of
the intellectual and rational ideas we have about the world around us. Challenges to the
ontological ideologies upon which much of humanity depends are not muted merely by attempts
to ignore them.
The existentialist movement also changed how we thought of and used the sublime
through the introduction of ideas like Hegel’s negative. The ideas set loose by the existentialists
prompted further, extended use of the concept of the sublime without reference to its use
historically. The shifting understanding and use of the concept of the sublime as we entered the
twentieth century aligned nicely with the problems of language and with the changing dynamic
nature of meaning itself. The sublime, like many of the inherited concepts of the Western
tradition, would suffer the same scrutiny as language and would need reevaluation within the
changing paradigms.
Although the existentialists did not mention the sublime directly, the basic ontological
relationship with mystery results in the same kind of psychology for the experiencer. For Sartre
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and the existentialists, philosophy in general presented ideas that would shatter the romantic
ideas that had been established in Western traditions. Existentialism as a philosophical idea had
sought ways of becoming relevant outside of romanticism. But the sublime is not something that
humans can leave behind. It is a part of the experience of being human and fills in the gaps left
by science, culture, and formal intellectual processes. Call it what you will, the experience we
have of the sublime—and the resulting relationship we develop with mystery—has existed from
our beginnings. The language and cultural backdrop used in expressing it change, but the basic
operations within the human experience remain. Existentialism, we could generalize, moved us
away from the romantic to the pragmatic, seeking to establish a sense of the truth in our
ontological understanding. Existentialism did not, however, move beyond mystery and the
sublime but only beyond romantic and other earlier understandings of mystery and the sublime.

LYOTARD
The changing horizons of culture and philosophy that manifested in the twentieth century
ushered in a period of suspicion and criticality about ideas of the past. The thinkers of the new
age would create fractures in the existing structures. One of these thinkers challenging the
existing structures was Jean-François Lyotard. In his essay “The Sublime and the Avant-Garde,”
he concludes, “The avant-gardist task remains that of undoing the presumption of the mind with
respect to time. The sublime feeling is the name of this privation” (The Lyotard Reader 211).
Lyotard brings the sublime into the present by associating it not with its historical references but
with its functions in the world and with contemporary art. He associates the sublime with
indeterminacy: “No longer ‘How does one make a work of art?, but ‘What is it to experience an
affect proper to art?’ And indeterminacy returns, even within the analysis of this last question”
(The Lyotard Reader 203). Having been disassociated from past connections to the culture,
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contemporary art needs to find its own purpose and become the creator of its own meanings. The
functions of art are in question and, much of the time, do not provide any adequate answers
based on the criteria of the past. According to Lyotard, “The artist ceases to be guided by a
culture which made of him the sender and master of a message of glory: he becomes, insofar as
he is a genius, the involuntary addressee of an inspiration come to him from an ‘I know not
what’” (Lyotard and Benjamin 202). The artist is the keeper of the sublime in the contemporary
world and must protect mystery and indeterminacy from falling under the rules of science. For
Lyotard, the sublime and art have joined forces in the contemporary moment because science
and the traditional places we historically looked for the sublime have lost much of their meaning
and power.
Art now takes its place as the location for the experience and the results of the sublime in
contemporary culture. Lyotard observes,
“The sublime,” writes Boileau, “is not strictly speaking something which is
proven or demonstrated, but a marvel, which seizes one, strikes one, and makes
one feel.” The very imperfections, the distortions of taste, even ugliness, have
their share in the shock-effect. Art does not imitate nature, it creates a world apart,
eine Zwischenwelt, as Paul Klee will say; eine Nebenwelt, one might say, in which
the monstrous and the formless have their rights because they can be sublime”
(The Lyotard Reader 202).
In this passage, Lyotard supports the idea that the sublime can manifest itself in ways that are not
common to our general understanding or acceptance of the sublime. We try always to think of
the sublime in an honorary or exalted way. These other ways, he suggests, act as mediating
factors in our understanding and practice of the sublime—and by practice of the sublime, he
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means to seek out of the sublime experiences through art or other processes. The change in
perspective laid out in Lyotard’s essay suggests that we can now use the sublime in ways that
become purposeful. This is a very different vision of the sublime that has associations with ideas
of becoming, pragmatism, and the growing distrust of the structures of the culture. In Lyotard’s
ideas of the sublime, an experience is constructed out of a larger dynamic whole. The dynamic
whole and our experiences can be directed by our interpretations; often in ways that will be
either useful or useless for our lives. We get to choose how we interpret our experiences and we
get to choose the interpretive strategies we use in the process. When we encounter things that are
mysterious, we often fall back on existing strategies of interpretation because we have not yet
formulated new ones or we are intellectually and emotionally unable to do so. Instead, we use
understandings that comfort us in these instances.
There are many things in the world that can be considered mysterious. Ideas and
ideologies are often grounded in mystery. One important question to consider is how we cope
with these mysterious experiences. In Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime, Lyotard remarks,
“The rational Idea is the concept of an unpresentable object; the aesthetic Idea is the presentation
of an ‘object’ that escapes the concept of this object, the presentation of what Kant calls das
Unnennbare, the ‘indefinable’ (180, 172). It is the indefinable not of the object itself (the form)
but of the state that the object provides for thinking” (65). For Lyotard, the sublime is not merely
the kind of experience that overwhelms but is a provocation to thinking within a certain set of
circumstances. Lyotard’s thinking about the sublime and his phenomenological description put
the sublime in a position to be a useful partner in existence.
Mystery is a critical part of the human experience. In the 1960s change had become the
order of the day. The peace movement, feminism, the social rights movement were all very
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active. Driven by the critical assessments of thinkers like Lyotard, the student uprisings in France
and in the United States in the 1960s challenged the cultural frameworks through social and
political actions. The philosophy of Lyotard and others revealed the need for inspection, critical
analysis, and revision of many of the cultural and intellectual norms of the day. The sublime
represents not only our limitations but also our possibilities by suggesting that they can and
should be sought out and surpassed. The sublime can, depending on our relationship and
interpretation of the experience, stimulate our intellects and give us a feeling of pleasure. For
Lyotard and others, “The pleasure in the sublime is said to be a pleasure ‘of rationalizing
contemplation’ (als Lust der vernünftelnden Kontemplation), the pleasure that we have in
contemplating while reasoning” (LAS 225). Thus, the pleasure we feel in the sublime is a kind of
Kantian pleasure of the mind, the activity of the supersensible. To have a limit suggests that a
point exists at which we can arrive and a further one which we can and possibly should traverse.
The idea of quiet contemplation that Lyotard identifies in the contemporary version of the
sublime through art is a good example. Contemplative practices in the West are not easily
adopted or appreciated. Contemplation and contemplative practices are a large part an Eastern
tradition. The West primarily has these practices lodged securely within religious dogma.
Thinking and contemplating are partners in the intellectual. In other words, one must be
contemplating something that suggests a shift in the thinking and/or the consciousness of the one
thinking.
Art, particularly contemporary art, is a direct manifestation of the cultural, social,
philosophical, and intellectual reflections of the contemporary moment. To engage in the sublime
activities of contemporary art is to come face-to-face with the realities of the world and our
limitations within the world. The sublime, in this way, can be seen as a primary source for this
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challenge: find the limits and move beyond them—the very thing existentialism and
phenomenology prescribes as ontology for living as human beings. Lyotard’s examination of the
sublime shifted ideas of the purely metaphysical and brought the sublime into direct contact with
the existential. We can now understand the sublime as part of an ongoing process. The sublime
still contains elements of mystery and mysteries are fundamental to any research. At the close of
Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime, Lyotard states, “The powers of thought in sublime
feeling in no way relate to one another according to a good proportion; they ‘disproportion’
themselves violently. The object that occasions the sublime is assuredly a ‘sign,’ the sign of a
supersensible sphere, but it disarms the presentation and goes so far as to discredit the
phenomenality of the phenomenon” (237). This is a rather Kantian description of the sublime
that leaves us with no new order but with only a new location for the initiation of the sublime.
The inexpressible limits of the sublime are central to its description and to our experience
of it. Because the sublime is an experience that includes both our emotions and our intellect, it
becomes a central point of interest to those searching for meaning in the human experience. In
his essay “The Postmodern Sublime,” David B. Johnson paraphrases Lyotard: “The sublime
rests, he says, on a principle of ‘thinking’s getting carried away . . . as if fascinated by its own
excessiveness’” (LAS 55). The sublime, in other words, is the aesthetic manifestation of
thought’s inexorable attraction to transcendental illusions. Johnson continues, “[I]n sublime
experience, thought tantalizes itself, as it were, with the possibility of discovering the absolute in
phenomenal intuition by transgressing its own boundaries, boundaries that it, itself, establishes
through critical reflection” (Costelloe 120). Johnson points out that the position of the experience
of the sublime is something that is both active and functional within a framework created by the
experiencer. The sublime directs us to look at the possibilities of being human. It is the
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unbounded realm of the possible and serves to remind us of the potential of living a life as a
human being.
For Lyotard, fundamental to the sublime is the presentation of the unpresentable. The
idea of the unpresentable is an interesting concept intellectually. We could ask where the access
point for our thinking about it resides: Is it in the notion that there is nothing to see? Or is it in
the notion that there is something that cannot be seen, ever? Or further, is it the fact that the
concept of the unpresentable, as a concept, suggests that this un-presentability is active in our
thinking somehow and that it has intellectual power of some kind? We have many conceptual
ideas that exist only in the mind and yet have efficacy in the world and color our approach to it.
The sublime experience and the concept of the sublime both have potential for our thinking and
acting in the world: the sublime is the promise of potential.
This is why Lyotard and the concept of un-presentability (The Post- Modern Explained
11) is central to our current understanding of the sublime. Having become critical of the
mysterious in theology and the developing preference for scientific thinking and materialism the
sublime had fallen out of the cultural consciousness. Lyotard’s unpresentable brings the
possibilities of the sublime back into the world view established by postmodernism. The
unpresentable, for Lyotard, became most prevalent in the experience art: the cinema which is
explored in chapter six of the this dissertation is also considered art and a prime location of the
unpresentable and the sublime.

JACQUES DERRIDA
Jacques Derrida, probably the most famous and influential of the postmodern thinkers
and an important voice in the philosophy of language, was also a powerful proponent of the
sublime as a concept. Derrida is best known for introducing the world to deconstruction, a
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principle of critical analysis that focuses on the interpretation and lack of fixed meaning in
language, particularly in philosophy itself.23 If language is unstable in the way Derrida suggests,
then we are adrift in the world, grasping at straws, hoping for understanding and communication.
The idea of the slippage of language reveals the sublimely illusory nature of the structures we
trust. Once we are exposed to Derrida’s ideas, it is difficult to return to the simple naivety and
unawareness of our previous positions. We are haunted by the possibility that Derrida is correct
and that there is a real possibility of the inauthenticity of our actions by participating in the
existing structures of the world. (Honderich 193)
The intellectual and cultural conditions created by Derrida and his theory of
deconstruction developed an open-ended discourse that has continued to this day. The kind of
freedom and loss of grounding these ideas caused is, like the Kantian sublime, an experience
terrifying and compelling all at the same time. (Kant The Critique of Judgement 75) Even though
Derrida also does not name the sublime in his discourse, his work created a space that can be
fully understood as a sublime experience. Derrida’s discourse generated a destabilizing effect in
philosophy and culture. Postmodernism, an outgrowth of deconstruction, reflected the cultural
experiences based in diversity and instability that would cause much of the canon of Western
thinking to become suspect as well. The questioning and mystery of the ideas that
postmodernism revealed thrust much of the culture into an intellectual chaos; people were
uncertain about what is, what should be, and what could be. For Derrida, language and the
structures we build with language always have contingent meanings. (Derrida 164) Derrida’s
work has been described as demonstrative. That is to say the style he adopts intends to
demonstrate to the reader the ideas in his work. Derrida’s chaotic writing style is difficult
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because we are conditioned to engage the process of reading in one of the privileged ways that
Derrida is challenging.
The ideas that postmodern thinkers presented asked us to have a questioning attitude;
structuralism, poststructuralism, and postmodernism all would make us question things that
before seemed stable and fixed. The postmodern moment was one in which diversity, openness,
acceptance, and an overarching suspicion of all things modernist came to the front of the social
and intellectual worldview. This would change the cultural landscape in all areas: art, music,
media, writing. The deep changes that were brought about through the ideas of postmodernism
have set a chain of actions going forward that still affect the world today. The critical nature of
the ideas presented by Derrida was contagious. Analysis and critical examination of systems and
structures became part of the cultural and ontological discussion. The chaos created by the
critical examinations of language and social structures became a sublime intellectual experience,
creating an uncertain, moving, and less defined reality. A reality which demanded we make
critical analyses of the conditions upon which we can form decisions for the future.

GILLES DELUZE AND FELIX GUATTARI
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, both twentieth-century philosophers and collaborators,
presented a complex, unique, and challenging examination of the process of understanding the
world and how language and communication operate. Deleuze and Guattari created an uncharted
and undefined set of ‘territories,’24 to use their term, for our understanding. In the text A
Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari use geological terminology as a metaphor to explicate
their theories: “In a book, as in all things, there are lines of articulation or segmentarity, strata
and territories; but also lines of flight, movement of deterritorialization and destratification”
(Deleuze and Guattari 3, ). Describing the use of a book in this way leaves much of the
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traditional understanding of books behind. The idea of reading a book from beginning to end
sequentially is a grounded structural paradigm. The linearity of traditional reading limits our
ability to understand and interpret what may exist in any work. What would be the potential
benefit of reading a book backwards for instance? Reading the last pages first and the first pages
last. We are not certain what the results may be because the existing paradigms deny this as a
possibility.
Deleuze and Guattari put forth the idea that there are many potentials in reading or in
understanding and analyzing cultural paradigms. Where an idea may turn up or act in support of
another idea is not fully determinable; it is dynamic in its actions within the strata of life.
Deleuze and Guattari call this movement and dynamic arising of ideas ‘a Rhizome,’25 or
‘Rhizomatic action.’ Plants that use rhizomes to propagate do so by shooting underground,
away-from-sight roots that can move in any direction. These rhizomes then can be the start of
new plants popping up in areas where no plants existed before. Thinking of ideas and
communication through language in this same way removes certainty and places uncertainty in
in its place.
Deleuze and Guattari embodied their ideas through language. Using more of a
metaphoric and poetic approach, we are escorted through a performative experience of
uncertainty and possibility, rather than being delivered to an existing and concrete set of
understandings. The terms immanence and a thousand plateaus, used by Deleuze and Guattari,
for example, establish a possibility for thinking of new ontological horizons outside the traditions
of Western philosophy and culture. By examining this moment in philosophy and these two great
philosophers’ sublime way of being and existing as humans creates a sense of hope that we can
free ourselves from the constraints of language and ideologies. The ideas of Deleuze and
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Guattari are overwhelming to our intellect, emotions, and possibly the everyday state we find
ourselves occupying. The relationship to the sublime in the contemporary moment is challenging
to define. Perhaps, the shifting of ideas in the diverse and chaotic situation of the contemporary
moment reveals what the sublime can be rather than relying upon outdated and conventional
interpretations.

CONCLUSION
In closing, the experience of the sublime is as varied and complex as our attempts to
understand the concept itself. Human existence is something that we continue to explore and
learn about through science, art, psychology, and philosophy. If answers are to arrive through the
lens of the postmodern, it will be through meta-analysis, rather than through any one individual’s
single expression. Our relationship with the sublime and the unknown continues to seduce us to
move forward. This is the same search for the truth of our existence we started in ancient times.
The sublime has somehow stayed with us. It is often used in philosophy for placing into context
challenging ideas as they arise from the complexity that is human existence. The sublime has
evolved and changed as people and the world have changed. The sublime has been there with its
unique and immanent conditions when needed. The sublime is not an object; it is a feeling, a
sense of something, but it is also a state of mind, a mood to which we attach an emotional
attitude. The sublime is not something existing outside of us but is something we create in order
to move ourselves in a particular direction. The sublime is a kind of intellectual and emotional
portal through which our consciousness can pass and be transformed. It is from this position that
the coming discourse of the sublime will launch, with a few returns and a directed focus on the
future of the sublime.
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CHAPTER THREE
Limitations of Language
Philosophers have scrutinized language in one form or another since the beginning of the
twentieth century. In the contemporary moment, suspicion and mistrust of language and its
limitations are a constant reminder of the paradoxes of structuralism, poststructuralism, and
deconstruction. The philosophic questions about language that resulted from these movements
linger on and leave unsteady ground beneath us. Our dependence on language is clear, as is our
realization of its limits. Possible corruptive uses of language have become something we live
with, but the suggestions from Lyotard, Derrida, and others linger in our consciousness like a fog
impeding our intellectual advance. In this chapter, I will examine the use, history, and problems
of language associated with the metaphysical, focusing primarily on the concept of the sublime.

PROBLEMS OF LANGUAGE
In presenting us with his term ‘différance,’26 Derrida made philosophy, and the world at
large, pay close attention to language and its use—most significantly, the way we use language
in the construction and interpretation of meaning. With this kind of unstable philosophic ground,
how can we be expected to have any established understanding of the metaphysical notions of
things like the sublime? This portion of the dissertation will focus on these problems, outlining
them and positing possible conclusions, new directions, and solutions to these ongoing
paradoxes. In adding to the evolving discourse on language, the intention here is not to provide
one solution but to contextualize the variations presented and to uncover the problems associated
with adopting one or another position in relationship to the mysterious and sublime.
With Derrida’s challenge to the speech/writing duality and his demonstration of language
as always deferred, meaning seems to have to wait until the correct moment to arise for a specific
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concept or concept construction to take place. But this would suggest a rather arbitrary position
for language. The uncertainty uncovered by the poststructuralist and postmodernist creates a
sublime affect in the understanding and possible placement of any ontology within the existing
world. How then can we assume to be a creature craving stability in Derrida’s completely
deferred and destabilized universe? If language and writing are both under suspicion regarding
meaning, how then can we assume that our communication has any validity or can reach the
eventual conclusions we seek?
The sublime, as we have come to understand it, carries a significant historical
background. The history of the sublime is especially interesting when examined in light of
poststructuralism and deconstruction. Through these lenses, metaphysical ideas such as the
sublime seem less important because of language and more important if we are dealing with pure
experience. If language, as philosophers have posited, reveals serious problems in the
relationships we have to human experience, then the occurrences we have difficulty articulating
in language should be judged by other criteria. In cases such as this, we often fall back on our
emotions or intuitions, rather than on words, to describe what we are experiencing. Emotions
have been associated with the sublime in one way or another since the concept was first
articulated. We often attempt to express our feelings through language, but we are usually left
describing these things with metaphors. The questions posed by poststructuralists and
deconstructionists offer some authority to ideas like the sublime, demonstrated by the fact that
we have a desire for certainty, but language cannot fully fulfill this desire.
How did we come to this association with language? In order to better see the field in
which the critical assessment and development of these ideas arose, we need to review some key
moments in the development of these concepts.

67
Our use and our understanding of language are changed through the work of these
thinkers. Also, our world and possibilities have changed as a result. This demonstrates the way
structures and social programming influence our actions. Through these structures, we adopt
meanings and associations. The challenges set forth by these discourses have also changed our
ontological possibilities and our relationships to what we can and cannot know.
Deconstruction’s fracturing of language has reverberated through the philosophy and
intellectual culture of the West. We can no longer operate without suspecting that our own
meaning is unstable or unverifiable in some way. The anxiety that this idea creates forces us to
face the existentialist problem head on. What can we depend upon if there are no stable
meanings anymore? This instability of language leads to a vision of ourselves as unstable; as
Lacan reminds us, our subject is constructed through the Symbolic (Evans 201-2), of which
language is a large part. By transforming language into an unknown, Lacan and Derrida make
existence a mysterious proposition. Even when we accept and operate through language, after
deconstruction and Lacan, this instability continues to haunt our thoughts.

FRACTURES IN LANGUAGE
The uncertainty established by the suspicions of language and meanings increased the
need to ask questions about all aspects of human existence: our relationships to the things in the
world, other human beings, civilization, and political and economic systems. The foundations we
had long depended upon for answers became, as a result of the suspicions of language’s
inadequacy, destabilized. In deconstruction and the postmodern, we found ourselves adrift from
the familiar, confronted by that with which we had no experience. Lacan demonstrates this
instability through his description of the Real (Evans 159-60), a part of our experience we could
not know and through which we might come to understand our anxiety. This anxiety derives
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from the realization that we are not necessarily inside reality, but we have been and continue to
be residing in a construct identified by Lacan as the Symbolic. The idea that we cannot know
reality is a destabilizing force in and of itself, and when you add to that mistrust of language and
constructions of meaning, it seems as though chaos has enveloped us. Thinking through Lacan,
we might say that chaos is the truth or the Real and the Symbolic is merely a construct. Lacan
seems to be saying that we cannot function in relationship to reality because we must live
through the Symbolic. If we cannot function within the Real, then why is the Real important or
pertinent at all?
Many similar questions have been asked about the validity of metaphysics, thereby
suggesting that what cannot be validated through our experiences is not something that should
concern us or philosophy. If there is something unknown to me, and I have no method for
validation of said thing, then said thing has no reason to invade my consciousness or trouble my
thoughts. This, however, has not been the case. Metaphysics has survived and has had somewhat
of a resurgence of late. For instance, quantum mechanics has brought into question the nature of
our experiences of reality. Experiments in quantum physics suggest that the existence of the
solid, real world around us is not as we suspected but has characteristics that would seem to be
more at home in a science-fiction novel. If science suggests these things, then how are we to
place them into our understanding?
We cannot see quanta, for that world is not commonly visible to humans through our
basic senses. But science has created a way to see these things in an attempt to understand and
speculate on this unseen world. As science deals with the practical aspects of these kinds of
discoveries, it is left to philosophy, to metaphysics primarily, to deal with how this kind of
knowledge integrates with the human experience and how it may possibly alter our ontological
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outlook and our decision-making in our everyday existence. The language we use in our
descriptions and in our attempts to deliver any conceptual reevaluations of our experiences is the
only tool we have developed. But as we have discussed, language is insufficient for describing
and constructing a stable knowledge of things.
Can we utilize the experience of the sublime in the contemporary moment? If we accept
that by using language to attempt to describe the sublime, we enter into a system that depends on
predetermined ideas and fixed meanings, what really can we hope to find? We know that the
language we use is insufficient to define or fully describe the experience of the sublime. Thus,
the danger is that the sublime becomes a word whose meaning is conflated with words like great
or excellent. If that is indeed the case, then the sublime is dead, and we need not proceed with
anything but its autopsy. However, I think this deserves further exploration before we can
dismiss the sublime as a useless concept.
As discussed in chapter 1, questions about the sublime have been raised since Longinus
first wrote his treatise. Debate continues about what the sublime is and where its origins lie. One
thing is clear: the sublime is an experience that humans have. It is described in any number of
ways and from a variety of perspectives, which makes any attempt to find the truth of the
sublime difficult. Language surrounding the sublime is flawed in ways that make the
construction of meaning a questionable practice. We do, however, continue to use language to
communicate with each other, primarily because our options are limited. With this in mind,
taking a longer look at the sublime, both from inside of language and from outside of language
seems to hold promise. The latter is the more problematic of the two, but the one that may hold
more potential for our understanding and application of the sublime in human experience.
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The sublime, as understood and defined through language, is well-trodden territory. I will
not attempt to refute but will only question some of the examples presented through philosophy,
culture, and history in order to examine how connections to the sublime have been used and
perhaps leveraged for specific purposes. A proposal of the following for the sake of argument:
Because the sublime is difficult to articulate within our language, it has taken on a myriad of
descriptions and definitions, so much so that these descriptions, relationships, and definitions
have not only changed over time but continue to accumulate meanings as part of our ongoing
understanding of the sublime. However, no matter the language and the meanings we assign to
the sublime, it remains ineffable.
Longinus associated the sublime with speech or rhetoric. Longinus states, “[I]t can be
recognized by its effect: it produces ecstasy; it astounds and does not (merely) persuade; it
controls or irresistibly compels the audience” (Costelloe 12). In his time, speech was a primary
pathway for information concerning the important issues of Greek society and politics. The great
orators of the time were known for their ability to use their speech to sway the masses and to
provide moving rhetorical moments that produced in their listeners sublime transformation.
The great value placed upon a rhetorician’s ability to affect the listener was deeply rooted
in Greek culture, much of which was built upon myth and legend. Their mythic stories and
legends were not written but were delivered via the spoken word. For any Greek, the power to
wield speech was seen as part of the forcefulness of the stories themselves, which the Greeks
regarded as their history, not merely as stories and myths. The telling of the great stories of
ancient Greece required the teller of these stories to be recognized as having been endowed with
the spirit of the gods. This is how Longinus identified the source of the sublime through rhetoric
and speech. However, his discourse reveals the nuances involved in speech and rhetoric.
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Malcolm Heath notes, “In Longinus’s initial formulation, this first source is designated ‘powerful
effect with regard to ideas’ (8.1). The concluding summary speaks of ‘sublimities in respect of
the ideas’ (15.12)” (Costelloe 17). The connection of speech to ideas is where the notions of the
sublime arose for Longinus. Heath continues, “Longinus quotes his own epigram: ‘Sublimity is
an echo of a great mind’” (Costelloe 17). Language without ideas has no meaning. From
Longinus we see that the Greeks had a proclivity toward certain kinds of ideas—ideas that
supported and encouraged Greek culture, history, religion, and social structures. Longinus’s
understanding of the sublime was partially defined by his experience and by the cultural and
intellectual forces in play during his time. For Longinus and the early Greeks, the sublime was an
experience emerging from language that produced the effect of moving the experiencer beyond
language.
In his treatise A Philosophical Inquiry into the Sublime and the Beautiful, Edmund Burke,
like Immanuel Kant, emphasized the sensual parts of the sublime by suggesting that the feelings
one experiences in the sublime are primary to understanding its power (Burke and Phillips 36).
Moving from Longinus, who centered the sublime as emerging from language, to Burke, who
moved the importance of the sublime out of language, has been a common treatment of the
sublime. It is difficult to contain an idea like the sublime inside of any one definition or
prescribed, stable, conceptual framework. That much can be said, and yet the sublime continues
to arrive again and again in consciousness. We could say that the sublime is an emergent
property in human experience. Like language itself, the sublime is a kind of grasping toward a
future of some sort. The sublime, like language, seems to contain the same contingency of
meaning. One must grapple with the experience in order to derive and interpret any kind of
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significance. The sublime’s contingency is greater than that of language, for language is limited
to the words in its lexicon. The sublime’s lexicon is an open-ended one.
The Age of Enlightenment changed in fundamental ways the language and ideas we used
to understand ourselves in the world. Kant characterized the sublime as emerging from an
external experience that we confront. However, for Kant, our experience of the sublime is the
realization that our reasoning mind has incredible power to overcome and transcend even the
most horrific and terrifying events that nature can provide (Kant The Critique of Judgement 92).
The sublime is not an object in itself but is a type of experience emerging from an encounter with
an object in the world. Language can—and does—contain, limit, direct, and focus our
relationship to things. A simple way to think of these limitations is to ask yourself: What is my
relationship to dreams? Are dreams things you dismiss outright as mere constructions of the
unconscious mind conflating experiences from memories? Or do your dreams hold interest
because they are messages from your unconscious mind that help direct your life?
Both of these positions have implications for the waking life we call our normal way of
being. We can consider the person who dismisses dreams out of hand to be a radical empiricist,
believing only in what his thinking mind can verify. The other person, a Kantian perhaps, taking
in the experience, may say a sublime dream experience is something to be directed back to the
mind for processing. Who is correct, and why? One or both of these possibilities could be
considered inside and/or outside of language. Our interpretation of dreams is based on words,
images, and meanings derived from language, memories, and our current circumstances. In other
words, our interpretation is based on an aggregate of the things that are involved in our existence.
Our strong connection to language is central because it is not merely communication but our
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connection to the world. Without language we are alone; it is a primary source of interpretation
for our existence.
An example of how our imaginations function in our relationship to the world can be
understood through Akira Kurosawa’s film Dreams (Kurosawa). In the film, Kurosawa presents
a series of dream-like vignettes steeped in metaphors and myths about our relationship to nature.
Kurosawa shoots the film so that we, the viewers, enter into his dreams. The relationship we
have to the idea that we are watching a dream, a film, Kurosawa’s dream, and our own dreams
leads to a compelling set of possibilities. The language we use to interpret meaning also frames
the thoughts we have about these vignettes. For example, Americans have a very different view
of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki than the Japanese; the same event results in
completely different cultural, social, and intellectual outcomes. The visual language Kurosawa
uses bridges the differing cultural interpretations of the events in the film (Kurosawa).
When Japanese myths confront the American mind and language, they create something
entirely unknown and new. One is compelled, while watching Dreams, to cross cultures in an
attempt to interpret these ideas. Engaging in this activity, the typical Western viewer, who has no
knowledge of the mythology of Japan and no real way into the myth and language of the
Japanese culture, must use intuition to interpret the film.
Similar to the example of the mythology of the Japanese culture, our relationship to the
sublime is not settled. Both Hume and Kant present information and ideas through language that
can be considered useful, perhaps even accurate, for a given circumstance. In the sublime, we are
caught up between our experience of the sublime and our desire to capture the experience and
articulate it through language. It seems like a natural human characteristic to capture and share
our experiences in this way. However, when it comes to the sublime, we must accept that the
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best we can do is hope that the others we communicate with have had similar experiences
because our words only point to the sublime but do not describe the experience.
The sublime, like other ineffable things, has developed through the ongoing encounter
with the unknown in the experience of existing. But the sublime—unlike other ineffable
concepts, such as ‘God’—has a proposed advantage in that it is articulated in language in a way
that does not relate to any particular ideological system. We have seen that the sublime has been
associated with many ideological structures, but because of its nebulous character it continues to
remain unencumbered by any one in particular. The essence of the sublime, if we can identify
one at all, would have to be the unknown. The sublime, in its many translations and
interpretations, contains as an experience a mystical uncertainty.
The language we use in attempting to describe the sublime almost always includes
elements of metaphor or pure radical belief, including the use of words such as ‘transcendent,’
‘epiphanic,’ ‘mystical,’ and ‘unreal.’ In addition, we use phrases like ‘in the flow’ to describe the
unbelievable qualities of athletes and dancers. Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi explains,
This feeling didn’t come when they [people who were engaged in activities they
enjoyed] were relaxing, when they were taking drugs or alcohol, or when they
were consuming the expensive privileges of wealth. Rather, it often involved
painful, risky, difficult activities that stretched the person’s capacity and involved
an element of novelty and discovery. This optimal experience is what I have
called flow. (110)
We make up words and construct propositions in our attempt to contain the experience of
the sublime, but each time our words all point to something beyond our understanding. It is clear
that the experience of the sublime denies us any specifics of language to translate to others the
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exact experience. The sublime is much more like a metaphor out of which arises feelings,
impressions, and thoughts that are not necessarily dependent on the thing experienced but the life
and history of the person having the experience.
Jean-François Lyotard wrote extensively about the sublime. He assigned it the term
‘unpresentable’ and attached it to art, primarily to the avant-garde forms of art that continue to
emerge to this day. Lyotard’s idea of the unpresentable suggests a value structure in things that
are not directly sensory. This is a departure from Longinus and Burke, for whom experiences of
things in the world were a necessary part of the experience of the sublime. Distinctly Kantian,
the idea of the unpresentable in Lyotard makes the imagination an important element in the
experience of the sublime. For Kant, it was reason that took that primary role. According to
Lyotard, “It’s still the sublime in the sense that Burke and Kant described and yet it isn’t their
sublime anymore” (Lyotard and Benjamin 199). His curious but telling comment suggests that
the sublime continues because the culture and situation in which we experience it changes and so
do we. To quote Lyotard again:
‘The sublime’, writes Boileau, ‘is . . . a marvel, which seizes one, strikes one, and
makes one feel.’ The very imperfections, the distortions of taste, even ugliness,
have their share in the shock-effect. Art does not imitate nature, it creates a world
apart, eine Zwischenwelt [an intermediate world], as Paul Klee will say, eine
Nebenwelt [a secondary world], one might say, in which the monstrous and the
formless have their rights because they can be sublime. (Lyotard and Benjamin
202)
As in the example from Lyotard, the sublime was now being applied to other parts of the cultural
milieu. One wonders why this change is taking place. We could consider that the sublime is a
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necessary part of the human experience; it holds a critical position in the human consciousness
required for our ability to create meanings and extend knowledge through the continued chaos of
becoming. The sublime seems to fit in the process: perhaps, it is the process of becoming.
In addition to the challenge Lyotard’s “unpresentable” makes for the systems of
language, Lyotard examines the practice of narratives in the world. Narratives are according to
Lyotard self-serving elements of any culture. He state, “ Narratives as we have seen, determine
criteria of competence and/or illustrate how they are to be applied. They thus define what has the
right to be said and done in the culture in question, and since they are themselves a part of that
culture, they are legitimated by the simple fact that they do what they do.” (The Post-Modern
Condition 23) Lyotard’s interpretation of cultural narratives strips the power from these cultural
forms of information and knowledge and gives further impetus to the unseen and un-seeable. In
the introduction to The Post-Modern Condition Lyotard claims, “ The narrative function is losing
its functors, its great hero, its great danger, its great voyages, its great goal.” (xxiv) Lyotard’s
suspicious nature regarding the narratives of the contemporary culture added to the questions
postmodernism had already established. Because of his critical examination of language and the
narratives of contemporary culture and the failings he found in them Lyotard’s discourse gave
the sublime and art an exalted place in our understanding of the world. This idea is explored
further in chapter six of this dissertation.
Wittgenstein took the process further, dismantling language from the perspective of the
problem of meanings. The idea of language as unstable is not something we are generally willing
to accept. For one, we must have a way of communicating basic ideas and necessary functions,
such as issuing warnings, signaling distress, finding food, or directing our tribe to safety. But
what about contemporary communication? Wittgenstein noticed that language is based upon
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unprovable assumptions (Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein, et al. 35e). In the area of philosophy in
particular, he noticed that much of what philosophy has to offer can be proven invalid through
his analysis of language:
With these considerations we find ourselves facing the problem: In what way is
logic something sublime? For logic seemed to have a peculiar depth—a universal
significance. Logic lay, it seemed, at the foundation of all sciences. —For logical
investigation explores the essence of all things. It seeks to see to the foundation of
things, and shouldn’t concern itself whether things actually happen in this way or
that way. —It arises neither from an interest in the facts of nature, nor from a need
to grasp causal connections, but from an urge to understand foundations, or
essences, of everything empirical. Not, however, as if to this end we had to hunt
out new facts; it is, rather, essential to our investigation that we do not seek to
learn anything new by it. We want to understand something that is already in plain
view. For this is what we seem in some sense not to understand. (Wittgenstein,
Wittgenstein, et al. 46-7,)
Wittgenstein uses the word sublime to describe our assumptions about the language we use to
organize the world. From his descriptions, we can draw an intellectual connection between
Lyotard’s “unpresentable” and the way in which Wittgenstein determines we should seek
understanding and meaning. The idea that language conceals the truth of things from us is not
new. Proving this idea through logic, however, is a new approach and challenge to language.
What is the problem of language for Wittgenstein? As other philosophers have noted, the
language we use relies upon concrete meanings for things it intends to represent. We use words
like ‘God’ and the ‘sublime’ to talk about things that are not present in reality. For Wittgenstein,
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this application of language is not useful, nor does it really communicate anything in the way
that language intends. That is not to say that for Wittgenstein mystery is not an important part of
the human experience.
Wittgenstein states that mystery is important; our mistake comes when we think that our
language can give it meaning. At the end of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, he writes, “My
propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually
recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb beyond them. (He
must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these
propositions, and then he will see the world aright” (Wittgenstein, Pears and McGuinness 74).
Wittgenstein doubts that language can fully communicate everything. His closing proposition in
the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus reads, “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in
silence” (Wittgenstein, Pears and McGuinness 74). Wittgenstein would agree that one of the
things we cannot speak about is the sublime. The logic of propositions does not allow for any
sensible accounting of things like the sublime. We end up using metaphors and poetry to attempt
to explain it, and both metaphor and poetry require going beyond the language to find meaning.
Put simply, Wittgenstein formulated that propositions must have logical meaning in order to
have meaning at all: if a proposition is found to have inconsistencies or includes words that do
not have a logical connection to a definition, then the proposition is illogical and therefore has no
meaning.

LANGUAGE SOLUTIONS
We can also think of the whole process of using words in (2) as one of those
games by means of which children learn their native language. I will call these
games “language-games” . . . .
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—Wittgenstein
Issues concerning language are, like much of contemporary philosophy, directed at the
critical analysis of the structures from which we construct meaning. For example, much language
used in the everyday communication of things like gender, social media, and politics often
follow a programmed pattern of acceptable use. For example, in polite conversation, there are
acceptable and unacceptable terms and protocols. Certain professions use jargon, understood
only by those whose attentions are related to that particular structure. The language they use
often has no meaning at all outside of the structures supporting that particular area of common
interest. Another example is someone traveling to a foreign country: he or she immediately
becomes aware of the inefficient process of translating and communicating with people using
different words and meanings to construct communication. These examples are not so unusual
when thinking of the myriad of ways in which we communicate and construct meaning in our
day-to-day lives. We often use a kind of local or working jargon in operating in a particular set
of circumstances. Only those skilled in the jargon and the circumstances can efficiently navigate
the system.
A good example of a local system of communication is when one is ordering a Philly
Cheesesteak sandwich in the home of the sandwich, Philadelphia. There is a certain protocol and
a series of questions one must answer that requires certain language be learned and understood in
order to get the kind of sandwich one expects. For example, this description of ordering a Philly
cheesesteak from Geno’s Steaks, the famous Philadelphia sandwich shop, reveals how language
can be used when most of what one might assume needed to be communicated is actually left
unsaid:
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When ordering a cheesesteak, the idea is to let the cashier know a.) that you
would like a cheesesteak, b.) what type of cheese you want, and c.) whether or not
you want fried onions. And you have to be as concise as possible while doing so.

Locals have become so adept at this practice that they basically have it down to
three words: saying “one whiz with” to the person behind the counter means that
you would like one cheesesteak [denoted by the “one”] with Cheez Whiz as your
choice of cheese [denoted by the “whiz”] and with fried onions [denoted by the
“with”].

Similarly, saying “one provolone without” would secure you a single cheesesteak
[one] made with provolone cheese [provolone] and without fried onions
[without]. (http://www.visitphilly.com, 2015))

This common instance of how language is used in everyday practice provides a glimpse into how
meaning, coming out of language, is arranged by the group using that language. In this case,
language and meaning are not necessarily codependent.
Meaning and language are tools that are used to communicate. In specific situations, words
and meanings that are agreed upon by the participants do so to facilitate communicating,
understanding, and prescribing of meanings within the scope of the situation. Meaning becomes
an extension of language, a language game, or a frame, if you will; but to us it is meaning that is
the ultimate aim of that language. In the cheesesteak example, language gets in the way of
communication, so the locals have shortened the language needed in order to construct a way to
have the necessary meaning reduced to as few words as possible. This example is a good one; it
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shows how, in even the most pragmatic cases, language and meaning are by arrangement. There
exists no absolute meaning in language. Meaning is something constructed by the users of that
language to do something more than speak; it is used to create a path to communication. Does
meaning create a path to communication or is communication in fact a meaning-making
practice?

LANGUAGE OF THE SUBLIME
The sublime is often in confrontation with the language of multiple systems of
communication, whose meanings are intended to leverage the sublime for use in only those
particular systems. The fact that the sublime cannot be articulated in language may ultimately be
more important. The struggling to articulate the sublime through language reveals how language
ultimately fails in the face of a great transcendent experience. The idea that the sublime
represents transcendent, exalted, or terrifying experiences has never been successfully articulated
in language and has always been considered something greater than any language. This failing
emphasizes the limits of language and also the need for the sublime. For example, when asked to
deliver a eulogy for a loved one or dear friend, we find words alone insufficient to describe our
relationship to the person and his or her relationship to the world and to others. Ultimately, we
tell stories and speak in metaphor and poetic language in the attempt to communicate what the
life of the deceased has been and meant. Often, we walk away from a funeral thinking that the
eulogy failed to reveal the whole story of the person’s life.
Issues with language, we see, are not new or recent. Contemporary philosophical
discourses surrounding these issues are not suggesting we abandon language as a means of
everyday communication. Rather, the ideas presented are intended to reveal how the language
we use can condition our thinking about the things in the world, and that, through this kind of
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conditioning, our becoming is also prescribed. Words take on a life beyond their mere utterances.
They become social, emotional, intellectual frameworks of meaning that we adopt and use in our
day-to-day lives. We become habituated to these meanings, and through this habituation these
meanings become truths—truths through which our very existence is mediated and determined.
The sublime is an interesting standout that has remained with us throughout our history.
Indeed, the sublime has been used for multiple purposes to construct different meanings
throughout the history of Western thought. Through pushing the idea of the weakness of
language and meaning further and accepting the contingencies we find in language use, we can
ask important questions about the sublime. Well-worn notions about it aside, the sublime still
exists as a unique experience that we find important to try and describe and to share through
language. But is that all it is? Is the sublime only another experience we cannot fully describe or
understand and, if so, then what can language ever possibly do in explaining, describing, or
communicating it?

DELEUZE AND GUATTARI
Contemporary philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari wrote in their seminal text
A Thousand Plateaus, “In a book, as in all things, there are lines of articulation or segmentarity,
strata and territories; but also lines of flight, movements of deterritorialization and
destratification” (3). Deleuze and Guattari explain the uses of language through the ideas of
geologic land formations and the way in which we understand the places we live. Territories and
plateaus describe a kind of relationship to places in ways that have an openness and
changeability to them, rather than stable and fixed borders. This way of understanding language
and the use of language is consistent with the work of other philosophical minds of the time,
such as Jacques Derrida. The poetic language used by Derrida, Deleuze, and Guattari to
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articulate the relationships we have with language and meaning challenges the core beliefs we
may have about all the things and meanings we understand with that language.
As our uncertainty about language’s function in communication and meaning grow, ideas
such as the ones presented by Deleuze and Guattari offer us an alternate perspective on how the
words we use function. Like Derrida’s idea of deferred meaning, the idea of a thousand plateaus
also indicates a continued building toward. The language and the idea of a building toward
something is one which, like the ontological outlook of the existential phenomenologists,
suggests an ongoingness: a dynamic becoming. The notion of a dynamic becoming as an
ontology requires a suitable language. As we have seen, language and meaning want to be
stabilized in order to ensure a consistency in communication and understanding. What, then, can
be gained by thinking of language as an unstable process within the human experience? The
control of language and meaning, much like any kind of controlling function, needs to be able to
consistently assign meaning to things in a system. But often the assigned meanings do not
represent reality or point the way to the kind of openness in thinking that we hope for in our
inquiries.
By using geological terms to describe the functions and meanings in language, Deleuze
and Guattari present a different vision of communication. This kind of understanding that comes
from reconceptualizing our relationships to communication, ideas, and meanings allows for
fluidity and adaption rather than the methods of structuralists, who understood language as
having fixed, culturally bound meanings. By using a term like ‘stratification’ to describe how
meaning is attached to words, Deleuze and Guattari juxtapose their ideas with those of
structuralism. They see structuralism as a way to use language that is outside of the historical and
dynamic environment of human experiences. Deleuze and Guattari understand communications
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instead as stratified layers building upon each other in an ongoing and dynamic system: a flow of
meaning creation. (Deleuze and Guattari 189) The coding and recoding of meanings in language
serves as a substratum for the next layer, and so on. Examining this further, these strata also
represent differences in content and expression. The different strata, acting as substrata, support
the changed meanings and changes of expression of the new strata. The strata are altered by the
social and cultural interplay that serves the needs of any situation at any given moment. If one
reexamines the example of ordering a Philly Cheesesteak, this way of understanding language,
meaning, and communication may be better at describing how the real use of language and the
construction of meaning operate within our experiences.
We can apply Deleuze and Guattari’s geologic model in thinking about the sublime.
Using the idea of stratification, we can see that the earliest mentions of the sublime are carried
along through time influencing our current understanding, use, and communication of the
sublime today. The strata of the sublime, so to speak, has had many years to develop, building
one layer upon another, taking new information and ideas and allowing them to evolve into the
meaning it has in the present moment.
But how has this evolution occurred? Under what influences did the sublime change?
These are the questions one would need to ask in order to understand an evolutionary process
like this one. Applying evolutionary processes to language and meaning reveals the build-up of
meanings over time and an accretion of social and intellectual baggage that once established
remains as a consistent part of the meaning and understanding of the thing under its power.
Unpacking things with evolutionary processes becomes compelling intellectually when applied
to things such as language and meaning and are even more interesting when applied to ideas like
the sublime, which are infinitely more complex and challenging. Darwin examined evolution
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through the natural world and the influences of nature on animals. There are also influences on
language which cause a kind of evolution in meaning to the words and concepts we use.
What can be considered influences in the context of language? We understand that
language and meaning and their usage in any culture can be a powerful influence. Labelling
people or things in the world in certain ways also shifts the associated meanings around them.
This phenomenon occurred in the language used in the controversial Patriot Act instituted after
the 9/11 attacks in NYC. To apply the new laws under the Patriot Act, new language was used in
reference to the people who were charged and held without bond or representation for the crimes
they allegedly committed. They were now called ‘terrorists’ or ‘enemy combatants.’ Both of
these words justified the treatment these people would undergo and, in turn, allowed the rest of
us a way to turn our backs on the probable mistreatment and torture done in the name of our
country. In more subtle ways than this example, other parts of our culture have been slowly
turned to mean other things. The sublime has been among these concepts that have undergone a
cultural transformation of meaning through language.
Although the sublime has always been on the fringes of language and meaning, it has
been and continues to be a consistent element in Western culture. The influences in the culture
have, as we have examined, altered the meanings, application, and understanding of the sublime.
What has not changed necessarily is the experience of the sublime itself. The interpretations may
have changed but the phenomena of the sublime experience have been consistent.

LANGUAGE IN USE AND THEORY
What can we learn from the ideas of using different conceptual language methods and
words like ‘evolution,’ ‘stratification,’ and ‘plateaus’? These ideas and conceptual changes
soften and open up the concretized meanings that have been applied to many things in the culture
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of the West. When encountering the sublime, we interpret the experience the best we can with
the concepts and language we have at our disposal. If the concepts, words, and meanings we
have available are locked with predetermined meanings, then the interpretive part of the
experience also places limits on our understanding. Preceding historical periods that have
concretized the ideas of the sublime have supplied the ground from which the new meanings and
understandings of the sublime were understood. It is not difficult to see that powerful ideas like
the sublime have in part been intended to promote or enforce certain social, intellectual, or
cultural ideas and ideologies. The sublime is easily coopted because stable meanings have never
been associated with it; if a particular set of meanings can be ascribed to the sublime, then the
cultural entity that has done the ascribing will have captured for its use the powerful experience
of the sublime.
Our understanding of meaning and language thus far suggests that ideas like the sublime
are closer to reality, in the Lacanian and Platonic sense, than previously understood. The theories
we have discussed indicate that Lacan is correct: our ideas of reality are always conditioned by
language. This conditioning always mediates and controls the meaning of things, which become
markers for things and, over time, stabilize into limited meanings. Things are no longer able to
shift and evolve, or to reflect new concepts.
Language, as we have discovered, has many shortcomings. The basic trust we had in the
construction of ideas and of meanings through language has, at this point, led us to a begrudging
acceptance of language as a method for communication and progress. Thinkers like Derrida,
Deleuze, and Guattari have proposed that the way we understand meanings and communication
through language is neither working as we had expected and intended nor resulting in the
outcomes we assumed. This idea of language’s inadequacy, like many of the ideas of the post-
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structuralists and postmodernists, was intended to reveal ways of being that were outside of the
stabilizing structures in place. However, through the discourses of both post-structuralism and
postmodernism, ideas of the dynamic and chaotic characteristics of reality were brought to the
forefront. Derrida, Deleuze, and Guattari ultimately suggest that we are complacent about ideas
for the sake of stability and safety. When the truth of our complacent dependence is revealed to
us, we are forced to reconsider the possibility of our partnership with the existing order. When
we are engaged in the world, we must try and confront it in a way that is as close to reality as we
can without mediation through words and ideas. We must be free to exercise our abilities in an
unencumbered way if we hope to find creative space to build a positive future.
The sublime as a concept requires this kind of freedom. Our encounters with all things
sublime ultimately require us to develop a position in relationship to the sublime encounter.
Generally, this relationship has been one in which we are shown our limits, in one way or
another. This creates a ground of uncertainty, a place of mystery, and a situation in which we
must depend only on what is available in the encounter at the time. For example, if we were to
suddenly wake up to an alien world and realize we had only been dreaming the life we believed
was true, the radical difference from what we had believed as truth would throw us into a
sublime state. Our present would not clearly align with our past, and our future would be
concealed in a fog of uncertainty. Perhaps, this example seems farfetched and we must ask
ourselves is the truth of our existence really any different than waking from such a dream? The
encounter with the sublime answers this question. We are presented with something that is
foreign to us, something we are unfamiliar with but yet still feels familiar—like a ghost that was
a member of our family. In these encounters with the sublime, language just rings hollow. In
many ways, we are lucky that the sublime remains available to us so that we do not lose our
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sense of place in the universe. To be active and responsible participants in the world, we must
accept the sublime and embrace uncertainty and chaos with the knowledge that in the future we
need to have courage to progress beyond our current limitations.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Lacan, Language, and the Sublime
One of the most important unknowns in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries came out
of the work of psychoanalysis. Freud introduced the world to the unconscious as a mysterious
force existing inside each and every one of us and, further, as something that has influence on
our conscious lives (Freud and Gay 572-83). This great unknown, the unconscious, became part
of the discourse of the self and could not be dismissed. We had to, once we became aware of the
unconscious, consider it as part of ourselves and hence part of the processes we use in being and
becoming. In other words, we must include the possibility that the unconscious mind exerts some
influence in our thoughts and deliberations.
The great mystery of what human consciousness is was problematized by the concept of
the unconscious. The sublime, the unknown, the mysterious, was now, in the scientific age,
thrust again into the light of day by psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic theory. Lacan and his
theories further problematized our relationship to the unknown and made it part of the experience
of being human.(Lacan The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis 17-28)
The great inner unknown, the unconscious, had to be better understood. We could not let
an unknown force have influence in our lives without a better understanding of what and how it
worked. In the Ethics of Psychoanalysis, Lacan states, “Antigone in her unbearable splendor. She
has a quality that both attracts us and startles us, in the sense of intimidates us; this terrible, selfwilled victim disturbs us” (The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1959-1960 247). Though Lacan
displays no interest in the sublime, his characterization of Antigone brings to mind the Kantian
sublime. Antigone as a “subject”27 becomes an embodiment of Lacan’s theories. For Lacan,
Antigone represents a radical encounter and a rupture with the existing order. Because of her
defiance of King Creon and her disregard of the demands and expectations of the social order,
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she becomes a shock to the system. We can feel a certain cathartic reaction in this reading of
Antigone as we can imagine ourselves in a similar situation within the current system.
The story of Antigone has been used in critical interpretations many times. The idea of
going against an existing set of conventional ideas still maintains its powerful potential. In his
essay “Lacan’s Antigone: The Sublime Object and the Ethics of Interpretation,” Paul Allen
Miller writes, “In its beauty, Sophocles’ Antigone presents what Lacan defines as a ‘Sublime
Object.’ Our ethical obligation as readers and analysts is to be true to this object to the precise
degree that it transcends all normative categories” (Miller 2). Through her role as a disruptor,
Antigone is a “Sublime Object,” transcendent and beyond the expected; we are thrust by our
imaginations into the sublime existence of Antigone. Miller suggests that the sublime and
Lacan’s theories are operating on similar registers and for similar purposes. Lacan must create
what has been called a sublime object—or what we interpret as such—for our subjectivity to
reflect upon, psychologically speaking. The Subject must encounter the motivating force of the
unknown in order to begin the search for possible answers. Lacan, like others before him, creates
a conceptual framework with a mystery at its center. This mystery, the unconscious, operates as
the motivating factor for the theory and practice of psychoanalysis.
Psychoanalysis introduces a mediation of our conscious abilities, so much so that we
question the very nature of the world and our own being. In other words, the potentially
unsolvable quandary of our conscious lives being controlled by an unseen, uncontrollable
unconscious places our conceptual understanding of ourselves into the unknown, into a sublime
state of existence. Antigone, for Lacan, represents a sublime encounter, rupture, intrusion, and
disruption. In turn, our reading of Antigone is an opportunity to examine and analyze Antigone’s
experience and our own. To simplify: the unconscious and the methods of psychoanalysis, as
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well as the sublime, present the Subject with mysteries that send reason into a search for
understanding. Both the sublime experience and psychoanalysis present us with a lack of
knowledge about the human experience that motivates our attempts to understand.

INTRODUCTION TO LACAN’S TRIADIC REGISTERS
Before we can proceed, it is necessary to unpack Lacan’s theory of the triadic structure
essential to his discourse. Complex and dynamic, Lacan’s triadic structure is notoriously difficult
to understand. In examining the way that the three registers work together, the intention is to
establish an understanding of the Lacanian perspective on the unconscious, the effects on the
Subject, and the suggested relationship to the unknown proposed by the theory. In making the
case for the connections to the unconscious and subsequently from the known to the unknown,
the hope is to establish a necessary relationship and understanding of the value of both the
known and the unknown. The goal is to disempower the problems that exist within the dualistic
thinking that prevents cooperation between the concepts of the known and unknown. The
conceptual importance of the Symbolic, the Imaginary, and the Real supports and creates the
platform from which Lacan’s discourse proceeds. The better we can understand the complex
nature of Lacanian theory, the better we can understand our relationship to the unknown. (Evans
18-19)
For the purposes of the forthcoming discussion and the defining of the three registers of
the Lacanian triadic theory, the work of Dylan Evans, a Lacanian scholar, will serve as a key.
The partial definitions of the concepts of the Imaginary, the Symbolic, and the Real are extracted
from Evans’s Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis.
The Symbolic, the most complex and problematic of the three registers in Lacan’s theory,
is described by Evans in this way:
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The symbolic dimension of language is that of the SIGNIFIER; a dimension in
which elements have no positive existence but which are constituted purely by
virtue of their mutual differences. The symbolic is also the realm of radical
alterity which Lacan refers to as the OTHER. The UNCONSCIOUS is the discourse of
this Other, and thus belongs wholly to the symbolic order. (Evans 201-02)
According to Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, the Symbolic is the field where the construction of
the Subject or the self happens. Problems arise when there is an interference or interruption in
our ability to integrate our Subject into the Symbolic. For Lacan, the Symbolic is understood as
the “Other.” This “big Other,” as is it known, is the thing that the Subject seeks pleasure in. For
Lacan, desire is the desire of what the Other desires (Evans 132).
Put simply, the Symbolic is the order of things around us: the social, the intellectual, the
cultural. The Symbolic operates as a central hub around which the Imaginary and the Real, the
other two registers of the theory, are perceived. Without the ground of the Symbolic, neither the
Imaginary nor the Real would have a point of reference from which to derive their meaning. In
turn, the Symbolic also needs the other two concepts, the Imaginary and the Real, in order to
have a kind of intellectual power.
The Imaginary is another essential component of the Subject. Evans characterizes the
Imaginary as having “connotations of illusion, fascination and seduction, and relates specifically
to the DUAL RELATION between the EGO and the SPECULAR IMAGE” (Evans 82). In our everyday
understanding, the Imaginary simply denotes the imagination, or illusion and possibly
hallucination. Lacan defines the Imaginary as the part of the Subject that deals with the image, or
the presentation, of the Subject within the Symbolic Order. The Imaginary has the function of a
reference for the Symbolic, much like a mirror provides a reflection of our image and the way we
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see ourselves as presented to others. This is how the Subject exists for insertion into the
Symbolic. Lacan’s theory presents the Imaginary as the illusory construction of the Subject. In
other words, we construct our Subject out of the structures that surround us. This Subject then
becomes the one we present to the Symbolic through the Imaginary.
Jean-Paul Sartre provides a written example of the difficulties in working within the
Symbolic Order. In Sartre’s play No Exit, (Sartre) three characters have died and gone to hell.
They are cursed to spend eternity with each other. The Symbolic Order they bring with them is
what produces the torturous hell they must experience. Sequestered in a single room, two of the
characters are women and the third is male. The characters in Sartre’s play have been chosen to
represent a part of the Symbolic Order. The character of Inès Serrano is described as a lesbian
who has seduced her cousin’s wife and also murdered the cousin. Estelle Rigault, the second
female character, is described as a socialite who married a much older man for his money. She
then had an affair with a younger man, became pregnant, and had his child. She decides she
cannot keep the child, so she drowns the baby in a lake causing the man, who becomes stricken
with grief, to commit suicide. The male in this party, Joseph Garcin, is described as a deserter
from the military who has been unfaithful to his wife and has repeatedly humiliated her with his
illicit affairs.
At one point in the play, Estelle, the character who is most dependent on her image
within the Symbolic, finds that her mirror is missing and believes it was taken from her when she
arrived in hell. Inès says to her, “Suppose I try and be your glass?” (Sartre No Exit 19). In this
way, Estelle and Inès become an example of “being for others.” Estelle needs to see her image,
not for any other reason than to present her image to Garcin and ultimately Inès in order to be
desired by them both. The importance of the Imaginary in Lacan’s triadic theory, as presented in
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Sartre’s play, lies in the expression of the libidinal economy and the psychological dependencies
it creates within the Symbolic. This play also provides us with an example of the encounter with
the Real, the big Other, and the Lack28—all critical associations in Lacanian theories. Sartre’s
play presents a world in which the Symbolic Order makes existence unbearable for the
characters, in part, we might speculate, because the encounter they have with each other serves to
break down the Symbolic and situate them in closer proximity to the Real.
In Lacan’s theory, the Real is something we can’t ever get at because we live in the
Symbolic. Evans situates it in the theory this way: “The Real emerges as that which is outside
language and inassimilable to symbolisation. It is ‘that which resists symbolization absolutely’
(S1, 66); or, again, the real is ‘the domain of whatever subsists outside symbolisation’ (Ec, 388)”
(Evans 159). The Real becomes that which does not fit neatly into the Symbolic Order in
Lacan’s theory. The Real, like the sublime, is what lies outside the Symbolic. If we operate in the
Symbolic captured by language, then it seems reasonable to assume that we are limited to what
language will allow. In Sartre’s play, the participants are forced into close proximity to the Real.
The attempts they make to maintain the Symbolic Order fail repeatedly because of the situation
and each of their particular qualities. By their very natures and the circumstances that the play
creates for them, they continually are challenged by the Real as they attempt to maintain the
Symbolic. Because of the circumstances of the play, we might say in present-day terms that they
are experiencing a ‘psychological break’ or they are ‘going mad.’ Sartre humorously makes
“hell” a place where the Real plays a larger role in existence. Clearly, he sees the opposite is true
in the everyday lives of people. This, of course, does not work the way it works in a world of
order. Once the Symbolic Order is broken or challenged, as it is in Sartre’s play, chaos ensues
and the Subjects, whoever they are, become untethered and lose their illusory grounding.
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Since the Real is described as the world outside the Symbolic, it also becomes a reference
point for the Symbolic and the Imaginary. Our connotations of the Real become a part of how we
understand the Symbolic and the Imaginary. The Real, as it exists outside the Symbolic, acts as a
reference for the psychoanalysis performed, for without knowledge of the Real, the Symbolic
would simply be thought of as the Real. In many cases this is Lacan’s point: the Symbolic is
mere illusion and the Real is what exists. Without the reference point of the Real to reflect upon
the Symbolic, the possibility of psychoanalysis would be impossible.
The usefulness of the triadic process for psychoanalysis becomes clearer when we see it
as an exploratory intellectual framework upon which we can hang possibilities. In addition, the
analytic process is also useful in understanding our experience of the unknown and the sublime,
if we extrapolate the conceptual problematics of our encounter with the unconscious. Presented
with the unknown of the unconscious and with the difficulties it generates for us in the conscious
world, we can see similarities with our encounters with many other unknowns. Our encounter
with the sublime is something similar to our encounter with the unconscious, but we often have
the encounter without the benefit of analysis. There is a value to our thinking about and coming
to terms with the ideas and problems of the unconscious. Just as there can be a benefit to our
other encounters with the unknown and experiences of the sublime. Between Lacan's
examination of the unconscious, the unknown, and the sublime, similarities arise, as well as
possibilities. Before we further explore the relationship between the unconscious and the
sublime, we must first look at the components of the triadic structures in more depth.

THE SYMBOLIC
The Symbolic is associated with language. Lacan states that we are bound by the
logocentric ontology of the Symbolic (Evans 201). Language and the Symbolic combine and are
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crucial to communication. If we do not understand the symbols in use in a particular language,
we do not have the ability to really participate in that time and place, and we stand outside like
aliens. For Lacan, the Symbolic is critical because it is where we exist as Subjects. Further,
Lacan’s most quoted statement that the unconscious is structured as a language suggests a
revealing juxtaposition of language with the mind, both conscious and unconscious. If Lacan is
correct and the Symbolic is the process we operate through, this structural enclosure needs to be
thoroughly understood.
Lacan’s theories suggest that there are two ways of seeing the world. One is through
language—though this means that language also becomes a mediating factor. The other is not
through language—there must exist an outside of language that Lacan calls the Real and which
will always be the unknown and mysterious.
The Symbolic is the system we use to communicate, understand, and operate in the
world. We could say it is like a computer programming language; this programming is necessary
for the Subject to operate correctly in the Symbolic. When the Subject does not operate
according to the programming of the Symbolic, or, if I may, the Subject becomes infected with a
virus that prohibits the smooth operation of the Subject in the Symbolic, analysis becomes
necessary. Analysis intends to provide the Subject with a clearer view of the Symbolic in order
that the Subject can operate successfully and not stand out or act as a disruption in the order
established by the Symbolic. If you recall the earlier example of Antigone acting out of the
acceptable practices of the Symbolic, Antigone stands out as an example of being at odds with
the Symbolic and operating closer to the Real.
Metaphor29 and metonymy30 are parts of language that we understand as operational in
the use and practice of language. Since Lacan regards our use of language as our only way of
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being in the world, the practices of these operations must also be necessary in our being in the
Symbolic. Metonymic functions in language, and hence in the Symbolic, indicate a linear
progression from sign to sign in an orderly fashion; this ongoing movement or expression of
communication is called a ‘signifying chain.’31 Metaphor, however, indicates a meaning that is
developing more dynamically in contact with a greater diversity of possibilities at any given
moment.
Metaphor and metonymy also refer to Lacan’s “graph of desire,” in which the “point de
capiton,”32 or point of meaning, freezes the chain of signification and inscribes meaning in the
Symbolic and in the structured system of language. Desire in the Symbolic is the basis of
communication itself. If meaning and desire do not become quilting points, neither
communication nor desire can find a common ground for communication, nor, in turn, can the
Subject. It is necessary for a Subject to have stable meaning in the Symbolic, and the point at
which metaphor and metonymy cross on the graph of desire represents where this possible
meaning manifests itself.
Metaphor and metonymy also refer to synchronic and diachronic functions in language
and are useful in the interpretations of Lacan’s theories. Diachronic function—diachronic
meaning relative to a historical progression, whereas the synchronic is relative to the temporal, as
outside of the historical—renders the expression of the Subject in the Symbolic. As Evans
explains, “The synchronic aspect is METAPHOR, by which the signifier crosses the bar into the
signified. The synchronic structure [of the point de capiton] is more hidden, and it is this
structure that takes us to the source. It is metaphor (E, 303)” (149).
The language functions of metonymy and metaphor pose provocative questions and
stimulate thinking about the construction and understanding of the Subject in the Symbolic. How
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they do this is similar to the way Lacanian psychoanalysis opens the pathways to diagnose the
symptoms that make analysis necessary. The Symbolic is defined as the same as the language we
use and thus the functions of language must control the construction of the Subject. The control
that language and meaning wield must then also apply to Lacanian psychoanalysis. The
interdependence of the parts of language, of metaphor and metonymy, of synchronic and
metonymic functions, is reflected by the way Lacanian theories analyze the Subject. This
analysis is based on the primary claim Lacan makes that we are bound by the Symbolic
(language) and that it is through this process that our Subject as self is constructed and
maintained. The processes of language not only help us understand Lacan but also our
constructed relationships to other language-bound concepts.

THE SUBLIME IN RELATIONSHIP TO THE SYMBOLIC
In Lacan’s theory, we must operate in the Symbolic, based in sign and symbol and in the
means and methods of language. Interpreting the world around us through Lacan’s lens can be
unsettling. Nonetheless, there is something liberating about the type of understanding and
perspective Lacan’s approach provides.
In looking at the relationship between the Symbolic and the concept of the sublime, we
might ask: How does the sublime operate in the Symbolic if the Symbolic mediates the
experience? In other words, if the Symbolic, as Lacan informs us, mediates our experience
through the use of language, then how can the language we use fully express the experience of
the sublime? Elucidating this problem is crucial to the understanding of the relationship between
the Symbolic and the sublime.
Unsurprisingly, the language we use to describe the sublime is often metaphor and is
rarely interpreted literally since the sublime is not an object, per se, but can be best considered as
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the ground that exists between the objective and subjective. To say the sublime is an aggregate of
the subjective encounter with the world seems clinical and, as a description, leaves us wanting.
However, that is indeed the experience of the sublime: an aggregate of the encounters with the
world whereby the Subject comes in direct contact with something he or she does not have the
ability to understand and cannot associate with any previous encounters.
The emotions generally associated with the sublime are fear, confusion, exaltation, terror,
being overwhelmed, and feeling out of control. These emotions all have a common origin: they
are outside of the way in which the Symbolic organizes the world, or, we could say, the way the
Subject organizes the world.
Emotions play a large part in analysis and in our interpretation of the sublime. Emotions
are often described as passions, that which we cannot control or that which is imposed upon us.
Current research suggests that this is not necessarily the case: emotions are our responses to the
world and we, in part, choose the particular emotion best suited for the circumstance and our
Subject self. Robert Solomon writes, “I want to argue that emotions are not disruptions or
irrational or occurrences, not forces or feelings or mere tendencies to behave. I will analyze the
emotions as constitutive structures of our world” (Solomon 108). This idea is consistent with
analysis in that the analysand33 needs to undergo psychoanalysis in part to be able to understand
his place in the Symbolic Order. It is when the Subject operates in ways that are at odds with the
Symbolic Order that ruptures occur, and problems arise suggesting the need for correction or
analysis.
The experience of the unknown and the sublime creates such a rupture. Does the
Lacanian analytic approach yield any results in healing a rupture caused by the sublime? Or does
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the sublime, by virtue of its indefinable nature, reveal that we are all in need of analysis because
we are trapped in the Symbolic and controlled by language?
The contention is that both the confrontation with the sublime and the idea of the
unconscious bring forth the same emotions and create the same kind of experiences. In both
cases, the emotional states we choose are a response to being outside of our preferred situation;
we choose the emotions that serve to re-situate our Subject in the Symbolic. For example, when
we get angry, we identify and categorize the set of circumstances that has “made us angry” or,
perhaps, the person or persons that we decide is the cause of our anger. But when asked to point
to the anger itself, we are hard pressed to clearly identify the location of the anger. That is
usually because the anger center is located somewhere within us, rather than in some external
entity. In a way, we could say that we have chosen to become angry. Perhaps, our interpretation
of the cause of our anger as somehow doing harm to the presentation of our Subject in the
Symbolic is the real source of our anger. Perhaps, we interpret the cause of our anger as
damaging the Subject we have worked so hard to create. Critically examining our emotion in this
way causes us pain because now who we thought we were—our Subject in the Symbolic—seems
to be shaken, or we fear we are seen differently than we desire to be. Our choices of emotions are
closely related to our presentation in the Symbolic.
Analysis is an attempt to bring an understanding of these discontinuities to light and to
help in forming a resolution for them within the Symbolic. The issue of discontinuity is
reminiscent of what Heidegger calls throwness and facticity.34 Heidegger’s ontological outlook
suggests that when presented with a situation we adapt to it in order to evolve through it to
something more. Whereas Lacan sees these Heideggerian concepts as ruptures in the Symbolic,
Heidegger sees them as opportunities to evolve. Perhaps, there is a connection between
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Heidegger and Lacan, in that there is a suggested action that seems related to both. For Lacan,
the purpose of analysis is to help us understand our consciousness existing at the nexus of the
three elements in the triadic structure. For Heidegger, it is the possibilities of the evolution of our
being.

THE MIRROR STAGE
The idea of the Subject is relatively new in the conversation we call ‘philosophy.’ The
concept of a ‘personal subjectivity’ and how it comes to be is a topic still in flux. Certainly an
important topic to consider in the ongoing experience of being human and in relationship to other
concepts we adopt as our principles for living. Lacan identifies the beginnings of subjectivity in
what he terms ‘the mirror stage.’35 In the mirror stage, an infant comes to identify with the
spectral reflection of his or her image in a mirror. This reflection not only shocks the “Subject”
into understanding that he or she is an individual but also establishes the relationship with the
self and produces the need for emotional practices.
It is the Subject who encounters the world and the sublime. The Subject determines the
choice of the emotional state in any given moment or situation. A particular Subject might
interpret a raging sea as sublime or as merely something that makes him or her angry, for it
interferes with his or her attempts to catch fish in the North Atlantic, for example. But in either
case, it is the Subject who does the choosing; there is no imposition. The sublime is an openended experience.
The emotional state we choose when we confront what we call ‘the sublime’ can vary a
great deal. When we find we are in the presence of an unknown, or when we feel fear at a set of
challenging circumstances that test our emotions, we then measure the experience in reference to
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the Symbolic. In making determinations concerning the sublime and the unconscious we act in
harmony with the Symbolic and with our subjectivity.
Desire and pain can both be primary motivating forces that focus our attentions, as
Subjects, on our relationship to the world. Desire, both conscious and unconscious, affects what
we do as Subjects—that is, it affects our interactions with the world. The sublime experience is
unique because it is not an object in the world. The experience of the sublime and the emotions
caused by it are an instance and a reflection of our relationship to things transcendent or
unknown. Robert Solomon calls this phenomenon a ‘frame experience.’ Solomon associates a
frame experience with things like déjà vu, in which there is no object that can be identified to
associate the experience with. He writes, “It is our passions—and our emotions in particular—
that set up this world, constitute the framework within which our knowledge of the facts has
some meaning, some 'relevance' to us” (Solomon 135). Our emotions filter our vision of the
world and how we interact and move through, decide and perceive our circumstances. Solomon
continues, “This is why I insist that the emotions are constitutive judgements; they do not find
but ‘set up’ our surreality. They do not apply but supply the framework of values which give our
experience some meaning” (Solomon 135, ). Many of our experiences are driven by some kind
of emotional content. We often identify our experiences on a day-to-day basis through emotional
description. We are happy, content, frustrated, frenzied, angry, depressed, etc. We never describe
our lives in clinical, materialistic terms, such as my biochemistry is malfunctioning today.
Instead we say I am sick or not feeling well, which has an immediate emotional connotation. In
summation, our emotions are critical parts of our conscious lives.
The response to the unknown and to the sublime is an emotional one as Kant declared.
Jean-Paul Sartre called this feeling ‘anxiety;’ (Sartre Being and Nothingness 77-85) such a
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feeling is framed by the encounter with the world when the Subject’s decisions regarding the
world are inconsistent with what the Subject believes or wishes to be true. Lacan’s analysis
emphasizes the need for adjustment when the Subject is not operating correctly within the
Symbolic Order. This can also cause anxiety depending on the Subject’s desires about the
Symbolic Order. Meanings are frozen and fixed in the Symbolic Order which is how judgements
are made in determining if the Subject is out of order with it. The sublime is unique in that it
cannot be contained or frozen in the Symbolic, yet because the Symbolic has no other options it
attempts to integrate the sublime via language. The failed attempts to freeze the sublime in the
Symbolic have resulted in the unique cultural and social manifestations referred to in chapters 1
and 2. The tensions between the sublime and the Symbolic are not new. Philosophy has been
addressing the rift for many years. In encountering the sublime, we are urged to judge the
experience but because these experiences transcend conventional ways of knowing our
judgments do little to help.
Heidegger, in his ontological phenomenology, expressed the idea that our encounters
with the world held critical importance because they established the basis for the evolutionary
movement toward a perfected authentic state of being. (Heidegger 68) The encounter with the
sublime and the subsequent analysis by the encountering Subject opens up a space for reflection
of the Subject in relation to the world as perceived. In other words, the encounter with the
sublime, unlike the encounter with the Freudian unconscious with its predetermined teleological
ends, presents possibility and motivation to search for authentic being.
Through cultural programming, our Subject operates normally in full adaption to the
Symbolic. This makes functioning in the system smooth and uneventful. When the concretized
by conventional thinking and concepts the Subject and the Symbolic are in working harmony,
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the relationship between the Subject and Symbolic loses it antagonistic characteristics. The
antagonistic elements, like Lacan’s triadic structure, in the relationship between the Subject and
the Symbolic create tensions, or, in other words, ruptures in the system that lead to the need for
continued analysis in Lacan’s vision.
The sublime, as we know it through the Symbolic, is a “frame experience” that has no
object, that is, it only reflects our own subjectivity back to us and is limited by what the
Symbolic can provide. In analysis, the Subject can only see its encounter with the sublime as a
kind of struggle to regain equilibrium with the Symbolic Order. The sublime creates a type of
oscillating action between the Symbolic and the Subject. In its interpretation through the
Symbolic Order, the Subject regards the sublime as an interruption to the order and seeks only to
interpret it in order to reestablish the consistent equilibrium with the order. The sublime can and
does annihilate the Subject by tearing the Subject out of the existing order and by creating a tear
in the fabric that holds the illusions of the order in place. But the possibility for a new
interpretation of the order and of the Subject exists in the experiences of the sublime. Through
the sublime, the Subject is presented with the opportunity of becoming free of the illusory nature
of the Symbolic order.
This tension that exists between the Symbolic and the sublime is the same as the tension
between the Symbolic and the Subject that needs analysis. Lacan’s theory and the ideas of
psychoanalysis in general suggest that when a Subject becomes inconsistent with the Symbolic
Order he or she is somehow broken. In in analysis in general, the model for the Subject is the
Symbolic Order. The unconscious with its wild desires and needs are interpreted through the
model of order that exists in the Symbolic. The sublime with its wild freedom is also interpreted
through the Symbolic Order and this becomes how the Subject understands the sublime. On the
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one hand, we agree to participate in this game we play with the Symbolic because we are
constructed through the Symbolic as a Subject. On the other hand, we must surrender to the
Symbolic and allow our Subject self to use the Symbolic and be interpreted through it. But the
sublime encounter is a paradox. This confrontation with the unknown in the sublime presents no
order to or entry into the Symbolic. Instead, a vacuum is created that the Subject attempts to fill,
but there exists no way in conventional thinking to fill the space that the sublime opens up.
To put it another way, the Subject is presented with a gap opened by the sublime, the
unknown, that the Subject attempts to fill; the Subject creates for himself an understanding of the
experience of the sublime through the connections to the Symbolic. The shock to the Subject in
the encounter with the unknown is much like the reading of Antigone in that the Subject must
cope with an unavailable reconciliation with the Symbolic in order to continue. To look into the
void created by the unknown in the sublime is really to only have our Subject reflected back to
us. This reflection of our Subject is not reflected back to us by the Symbolic but by a reality of
the uncertainty in which our Subject exists. Like the Lacanian “mirror stage”—or, we might say,
a repetition of the “mirror stage,” the unknown and the sublime insist upon keeping the Real as
part of the equation in the construction of the Subject.
In Lacan’s thinking, the Imaginary presents, as representation, the Subject and readies it
for insertion into the Symbolic. The Subject exists not only in and through but also outside of the
Symbolic network. For Lacan, the Subject confronts the fact that it is constructed by the
Symbolic through the transcendental idea of the Real. (Lacan The Ethics of Psychoanalysis,
1959-1960 70) Anxiety is what remains when the Subject encounters the sublime and finds that
the Symbolic is lacking. What the Symbolic lacks is the ability to construct the Subject in an
authentic way, such as the one outlined in Heidegger's theory of the evolution of being. For
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Lacan this would mean the Subject needs analysis to reestablish the equilibrium with the
Symbolic. One could argue that Lacan is also approaching the evolution of the Subject only
through different means.
Psychoanalysis intends, like the sublime moment, to lift the veil of the Symbolic for the
Subject in order to provide room for decisions and evaluations of a possible existence outside or,
if chosen, inside the Symbolic Order. Lacanian psychoanalysis, like the sublime is an opening up
of possibilities, a way of understanding the problems created by the Symbolic. In the sublime,
being inside or outside the Symbolic—i.e., the capacity for interpretation and language—is left
open to the Subject's choosing. The Subject decides what relationship to have to the unknown
rather than having one imposed. The telos of the sublime, like Lacan’s relationship to the triadic
structure, is an unknown, an opening, a possibility.

THE IMAGINARY
The Imaginary, something we think of as a product of the imagination, is central to the
triadic structure Lacan establishes. The Imaginary is responsible for the Subject being
understood through the presentation of the image in the Symbolic. The examination of the
Imaginary and presentation of the Subject inform us of a critical part of Lacan’s theory of
psychoanalysis and of the Subject. The presentation of the Subject must be consistent with the
Symbolic. What analysis is intended to do, then, is to be able to help the Subject integrate the
concepts of the Symbolic, the Imaginary, and the Real in a way to reveal possibility. The process
of Lacanian analysis is also challenging and always changing, as each Subject has a unique and
dynamic relationship to the three registers, particularly the Imaginary. There is a connection
between Lacan’s Imaginary and the imagination. The use of and our understanding of the
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imaginary become a critical part of our being able to understand how the Imaginary functions in
Lacan’s theory.
Dylan Evans, in An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, states, “The
imaginary is the realm of image and imagination, deception and lure” (Evans 82,). He continues,
“The imaginary is thus the order of surface appearances which are deceptive, observable
phenomena which hide underlying structure; the affects are such phenomena” (Evans 82). This
association with our powers of imagination would suggest also that, for Lacan, the Imaginary is
associated with the mind’s ability to generate ideas and fantasies. Lacan weaves a complex and
dynamic interrelationship between the three registers and those things that affect individual and
collective psychologies. The Imaginary in Lacan’s theory provides a complex conceptual
collection not unlike the messiness of existence itself.
The Imaginary is important and relevant in Lacan’s discourse because the psychoanalytic,
therapeutic aspect must have reference to something. The unconscious hides the true symptoms
of the Subject beneath the Imaginary—that is, the Imaginary as image of the Subject. Without
the Imaginary, the Subject would be unable to construct a conscious existence, precluding any
analysis or possible interactions with the unconscious. Evans, quoting Lacan, states, “The
imaginary is decipherable only if rendered into symbols (Lacan, 1956b: 269)” (Evans 83).
Lacan’s Imaginary has a specific role to play in his psychoanalytic theory, and here Lacan’s
mention of the Symbolic refers to the interrelatedness of the Imaginary and the Symbolic in his
theory. Evans, in explicating Lacan, places the Imaginary and the Symbolic in a dynamic
relationship and reveals how the process by which each operates on the other is central to
Lacan’s analysis.
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The interdependence of the Symbolic and the Imaginary suggests that within the act of
psychoanalysis there are also other interdependencies. The experiences we have, according to
Lacan, are mediated by the three registers. (Evans 18-19) Without them, the construction of our
Subject-selves would not be possible, at least not in the way we commonly understand. We can
also suppose the three registers are reference points for an internal discourse that leads us to
better understandings of each. The Imaginary provides the raw material for the process, and the
Symbolic organizes the results and inserts that organization into a usable order. The
codependency of the Symbolic and the Imaginary reveals possible weaknesses in the process of
analysis and in our interpretations of it. If the Symbolic exists for the Imaginary and the
Imaginary exists for the Symbolic, the circularity and the interdependent nature of the
partnership seems critical to the understanding of ourselves.
As Lacan theorized, without the presentation of the Subject, we would have nothing to
examine in relation to the Symbolic. Without the Imaginary, the resulting gaps in the processes
would severely limit, even cripple, the theory itself. Lacan argued that we operate in the way the
structure expects us to, that we act, in a sense, as if we are something that is a part of that
structure. This seems commonplace, when the social order expects us to operate in particular
ways and consistent with what the system recognizes as normal. By social order, I mean the
cultural norms, ideological interactions, and shared ontology in which we operate. This, from a
certain perspective, is a kind of make-believe, and we learn to operate and cooperate in this way
by modeling ourselves on the other Subjects in this social order. Often, we find this kind of
interaction uncomfortable and inconsistent with what we would really like or would necessarily
choose for ourselves. But we are coerced into playing the game the Symbolic requires in order to
fit in and to communicate with others. Lacan argues that it is because we are creatures of
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language that we are bound by and see ourselves—imagine ourselves—through language and the
Symbolic.
Looking again at the encounter with Antigone, there are two parts. One is our
phenomenal encounter with Antigone as a character in a narrative and the second is our
imagination of ourselves in sympathy with Antigone in the story. The imagination, as one of our
primary mental powers, allows us to imagine ourselves in the place of Antigone. While we see
the character Antigone as a Subject in the world from the outside, we also consider Antigone
from the inside: we imagine our own subjectivity in her place. In other words, we become
Antigone in two separate ways. This duality marks all our encounters with others.
Our subjective-self depends on the other for its presentation, for its being in the moment
of the encounter. Lacan suggests that we cannot exist without the other and that we are literally
for others. This imaginary practice is not a revelation; we must always become the Subject in
whatever narrative we construct. As more commonly understood, we must sympathize with the
characters in a narrative in order to better understand them, thus putting into action any possible
suspension of disbelief or cathartic power. This rehearsal of being the other36 is crucial to the
Lacanian theory because it can act as a remedy for repression. But Antigone also becomes what
Lacan calls the ‘big Other,’37 a radical other-ness, which always lies just out of reach. The
cathartic activity of the Imaginary, producing the fantasy of entering into the radical Real, is an
exercise that both reminds and warns us of this encounter and the possible consequences.
In experiencing Antigone, we confront the dilemma she confronts. Even in the
imaginative state we attempt to cope with the problem facing Antigone and in so doing we also
must acknowledge our own consciousness. Following Freud, Lacan describes the activity of the
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Imaginary as associated closely with fantasy, which, in psychology, is required to control
desire.38 According to Evans,
While Lacan accepts Freud’s formulations on the importance of fantasy and on its
visual quality as a scenario which stages desire, he emphasizes the protective
function of fantasy. Lacan compares the fantasy SCENE to a frozen image on a
cinema screen; just as the film may be stopped at a certain point in order to avoid
showing a traumatic scene. . . . (Evans 60)
The functions of fantasy, along with the Imaginary, establish the groundwork for the Subject to
create an image for insertion into the Symbolic Order. Evans again: “Although Lacan recognizes
the power of the image in fantasy, he insists that this is due not to any intrinsic quality of the
image in itself but to the place which it occupies in a symbolic structure; the fantasy is always
‘an image set to work in a signifying structure’ (E, 272)” (Evans 61). Simply put, the Subject
uses the Imaginary in the creation of an image that is suitable for insertion into the Symbolic.
In Lacan’s theory, the creation of the Subject through the Imaginary is akin to Kant’s
imagination and its function in the operations of experience. How can the imagination and the
Imaginary work in the experience of the sublime? Lacan believes that staging an image in order
to insert it into the Symbolic is essential. Through this process, the image can become an object
for our consciousness. Unfortunately, the sublime is not an object in this way; it is an experience
motivated by objects in the world, but that experience itself is not an object as we understand it.
The sublime is an object of the mind, an object of the intellect and of the world beyond,
underneath and supplemental to the Symbolic, as we know it.
It is necessary for us to use the Imaginary when encountering the sublime or the
unknown. The Imaginary temporarily stands in, if you will, for our understanding in instances of
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the sublime. The Imaginary then resolves the encounter by characterizing and categorizing it for
insertion into the Symbolic. Antigone, as an experience of the sublime, if you will, negotiates an
internal discourse between the Symbolic and the sublime. This, in turn, drives a conscious,
introspective discourse between the Subject-self and the Symbolic Order.
The usefulness of both the sublime and of the Imaginary/imagination have critical value
for our thinking and existing. They open up fields of possibilities; they can operate on many
levels, providing a pathway to perspectives about the unknowable in an attempt to create a
concept stable enough for examination where no concept existed before. William James, in his
lecture “What Pragmatism Means,” states, “The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be
good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons” (James and Kuklick
520). The sublime—as unknown, unknowable, and other concepts derived from the crucible of
the encounter with it—provides a “good” of a critical nature. The imagination and the
psychological Imaginary, motivated by these sublime encounters, provide a myriad of useful
pathways, solutions, and lines of inquiry in the construction of the consciousness of the Subject.
The mention of consciousness sends reason and imagination into a struggle in order to organize
the experience of being presented with the self. Psychoanalysis’s is to help the Subject better
relate to the Symbolic. The sublime’s telos is greater: it asks us to uncover our own relationship
to the knowledge and wisdom of our own possible chosen telos.
In his essay “Lacan and Philosophy” in The Cambridge Companion to Lacan, Charles
Shepherdson writes about Lacan’s “imaginary body”: “[F]or he claims here that the image of the
human form, unlike other instances of the beautiful that may be apprehended in the perceptual
image, has a sublime element to it, a rupture with visibility, an aspect that touches on the infinite
and the ‘unpresentable’” (126). What about the image of the human body becomes, for Lacan,
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something of a sublime experience? In reference to the Symbolic, Lacan’s “big Other,” the body
and our apprehension of it, exists in all three registers of the Lacanian triad. We apprehend our
bodies through the three individual registers, but it is not fully comprehended through these
registers. Hence, the sublime element for Lacan, reveals itself as something that is both there and
not there. Of the three registers of Lacan’s theory, the Imaginary has the most space for this
examination.
Slavoj Žižek states that Lacan’s Imaginary operates with the Symbolic in the creation of
the Subject. In his examination of the Lacanian concept of ‘the letter’39 as always reaching the
intended recipient, Žižek points out that “whosoever finds himself at this place is the addressee
since the addressee is not defined by his positive qualities but by the very contingent fact of
finding himself at this place” (Žižek Enjoy Your Symptom! : Jacques Lacan in Hollywood and
Out 13). The Subject, as addressee or as participant in the Symbolic Order, is always already
constructed through the Imaginary as directed by the Symbolic. Hence the Subject becomes the
addressee by being in the proper place in the Symbolic.
For Lacan, the Imaginary functions in concert with the Symbolic and the Real in the
construction of the Subject. The Imaginary performs a crucial step in the ordering and processing
of the Subject and in the Subject’s insertion into the Symbolic and the social order.
Consciousness, for Lacan, is ordered and prescribed by the results of the Imaginary and the
Symbolic. This truth, the truth of the Subject in the Symbolic, is a truth that we can consider to
be structured like a fiction, a make-believe, or further as constructed through the imagination.
With Lacan in mind then, we can consider the sublime in the Symbolic Order as also
something constructed through the registers of the Imaginary and the Symbolic. The advantage
for the analyst in the process of analysis is that the analysand must accept the basic premise
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behind the analysis before any work begins. It is the same as understanding any kind of
intellectual relationship: we have a concept that allows a process to proceed in an orderly
fashion. A good example is the process of making coffee. Many in the West have learned the
process of making coffee by understanding the motivation and the telos of the process. We want
coffee, so we proceed to create the coffee by the processes we have learned; we then drink the
coffee to satisfy our desire for the coffee. We have a programmatic process and a programmatic
relationship with making coffee. By revealing the relationship we have to language and the
Symbolic, Lacan situates the Subject within the experience of analysis in order to give the
Subject a perspective upon which to operate. The sublime experience, like Lacanian
psychoanalysis, is a process that both reveals a construction and attempts to perform a
deconstruction in order to reveal a truth. The truth, in the Symbolic, is also a construction, and so
is the sublime as we understand it through the Symbolic.
The way Lacan's theory of the three psychological registers operates in the analysis of the
Subject addresses the unknown of the unconscious. Similarly, the Subject’s experience of the
sublime is also an encounter with the unknown. Both Lacanian psychoanalysis and the
encounters with the sublime have the potential to reveal a truth about the Subject participation in
the Symbolic Order. The presentation of the sublime most often takes the form of a description.
This description constructs within the Symbolic Order a fabricated truth of the sublime for the
Subject. The questions needing consideration are the following: Is the sublime a proper gateway
to the unconscious, much like psychoanalysis? Can both the sublime and psychoanalysis provide
paths of inquiry that show the weaknesses in the construction of the Subject? Are psychoanalysis
and the sublime the same thing? Is the sublime a stand-in for self-analysis, with the Other
standing in for the analyst? These same questions could be posed to psychoanalysis as well. Self-
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examination, as in analysis, is intended to reveal things about our Subject. Contemplative selfexamination is a chance to refresh our relationship to our own consciousness and consider our
attitudes and operations in the world in respect to things that we may find troubling or difficult.
Without doing this from time to time, we can easily lose our way and let the structures of the
world direct our living.
In addition to psychoanalysis, the sublime is also closely connected to the Imaginary. The
Imaginary and the imagination both supply necessary potentials to the Lacanian encounter of the
Subject and the unconscious. The sublime facilitates a similar operation in the construction and
the examination of the Subject. The rupture provided by the sublime presents the anxiety of the
Real. In psychoanalysis, the unconscious operations and discontinuities among the Imaginary,
the Symbolic, and the Real are revealed. In the sublime, the Subject is confronted with an
unknown, but because there is no prescribed system for the sublime the Subject must create one.
Psychoanalysis works with the discontinuities to integrate the Subject back into harmony with
the Symbolic. The sublime, on the other hand, presents the discontinuities as opportunities to
reevaluate the Subject-self’s encounter with the Symbolic. The sublime activates the Imaginary
but not necessarily in service of the Symbolic, and it is by this presentation that the sublime
reveals the discontinuities the Subject has with the Symbolic. The sublime experience offers an
analysis of the Symbolic.
The experience of the sublime offers the opportunity to re-envision our Subject-self and
to revision the Symbolic as a changed Subject. The sublime's value lies in the potential for the
Subject to be made aware of the workings of the Symbolic, especially its structures and
weaknesses. With this awareness, the Subject can then reenter the Symbolic as a more authentic
being, i.e., in a way that may be more consistent with the Subject’s real desires.
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THE REAL
Like the Kantian concept of the thing in itself (Stang) or the Platonic theory of
forms,(Plato The Republic 378-416) the Lacanian Real takes its place among those proposed
objective claims of things outside of our perceptible abilities that have been part of the
philosophical discourse for millennia. The need for a reference point that lies outside of our
experience, while curious, also makes it possible for us to project and imagine something better
or greater than what exists at any given moment. Like Plato’s metaphysics, for Lacan, the Real is
not something we can contact directly. The shock of direct contact with the Real, coupled with
the sudden realization of a constructed self, would be too jarring and traumatic.
Lacan’s use of the concept of the Real is fluid and dynamic. In our contemporary
understanding, the Real is the world we believe it to be as a concretized universal truth. This is
not how Lacan uses the term. Evans clarifies,
It is not until 1953 that Lacan elevates the real to the status of a fundamental
category of psychoanalytic theory; the real is henceforth one of the three ORDERS
according to which all psychoanalytic phenomena may be described, the other
two being the symbolic order and the imaginary order. The real is thus no longer
simply opposed to the imaginary, but is also located beyond the symbolic.”
(Evans 159)
The Real, like the Imaginary and the Symbolic, operates as a theoretical lever that allows
a kind of conceptual understanding and articulation of the interdependencies inside of Lacan’s
triadic theory. Without the Real, the rest of the theory simply would not operate in the way
Lacan demands and deliver the kind of thinking required to understand the psychoanalytic
problem in Lacanian terms. It is necessary to the process of analysis that the Real be understood
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as an unknown in order to be a reference point in analysis. Lacan included the Real as part of his
theory to serve as a reference point for the Subject's experience of the anxiety of the unknown.
Psychoanalysis intends to regulate this relationship between the Symbolic and the
Subject to establish a consistency of behavior with the Symbolic. Therefore, the Real has a job to
do in Lacanian psychoanalysis, which is to stand in for nothingness, anxiety, and the unknown.
Understanding our relationship to the unknown is an important element in analysis because this
is often a source of anxiety and the reason for an individual’s maladjustments to the Symbolic. A
sense of knowing where one stands in relationship to the registers in Lacan’s analysis is critical
for the realignment of the Subject and the Symbolic. It can also be critical for a relationship with
the unknown and the sublime.
The Real and the sublime are both conceptual objects. They overlap in some areas, but
they often produce very different results. They are conceptual because we cannot point to
something as a concrete location for either of these things. They are necessarily things that are
constructions of the mind and experience. Conceptual objects are useful in the relationship to
these kinds of unknowns. Humans create these conceptual objects so that they might adjust or
readjust as needed or desired within any perspective.
The conceptual objects we utilize and construct via language serve and support the
structures we are habituated to. This practice of constructing conceptual objects that align our
relationship with the Symbolic with our desires is why psychoanalysis appears a valuable ally in
our attempts at understanding. Analysis identifies a weakness or inconsistency with the Subject
in the Symbolic and suggests the possibility of a better way. The sublime, like psychoanalysis,
strips bare the façade of the Symbolic and opens up a space for contemplation of the Symbolic
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itself. The transcendental Real along with the unknown and the sublime are the surfaces on
which this intellectual project can happen.
So how does the Real, as a transcendental object, do this? It does this through a
conceptual understanding of the unknown; the Real is, in Lacan, intentionally unknown. We
describe the Real and the sublime as something beyond, something so great that the mind itself
has difficulty containing the immense accumulation of experiences. Primary among these is the
pressure to organize the experiences of the sublime and the unknown for the Symbolic. Many
attempts have only served to postpone the inevitability of the possibility that there is no answer
or basis and that assimilation into the Symbolic is just another construct.
The sublime, the unconscious, and nothingness are all markers in the search for meaning
in the human experience. Without this motivation, what indeed would human existence be?
Many people consider the idea of a utopian future the worst of all possible worlds. Why?
Because the seeking and searching is over; all our needs are met; and we live a life of complete
repose. This appearance of stability and contentedness is, perhaps, why Eve, in her greatness,
delivered to Adam the fruit of the tree of knowledge: not to condemn him to life as a human but
to free him from a life of mindless frivolity, from a life as a non-being, a symbol of nonexistence, a ghost of what a human being can be.
The sublime and the Real are partners in exposing the anxious relationship we have with
the unknown as it has developed in human psychology. We want and need to have the blank
canvas of the possible on which to paint our thoughts, concepts, and ontological horizons, but
this also leaves us with a sense of anxiety. The nothingness that Sartre identifies as the reason for
being is a conceptual tool that intends to motivate us to live authentically outside the Symbolic.
The nothingness, or possible nothingness, embedded in ideas of death have led to the
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construction of many conceptual, religious, and ideological monuments throughout history. Fear
of death, which has existed since humans became sentient beings, has been a central focus of
many cultures. The ancient Egyptians went to great lengths to ensure that the dead would have
the accouterments of a good life in death, or, as they preferred to call it, the ‘after-life.’ Great
tombs were built, and even common people were given similar treatment in the burial rituals of
ancient Egypt. This, of course, did not mean that there was an “after-life” but only that the living
expressed hope for an “after-life” of some kind so that the experience of human life could in
some form carry on.
The sublime and the Real both provide this conceptual groundwork for human
psychology to operate on. This hidden variable, if you will, puts the human mind in a kind of
motion; this motion is unlike other kinds of mental activity in that there is no known solution for
it. Human psychology, if Lacan is correct, can be thought of as a type of computer program that
runs through language and operates on the premise that language is truth. The way in which the
unknown, which causes what we call ‘the sublime,’ operates is a reminder that we can transcend
language.
Religions have attempted to put this ontological quandary to rest by suggesting we are
incapable of understanding because we are not God. Only God understands, and our position is
to obey and believe. Philosophy also has attempted to resolve this problem by suggesting
different ontologies and definitions of the things known and unknown and our relationship to
them. If reality is only an object of the mind, as Kant and Plato suggest, then how seriously are
we to consider it in our decisions? Kant suggests that our access to the “supersensible”—a metaproperty of the human mind—through the sublime places us in proximity to the Real in an a
priori, transcendental way. For Kant, we receive this enlightened power of the mind through this
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encounter.(Kant The Critique of Judgement 76) The symbolic interpretation Kant gives for the
sublime supports the enlightenment moment but ultimately leaves us without direction. None of
these solutions seems to fully resolve the issue or bring us closer to the kind of relationship that
can have value in relation to the unknown.
Can the sublime reveal or open up a space for the understanding of what Lacan calls the
Real? Lacan’s claim that we cannot access the Real because we are bound up in language and the
Symbolic is an interesting intellectual puzzle. But this idea seems to make the Real all the more
compelling. The Sublime exists on the threshold between what is and what is not bound by
language. The experience that is the sublime and the way in which we describe it using language
further emphasize the distance between the inside and outside of language. In essence, the
sublime divulges that which is beyond language, which is equal to what Lacan calls ‘the Real.’
The Real and the sublime are really conceptual objects of the mind; they do not exist objectively.
By examining these two concepts we may see what conditions they may exert in framing our
experiences.
What are the boundaries between the Real and the sublime? Does one assist or become
the child of the other? I suggest that the Real and the sublime differ only in definition. They both
operate as unknowns, but they are used in the service of different conceptual frameworks in
language. Definitions or interpretations are created for use in language and are agreed-upon
symbols that we use to communicate or to attempt to communicate. Language both solves and
creates problems that are revealed through concepts like the Real and the sublime. We do not
have sufficient language to describe and/or associate the Real or the sublime or to adapt them
fully to our understanding. In using language to articulate the sublime and the Real, we only
create a framework of expression that circles the basic ideas. The language we use to frame the
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sublime and the Real is more metaphor than solid material meaning. The use of metaphor in
describing the Real and the sublime becomes important because of this flexibility and lack of
rigid analysis. A probable reason for the creation of concepts like the Real and the sublime is that
we need the unknown, which is often related to fear or anxiety but can also represent the
possible. At the very least, these two concepts create a unique intellectual situation for the
framing of our experiences and our subsequent thinking about them that questions the
relationships of our Subject to the structures we inhabit.

LACAN AND LANGUAGE
Language, as seen through an analysis of Lacan’s thought, also mediates how and what
we know. Taking our use of language for granted, we have come to accept its limitations as part
of the process of being human. Lacan’s suggestion that language and its structures have a
significant effect on our psychology and should give us reason to want to examine language
more closely. Lacan’s theories provide insight into our use and understanding of language and
reveal language’s mediating and limiting factors, which can intrude on our search and can color
our understanding of the world. In this case, the relationship we have to language creates the
understanding of things we can know and things we cannot or do not yet know. If language
limits our abilities in the way it has been presented here, then more work needs to be done in
order to find out if change is possible.
Lacan’s theories and the surrounding discourse suggest to us that language, as we
understand and use it, is seriously flawed. Yet, as Lacan declares, we cannot escape the use of
language, and it is essential in our understanding of concepts that lie beyond language.
Established mysteries, like God and the sublime, are still articulated through language. The fact
that we cannot fully articulate these things through words does not diminish the importance of
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these feelings and experiences. In certain ways, our encounters with the sublime and the
unknown make them all the more attractive to us in the human experience. We are particularly
drawn to the mysterious, and the question then becomes: If I cannot describe or clearly
communicate a concept of that experience, does that make it invalid for consideration within
human existence? Like it or not, our tendency to be curious is a part of what it means to be
human. Yet examination based on curiosity alone is at times misdirected or flawed and lacks any
credible and demonstrable evidence.
The desire to know and to understand our place in the universe and the world around us is
known to be a universal human trait. The reasons for our desire to know is that to have
knowledge, to be informed, allows us to better chart ourselves a course for a future. This desire
has been fundamental in the creation of civilizations from the first historic references. We cannot
deny the desire we have for certainty and knowledge.
Things that are unknown and things that do not have stable explanations in the human
experience are numerous. For example, we often find ourselves considering things that are
fanciful, such as pondering a different life, having daydreams, or sometimes even having visions.
Often these imaginings intrude upon and motivate what we do in our everyday existence. For
example, reading a horoscope for fun can set and frame your experiences for that day. There can
sometimes be negative or dismissive language associated with these events, but the fact remains
they do have influence on our existence.
If language mediates the human experience, as Lacan suggests, we must question the
nature of language and its uses and functions as it pertains to our experiences. Lacan’s unique
association of language and the psychology of the unconscious gives a particularly rich
perspective from which to view these experiences. His ideas make it clear that we are presented
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with a dilemma when we are considering analysis. In order to do an analysis, we must use
language, but this language we use is also mediated by the very problems of language itself. It is
as if we are, to use a Zen analogy, like the eye trying to see itself.
Lacan, Derrida, and Foucault, all contributed to this examination of language, which has
led to postmodern conceptions of meaning. The question posed to the postmodern thinker: What
can human experience mean, if nothing can have meaning? We can thank Lacan and others for
this intellectual position which attacks our basic assumptions for deriving meaning (language)
and, at the same time, sends the mind off in search of ways of attaching new meanings to
problems. When evidence comes to light that something has a mediating function, the natural
tendency is to ask how and why it does this. Humans have many experiences outside of
language; we need only to understand how such experiences are useful in our existence without
the limiting factors of language.
Kant established the transcendental foundation for understanding, showing how the
human experience needs conceptual categories that can be used to frame experiences. Concepts
are critical for human understanding and thinking. Concepts help us to see the world and ideas in
certain ways, and we need these perspectives in order to be a part of the world. Concepts like the
sublime establish a particular intellectual foundation on which we can stand and, from there, look
out at the world. The uncertainty of language, however, can make us question these perspectives
and interpretive strategies. The question about being inside or outside language creates rich,
valuable possibilities for thinking. The disorienting effects of experiences outside language are
not new, but our ability to understand and put these experiences to use has been lost in the West.
For us, the question of the inside of language and the outside of language can be likened to
asking a goldfish to imagine itself to be outside the water. The party game Charades is an
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example of how language fails us and of how attached we are to language. Lacanian theory
proposes that through an awareness that we are inside of language—i.e., controlled and
conditioned by it—we can better understand how our psychology has developed and, in the case
of psychoanalysis, identify failings and make corrections. Still, the question of being outside of
language maintains it compelling nature.
In considering Lacan’s theories in relation to mystery—primarily to the sublime, the
perspective of being locked inside of the Symbolic and hence language can act as a basis for our
initial thoughts. Much language has been used in an attempt to understand the sublime or, to be
more accurate, to capture the sublime for particular purposes. Language has become, in concepts
such as the sublime, a way to enable specific ideologies and movements to flourish and to
influence populations. Humans naturally seek certainty when faced with deep philosophical
questions, for the lack of certainty allows the anxiety the existentialists revealed to enter
consciousness. It is because the human experience is not clearly understood that this anxiety is
still with us and perhaps will continue to be with us if we lean upon the language and strategies
of the past for our knowledge of it.
Our psychological dependence on desire, as supposed by Lacan and Freud, is an
indication of the need we have to be loved, appreciated, and noticed in the world. Insecurities
drive many human efforts. Lacan, in his graph of desire, clearly locates this need as a central
motivation in the experience of humans, even though, for him, this is largely part of the
unconscious. According to Lacan, much of our desire emanates from the supposition of the
desire of the other. Again, our desires are to be the desire of the “other.” The insecurities we feel
are that we are not what the “other” desires.
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Lacan and psychoanalytic theory offer us a vantage point for seeing the landscape of
human experience, the limits of our abilities and weakness, and the paradoxes that claim
authority over us. Understanding the way in which we use and fall under the spell of language
gives us leverage in places where language clearly fails to operate. In these failures, we may
begin to mine the importance of how our psychology works. Further, we have a better view to
see how we have constructed, utilized, and perhaps dismissed important concepts and functions
of our own experiences as part of any becoming or being.
The experience of the sublime remains dynamic, free from the confines of language; it
asks challenging questions and stands as a representation of freedom. Lacan’s psychological
analysis and theories suggest that freedom is not a given and that language limits and controls
our freedom to exist in the ways we may not choose. The sublime experience, as we know it, is
one where we are presented with an ultimate freedom. No language can describe it and no other
person can have exactly the same experience. In the sublime, we are free to emerge from the
experience and take a new direction, plan a new future.
Freedom can be understood as a primary desire in the human experience. Our need to
exercise our will in ways we consider useful and pleasurable is central to what we consider to be
freedom. The idea that language encapsulates my being makes me uncomfortable and stirs an
angry rebelliousness. The desire for freedom, associated with the freedom I can imagine or that I
assume exists for the Other, is the point of connection for Lacanian analysis. My encounter with
the sublime experience is a direct expression of this freedom. It places me outside of language; it
frees me, if even for the briefest of moments, from this structure. It allows me to have a look at
what the experience, unburdened by concretized symbolic universals, can be.
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COMPARISON OF THE SUBLIME AND LACANIAN THEORIES
The usefulness in examining the sublime through the lens of Lacanian theories centers on
the fact that the unconscious and the sublime share the characteristic of being unknowable or of
simply being considered a mystery. The very notion of unknowability is difficult to understand
in the experience of being human. To integrate the unknown into the human experience in a
Western secular way has not been successful to this point. Countless examples can be cited, from
the split of faith and reason in the Middle Ages to the rift between analytic and continental
philosophy to the stark differences between Western and Eastern philosophies. Cultural and
ideological confrontations, based on the defense of one side or the other, abound.
Lacan’s psychoanalysis shines a light on the structures that bind us. With this knowledge
we can attempt to shift our perspective to processes that better fulfill our desires. In the sublime,
a similar opportunity to revise the world and ourselves also exists. Lacanian psychoanalysis and
the sublime both offer an opportunity for change and reflection, thus providing the possibility of
adjustment or alteration to our interpretation and interactions with the Symbolic. The sublime
experience stops language and the Symbolic from operation for a brief moment. It is in this brief
moment, when existence and our being are both free from constraint and rule, that we can
exercise our will to emerge from the experience as a Subject transformed.
Lacan, following Freud, was concerned with the unconscious and with how language is
used and understood and how it affects our consciousness. If value exists in the theorizing of the
unconscious in this way, then one could also apply this thinking to the idea of being outside of
language and could consider what kind of ontology is possible in this way.
Art is often an area where the term ‘sublime’ is heard in contemporary times. The reason
for this is that art is often attempting to transcend or make a transcendent statement about the
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world and its practices. In other words, art needs to operate outside of language specifically for
the reasons outlined so far. But the sublime is not a specific experience, emotion, or feeling.
Rather, to best understand and experience the sublime requires all of our abilities: reason,
emotion, imagination, and understanding.
The sublime used inside of language, as we attempt to articulate and interpret the
experience, often becomes confused and misdirected. Usually, we leave the sublime in the void
between language and the transcendent. Like our Subject, the sublime is mediated through
language and controls its use, description, and interpretation. Returning to Lacan’s suggestion
that language is a symbolic structure leads to the following questions: If language is Symbolic,
what is the sublime symbolizing? Or what are we suggesting the sublime is a symbol for? Or
what symbol signifies the sublime? Is the sublime a sign or a referent? Kant offers us an answer:
the sublime is an experience that symbolizes our own cognitive abilities. (Kant The Critique of
Judgement 81)But Kant’s answer leaves us wanting. The idea that the sublime only evokes a
feeling of terror from a place of security from that terror does not cover the expanse of how the
sublime can affect us. The terror one feels in Burke’s sublime either must be a real terror or not a
real terror. Burke’s description of the sublime, as being at once terrible as well as pleasing,
seems to forgo the possibility of the overwhelming power of terror annihilating any likely
pleasure, even what he defines as negative pleasure. Kant refers to negative pleasure in reference
to the sublime because the immediate experience in the sublime is a limiting effect on the
sensible qualities of experience. In other words, it is a negative pleasure because we are attracted
to and yet repulsed by the experience, which forces us back into the mind and rationality. For
Kant, this attempt at transcendent rationality reveals the ‘supersensible’ powers of human reason.
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Kant’s language describes the inner intellectual dialog that arises from the encounter with
what he calls the sublime, not the sublime as it is. Kant requires an object in reality that moves
the Subject into the experience of the sublime. Would Lacan suggest that the encounter with the
sublime has a desire attached? And if so, what desire could be attached to something as
ambiguous as the sublime? Lacan’s analysis places desire at the center of much of what moves
the Subject in the world. What we know about the sublime would allow us to say that it creates a
desire in that it is a great unknown like the unconscious. In psychoanalysis, the need to
understand desires as they relate to the Subject and the world is a primary factor because our
desires direct the creation of our Subject.
The sublime is something we have, use, and participate in that demonstrates how
incomplete language is in the human experience. Throughout history we have romanticized the
sublime and identified the experience as special. But our examination has constructed the
sublime as special because we need it to be distinct for some purpose or desire. In the sublime
experience, we select a certain kind of response that fits within the current set of social, cultural,
and intellectual situations which express our desires in the Symbolic Order. Despite this
conditioning, there is the potential for the sublime experience to help us change and transcend
our current way of being. The sublime experience changes as we change. Things that seemed
dull and mundane to us at one point suddenly become the most moving and sublime in another.

POSSIBLE VALUE IN COMPARING THE SUBLIME AND LACANIAN
PSYCHOANALYSIS
To better understand what possibilities may exist in the comparison of the sublime to
Lacanian psychoanalysis, we have to allow for several assumptions. Psychoanalysis begins with
the assumption that the unconscious affects the consciousness; in other words, the unknown
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affects the known. Lacan’s theory lays out the conceptual framework for us to understand and
analyze our actions and potential idiosyncratic behaviors through analysis. If we can assume the
value of Lacan’s theory, then it would seem practical to apply this theory to similar situations
that have the same open-ended relationship with the unknown.
Although Lacan does not directly posit a telos for his analysis, there is an implied search
for truth the Subject of the analysis can lean upon to position themselves in relation to the
Symbolic. Analysis does not promise the healing of the Subject in the Symbolic; it only reveals
the problems in how Symbolic functions and how the Subject can stand in relation to it. Lacan’s
analysis offers a the Subject a framework and an acceptable way to unpack the structures binding
us by creating an opening in which to better understand the complexities of our circumstances.
The sublime is influenced by the Symbolic as well, taking interpreted meaning and
understanding from the Symbolic in the same way the analyst does.
Can analysis and the sublime intend the same purpose? The Symbolic would seem to
require the Subject to conform to the Symbolic Order and to be consistent with other Subjects.
But Lacan’s triad structure creates an open system that moves in multiple directions that denies a
singular monolithic understand of our consciousness. When we encounter the sublime, even
when the experience shakes us loose of the Symbolic, we often use the responses that the
Symbolic has predetermined for us. Operating inconsistently with the Symbolic is the kind of
rupture Žižek and Lacan both use as examples and has been used to great effect in drama. Recall
that Antigone is torn between a moral responsibility to give her brother a proper burial and the
law represented by King Creon, who has condemned the brother to be killed and his body left to
be devoured by the birds. The dilemma itself is created by how the character is interpreted
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through the Symbolic. The choices that Antigone confronts show the distance that exists between
the Symbolic Order and the desires of Antigone as a Subject.
As we have seen in previous chapters, differing connotations of the sublime have been
put in service of the prevailing Symbolic Order of the time. In the West, language has been used
to encapsulate the sublime into popular culture. One thing that is still clear, however, is that the
sublime is required to be something mysterious. For Lacan, the unknown of the unconscious is
the primary motivating factor for the analysand’s focus in relationship to the Symbolic. In the
sublime, the Subject is left struggling with the unknown, the unanswerable. The Symbolic
imposes itself upon and predetermines much of what the Subject can be.
Applying Lacanian theories to the sublime points us in two directions: one is the
unknown and the other is the problems in the Symbolic itself. Questions can arise from the
sublime experience in which an unknown can be interpreted by the Symbolic. But because this
distinction is never quite sufficient, it can also lead us to questions about the Symbolic and the
interpretative powers being executed. Lacan's theory presents the unconscious as an unknown
that can be examined by building a relationship with the Symbolic, Imaginary, and Real in a type
of dynamic system. The resulting analysis through the dynamic associations of the Symbolic,
Imaginary, and Real give the Subject a way to seek truth about the Subjects place in existence.
The result of Lacanian analysis, and our encounter with the sublime, reveals our relationship to
the ontological and can be a benefit to our understanding of and enhance our relationship with
the mysterious.
The agency that the Symbolic Order claims defines the sublime as an unknown with a
revered status often used for religious ceremony or, in the contemporary moment, for artwork,
sports, and in other parts of popular culture. The agency that is exerted by the Symbolic on the
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concept of the sublime has had a range of purposes, from swaying the masses in ancient Greece
to describing contemporary art in our present moment.
Lacan’s analysis intends to bring the analysand into a more harmonious and functional
association with the symbolic order. By thrusting the Symbolic, Imaginary, and Real as concepts
into the consciousness of the Subject, a perspective of possibility is achieved. From this
perspective, interpretations can be constructed such that the analysand can see the Subject as
both being and not being. Put simply, Lacanian analysis reveals a kind of game, so to speak, in
which the player (the Subject in need of analysis) does not realize a game was being played. The
sublime reveals a game of a different sort, one in which we do not enter into or play by a set of
rules, as in the Symbolic. It presents a game where the rules are made up by the game and the
Subject. The conceptual framework of the sublime is openness. But an examination of the
sublime is something that requires the human mind and spirit to open up and freely examine the
experience and its effects on the experiencer. The understanding in the experience of the sublime
has many contingencies—not the least of which is what the Subject does with the experience.
Lacan’s theory is anything but simple or easy to understand. The importance of Lacanian
analysis, however, can be useful in the progress or potential progress and evolution of any
Subject. A questioning mind has been the motivating factor of most of human progress. There
have also been many cases in which critical thinking and rationalism have taken humans in a
seriously destructive direction. Lacan also deals with the unconscious, but the triadic structure
analyzes the unconscious in the relationship to the forces the subject has to cope and work with
in the world. The integration of the unconscious into the Symbolic Order suggests that there is a
program to follow. This reads as a type of determinism: a prescribed set of rules to follow with
already accepted results. But reason does not accept this because such an idea dismisses freedom
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of will. Questions of determinism and free will are embodied in the examination of the Subject in
relation to the Symbolic. Lacan suggests that in accepting the programming of the Symbolic
alone that the Subject may exist in harmony with the symbolic order, but that this can create and
incomplete subject and instead Lacan argues for the inclusion of the Imaginary and the Real to
insure an operating synergy and possibility of finding a truth the subject can utilize for progress
and evolution. The unmediated sublime experience offers freedom: an unknown freedom that
also holds possibilities for progress.

SUMMARY
Theories of human psychology, like Lacan’s, give us a conceptual framework within
which to explore and attempt to understand the world. Lacan’s particular theories provide a
myriad of questions about our place in the world and how it is constructed. In using the theories
of Lacan, we can be led to a particular ontological position. A position that we may ultimately
decide is incorrect for our dispositions. In suggesting that our language mediates our experiences
of the world, Lacan suggests we take another look at the foundational questions about the nature
of human experience and existence. Just like the sublime outside language, Lacan’s theories
make us uncomfortable in this world and present us with a paradox. We can simply accept our
place in the Symbolic, with all its failings, or we look to Lacan’s multilayered triadic structure
for better questions about our existence. Johann Gottlieb Fichte said, “[T]he kind of philosophy
one chooses depends upon the kind of person one is” (Breazeale). The reality for us is that the
outlook we take, the expectations we have, the beliefs we choose to operate under, can be
influential in how we perceive our existence. The sublime, as an experience, gives us an
opportunity to recognize our role in addressing the unknown. This experience of the sublime can
lead back into the Symbolic, but similar to Lacan’s triadic examination, can also open us up to
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other potentials and ontological outlooks. The fact that we can imagine other ways of being and
the fact that we are ultimately free to choose these other ways of being are necessary elements in
psychology and in the human experience.
The reading of Lacan and his expositions of his theories creates for the reader a sublime
experience. Lacan is very difficult to read and to understand. It takes multiple readings and time
to digest the ideas presented and they are often deliberately challenging to the concepts we have
become habituated to. My personal experience of the reading of works by Lacan have left me in
the same spaces as some of the other sublime experiences I can identify in my life. His work has
left me ungrounded, uncertain, grasping for solid connections to the conventional thinking that
my Western habitual practices have provided. In many ways reading Lacan is a sublime
experience: one through which you can be transformed.
In using Lacan’s theories and relating them to the sublime, we can see how mediating
factors stifle possible conceptual constructions that can assist in our progress and thus limit the
results of our experience. Lacan’s theories and the sublime open up spaces for conceptual
inauguration and analysis. Though these may be slightly different spaces, they are still effective
tools in the construction and analysis of the Subject, culture, and possibilities for future
ontological choices.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Faith and Reason
Faith . . . must be enforced by reason . . . when faith becomes blind it dies.
—Mahatma Gandhi

Faith consists in believing when it is beyond the power of reason to believe.
—Voltaire
FAITH AND REASON, WHAT IS THE PROBLEM?
It might seem odd to include a problem like the rift between faith and reason in a
dissertation about the sublime. I chose to include this discussion because it highlights and
problems of Western preferences for dualisms in thinking and in our problematic relationship to
things unknown or mysterious. The West has a preference for scientific and analytic thinking and
because of that, I believe, it reveals the weakness in limiting our preferences to only specified
outlooks. The primacy of the sublime experience in forming a vision of the future of humanity
lies in the realization that many of our experiences will be a mysterious. Mystery acts as a
driving force propelling us forward into an uncertain future. The relationship we have with the
sublime and the mysteries it presents can define a course towards what the best of humanity can
be rather than what it seems to be at any moment. This is an element which we, in the
contemporary West seem to have left behind, and instead we embrace technology and the virtual
as replacements for the reality of our human existence. The sublime still exists to inform us that
to be human is to have experiences that are grounded in the complete expression of our
humanity: this includes both having faith and using our reason and having a positive and useful
relationship with the mysterious and sublime.
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As the two quotes above would seem to indicate, there has been a consistent and ongoing
discourse surrounding the concepts of faith and reason. In the West, as examined earlier in this
dissertation in the chapter on language, the idea that a word and its meanings can have some
privileged position in the culture has been explored.40 In addition to certain words holding a
privileged place and meaning in the culture, some concepts are interpreted as being solidly
determined and with concrete meanings. The privileging of a term has the same effect as the
privileging of a class or specific group of people. This creates a confrontational attitude between
the meanings of things and creates a type of classism within those meanings. This, in turn,
creates a distance or rift between two terms in any binary.
Typically, these binaries do not seem like such a problem. Take the choice between
chocolate or vanilla ice cream. It does, however, become a much bigger issue when we are
discussing making a choice between faith and reason, between the known and the unknown. This
rift exists between the words and concepts ‘faith’ and ‘reason’ because of the ongoing and
developing cultural dependence on the use of these binaries that results in a classist view and
determination of the meanings of the parts of the binary.
The examination of the dilemma of privileged terms in language has been explored
earlier in this dissertation and by other theorists and philosophers. Probably one of the most
scrutinized examples of dualisms can be traced back to René Descartes body mind problem.
(Descartes and Veitch 93-103) “ I suppose, accordingly, that all the things which I see are false
(fictitious); I believe that none of those objects which my fallacious memory represents ever
existed; I suppose I possess no senses; I believe that my body, figure, extension, motion and
place are merely fictions of my mind.”(Descartes and Veitch 93-4) The resulting dominating
term in Descartes exploration is the mind. For it is the mind that must exists even if the body is a

135
fiction made up by that mind. In the dualism we know as faith and reason, reason has, as we will
explore, become the privileged term. It is necessary for us to have clearer understanding of how
the privileged term (‘reason’) has affected our relationship to mystery and what this ultimately
does to our ability to understand our world in ways that can bring about peace, equality, and
benefit for all.
In identifying early thinkers who began the practice of privileging certain terms, we can
look back to Plato.41 In his writings, Plato, often through the character of Socrates, sets the
course for the privileging of reason over faith:
And what, Socrates, is the food of the soul? Surely, I said, knowledge is the food
of the soul; and we must take care my friend, the Sophist does not deceive us
when he praises what he sells, like dealers wholesale or retail who sell the food of
the body; for they praise indiscriminately all their goods, without knowing what
are really beneficial or hurtful: neither do their customers know, with the
exception of any trainer of physician who may happen to buy of them. (8022)
In this quotation from Protagoras,42 Plato again privileges knowledge (reason) over all else and
establishes the rational as having primary importance in the ethical, religious, political, and
social aspects of life in early Greece. In his most well-known text The Republic;43 Plato also
makes the case for a society ruled by reason. As an example, in book X of The Republic, Plato
suggests we banish the arts and artists from his ideal state because he believes that the artist and
their arts lie about the truth of the world: “And the tragic poet is an imitator, and, therefore, like
all other imitators, he is thrice removed from the king and from the truth” .(Plato 382) Plato in
The Republic argues for the use of reason and the rational as guiding principles for all aspects of
living.
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These foundations of thinking begun by these early philosophers created a platform from
which all future judgements and relationships to the things in the world would come to be
understood. To separate ourselves from the animals by appreciating our ability to reason was a
natural response in the early moments of human understanding. It would, as many things often
do, result in reaching an impasse.
Rene Descartes44 set a hard boundary on our understanding of reason versus faith. In his
famous statement, “cogito ergo sum” (I think therefore I am), he established a radical doubt that
empirical metaphysics must still answer to this day. In Discourse on Methods in establishing this
radical doubt, Descartes states,
And finally, when I considered that the very same thoughts (presentations) which
we experience when awake may also be experienced when we are asleep, while
there is at that time not one of them true, I supposed that all the objects
(presentations) that had ever entered into my mind when awake, had in them no
more truth than the illusions of my dreams. But immediately upon this I observed
that, whilst I thus wished to think that all was false, it was absolutely necessary
that I can, who thus thought, should be somewhat; and as I observed this truth, I
think, therefore I am (COGITO ERGO SUM), was so certain and of such
evidence that no ground of doubt, however extravagant, could be alleged by the
skeptics capable of shaking it, I concluded that I might, without scruple, accept it
as the first principle of the philosophy of which I was in search. (351-2)
Plato’s and Descartes’s thoughts helped in establishing a process for the examination of the
world with the expectation that they would find a singular, central, universal core of truth of the
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human experience and that universal truth would answer all our questions. This notion is itself
very rational and continues to be compelling to our intellectual questionings.
This way of beginning our understanding of the human experience would suggest that our
relationships to the things in our world are based on having a two-part meaning, what we now
call ‘dualisms.’ In other words, for meanings to arise from dualisms, we must suppose a type of
reflecting surface between the two terms. To understand what darkness is, we must also know
lightness. These basic relationships would ultimately form into the many dualisms we know and
use today. Descartes’s mind and body problem,45 Plato’s metaphysics of the forms,46 each
suggest a choice be made in relationship to our perceptions. These dualisms, as well as others,
functioning as tools of understanding, became part of the intellectual culture at large. The use of
binaries, or dualisms, and our way of understanding them still hold influence over the meanings
of the words placed in these binary oppositions. The existing binaries, and the meanings we
interpret through them, restrict and mediate those very meanings. Some of these concepts and
meanings are surely important to our outlook regarding our existence and, if we can gain a better
view of them, can help us to understand and create better directions for our progress.
The thoughts of thinkers like Plato and Descartes, and their contributions to the
worldview of the West, encouraged rather than discouraged our suspicions of the compatibility
of faith and reason. The purpose is not to challenge others who have articulated this dilemma
before, but to re-articulate this problem for use in our current situation in the West.

DEFINING LANGUAGE: PRIMARY TERMS
Faith means belief in something concerning which doubt is still theoretically
possible; and as the test of belief is willingness to act, one may say that faith is the
readiness to act in a cause the prosperous issue of which is not certified to us in
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advance. It is in fact, the same moral quality which we call courage in practical
affairs; and there will be a very widespread tendency in men of vigorous nature to
enjoy a certain amount of uncertainty in their philosophic creed, just as risk lends
a zest to worldly activity.
—William James47
In the understanding of the forthcoming discussion, the text will follow William James’s
model for truth, which relies on belief as a participant in the determining of truth.
Truth, James holds, is “a species of the good,” like health. Truths are goods
because we can “ride” on them into the future without being unpleasantly
surprised. They “lead us into useful verbal and conceptual quarters as well as
directly up to useful sensible termini. They lead to consistency, stability and
flowing human intercourse. They lead away from eccentricity and isolation, from
foiled and barren thinking” (103). Although James holds that truths are “made”
(104) in the course of human experience, and that for the most part they live “on a
credit system” in that they are not currently being verified, he also holds the
empiricistic view that “beliefs verified concretely by somebody are the posts of
the whole superstructure” (P, 100). (Goodman)

In James’s account, faith is followed closely by belief. He outlines the synergy between faith and
belief as necessary in order to have the kinds of experience that give us the best kinds of
understandings. James, in The Will to Believe, describes our relationship to faith: “In all
important transactions of life we have to take a leap in the dark. . . . If we decide to leave the
riddles unanswered, that is a choice; if we waiver in our answer, that, too, is a choice: but
whatever choice we make, we make it at our peril” (James 31). James in his distinctly pragmatic
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approach does two things for us: first, he sweeps away much of the mystical un-provability of
the ideas we typically associate with faith; second, he places the discussion about faith in a better
relationship to terms of possibility and potentials for us as living beings.
Faith can and, in this discussion, will be associated with uncertainty in its most natural
state. Many will argue that this is not faith because in religions and generally in our
contemporary understanding faith has become a type of certainty. But, depending on what
choices we make regarding how we choose to associate ourselves with faith, even when
considering blind religious faith, a decision is made that will determine the way in which we
interpret a particular metaphysical/ontological outlook. Feeling compelled to make the choice
between either faith or reason exists at the heart of the disparity. We can speculate that blind
faith, of the type various religions require, is a natural block to reason. When considering faith,
we can speculate that this type of faith is very logical. Kierkegaard states, “If I am able to
apprehend God objectively, I do not have faith; but because I cannot do this, I must have faith”
(207). Kierkegaard’s take on what it means to have faith creates a clear path to the kind of faith
he believes in necessary to truly believe in God, the greatest mystery. This idea also denies any
other system of belief and stifles the possibility of inclusion of any other diverse or pluralistic
rationalities. The possibility of finding an ultimate answer to human existence, one which
continues to elude us, is perhaps why it remains so compelling.
Religious faith has become for many, what the word ‘faith’ has come to signify. The
vocabulary used for ideological and religious paths that have dominated the discourse
surrounding faith has established itself and has come to be accepted as ‘truth.’48 When ‘faith’
operates as the privileged term however, as in the religious what? You need a noun here, it has
proven unable to provide us a clear or better understanding of the concepts of faith in general.
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Faith, even blind faith, requires that a choice be made. The decision we make concerning
our beliefs, whether leaning toward certainty or uncertainty, establishes our fundamental
relationship with mystery. Further, this relationship depends upon the vocabulary we have to
describe and organize it in our experiences. As you recall from the chapter on language, the
restricted meanings of words complicate language in many circumstances. The term ‘blind faith’
derives its meaning from the seeming virtue of finding empirical truth for the thing under
examination. Faith of this kind is by design and necessity a limit to reason, but by denying us any
access to reason it also limits the overall abilities of the person. Blind faith, the kind that most
religions demand, states that reason cannot participate with faith; one needs only faith to find
truth.
The concepts and their cultural, social, and intellectual connections to the word ‘faith’ are
complex to be sure. This text assumes not to answer all the questions or objections surrounding
faith but will, for the purpose here, examine faith in its relationship to mystery, to the things we
do not yet understand. Faith, it will be suggested, can be in part descriptive in the relationship to
the mysteries we encounter. This is important because it can motivate our actions, which can be
and should be in large part moderated by our reason.

DEFINING REASON
There is always some madness in love. But there is also always some reason in
madness.
—Friedrich Nietzsche49
In the above quotation, Nietzsche makes clear that reason is brought to service for almost
any circumstance. Perhaps, this is why it seems to have been so valued since the Enlightenment.
It has come to be the part of us we believe in and depend on for making the best choices and for
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placing value on things. Like faith, however, reason gets used in ways that favor the outcomes it
in isolation can provide. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy defines reason this way: “The
general human ‘faculty’ or capacity for truth-seeking and problem solving, differentiated from
instinct, imagination, or faith in that its results are intellectually trustworthy—even to the extent,
according to rationalism,50 that reason is both necessary and sufficient for arriving at
knowledge”51 (Honderich 791).
As an example, however, of how reason is put in service of questionable ends, the Nazis
in power in Germany in the 1930s and ’40s made a rational case to the people of Germany for
the starting of World War II and the unbridled killing and torture of millions of European Jews.
It is difficult for us to consider such a horrible event as being done by reasonable people, but we
must believe it to have been the case if we accept the fact that an entire country could have
sanctioned such atrocities. Otherwise we would be forced to consider all Germans and the
reasoning they used as inherently evil. Theodore Adorno and Max Horkheimer in their Dialectic
of Enlightenment raised a warning:
By leaving consideration of the destructive side of progress to its enemies,
thought in its headlong rush into pragmatism is forfeiting its sublating character,
and therefore its relation to truth. In the mysterious willingness of the
technologically educated masses to fall under the spell of any despotism, in its
self-destructive affinity to nationalist paranoia, in all this un-comprehended
senselessness the weakness of contemporary theoretical understanding is evident.
(Horkheimer and Adorno xvi)
Adorno and Horkheimer, living in the time of the rise of the Nazis, were able to see Fascism52 in
its relationship to the ideals set forth in the Enlightenment, which raised reason to the heights we
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understand it to have today. One of the main points in the Dialectic of Enlightenment is that
using reason alone leaves open the possibility for bad decisions, decisions that place value on
things that disregard or treat the people in the system like replaceable or reproducible parts.
The terms within any dualism often change order of privilege depending on their
context. As noted, reason is that part of us that requires and expects verification and justification
for the things we encounter. Reason fulfills our desire to organize and to place truth values on
things in the world. These value-structures we create place emphasis on things we need to
believe to create consistency with the ontological choices and our preferred metaphysical
directions.
Reason is also a word connected with a diversified set of meanings across intellectual and
cultural boundaries in the West. The prevailing idea of reason is that it is cold, logical, rational,
unbending, and, as a cultural force, always the most accurate and correct place to ground our
experiences. We often hear the phrase “be reasonable” when someone is attempting to convince
another of a version of truth the other is not ready to accept. Reason is a particularly powerful
character: it serves many of the West's ideological forces. Its influence can be found everywhere
from fashion to fast food.
The antagonistic relationship between faith and reason has consequences that mediate our
choices and our relationship to mystery. This, of course, did not happen instantly, nor did it
happen because either faith or reason was found failing. This dualism, and our subsequent
bifurcated understanding of the two terms, has made this rift prominent and the possibility of
cooperation between them less likely.
To summarize and clarify, reason is the human capacity for thinking. Thinking can, as we
have shown, be turned in the direction needed to support any particular case. From this point
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forward this type of reason or reasoning we should consider instrumental rationality or
instrumental reason53 and not the concept of reason in its purest sense. Reason is the pure
function of thinking that provides grounding and organizing of our experiences.54

GENEALOGY OF FAITH AND REASON
This chapter will explore the genealogy of our ongoing understanding of faith and reason
and our relationship to mystery. We will excavate cultural landscapes with an eye to better
understand the complex relationship we have with the unknown. By developing a better
understanding of our relationship to the unknown and our preference for binary language usage,
we can plot a course toward an ontology that offers the possibility of progress and a better world.
Early religions based their ontologies on the notion that there were many gods or deities
responsible for natural phenomena. Speculation leads us to assume these religions interpreted
what we now understand as natural as supernatural. “The gods are essential to the Homeric
Greek understanding of what it is to be a human being at all” (Dreyfus and Kelly 62). Hubert
Dreyfus contends that the multiplicity of gods in Homeric Greece kept the people in touch in
some way with their humanity. Understanding the passions of the different gods was essential for
the Greeks to appreciate and contextualize the lives they lead. In an explication of the story of
Helen in The Iliad,55 Dreyfus states,
Helen’s greatness, on this interpretation, is not properly measured in terms of the
degree to which she is morally responsible for her actions. What makes Helen
great in Homer’s world is her ability to live a life that is constantly responsive to
golden Aphrodite, the shining example of the sacred erotic dimension of
existence. Likewise, Achilles has a special kind of receptivity to Aries and his
warlike way of life; Odysseus had Athena, with her wisdom and cultural
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adaptability, to look out for him. Presumably, the master craftsman of Homer’s
world worked in the light of Hephaestus’s shining. (Dreyfus and Kelly 62)
We can suppose that Dreyfus thinks that, for the Greeks, there was an inclusive understanding of
the passions of the gods as part of the human experience and that people were often influenced
by and should, at times, also indulge in these passions. Out of their control, the sublime nature of
the effects of Aphrodite on Helen was something the Greeks accepted as necessary to their
ontological outlook. The sublime nature of the passions invoked by the interventions of the gods
in ancient Greece allowed the characteristics of the gods to become acceptable characteristics in
human beings and to be valid in the ongoing progression of life in the Greek culture.
With the kind of ontology the Greeks developed, it seems reasonable to assume that, they
had a limited or, more likely, a different kind of knowledge of the natural world (in comparison
to the scientific sophistication of today). They would have most likely imagined a caretaker or
creator of the things that were outside the realm of their understanding. We could also speculate,
because of the level of intellectual and cultural chaos in the world for people in ancient Greece
that they lived in a type of sublime state: always somewhere between truth and chaos. The
Greeks did not choose between faith and reason but understood their lives as a negotiation
between them.
The Greeks must have been much more comfortable with things they did not fully
understand than we are today. To live comfortably with the known and the unknown in the world
provided the Greeks a life of passion alongside the determinations made by rational thinking.
The inclusive ontology of the polytheism of the Greek culture is lost to us. The fall of Rome, the
rise of Christianity, and the onset of the Dark Ages created an excess of violence, power
struggles, and limits to the possibilities people saw for their lives. The kind of freedom enjoyed

145
by the Greeks was gone and a new set of possibilities and rules would direct people’s lives. This
new set of possibilities would be driven by a desire to be free from the chaos of the Dark Ages.
Religion, particularly Christianity, would provide a safe harbor for those escaping the turmoil of
the Dark Ages, but not without consequences. These religious conditions continue to affect our
understanding and relationship to the known and unknown.

CHRISTIANITY
People who perhaps never once go to church, never think about God, never name
his name except when they curse! People to whom it has never occurred that their
lives should have some duty to God, people who either maintain that a certain
civil impunity is the highest or do not even find is to be entirely necessary! Yet all
these people, even those who insist that there is no God, they are all Christians,
call themselves Christians, are recognized as Christians by the state, are buried as
Christians by the Church, are discharged as Christians to eternity!
—Kierkegaard56
This quote from Søren Kierkegaard, written well after the Middle Ages, is his attempt to
show how the Christian church had become a social structure and not a religion. This quote is
presented to place in context the experience of the church from a philosopher deeply committed
to faith and to Christ. I present it here to keep the contemporary issues present in the discussion
and to better understand the mixing of religion and society.
I realize that there were thinkers who worked in the middle ages trying to create a rational
path to understanding God in the Christian system. I have chosen not to address that theological
exploration in dept here because the work of this dissertation is not involved directly with the
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search for God in the theological sense, but is concerned with the relationship of faith and reason
as it manifests in the sublime. I mention the Christian expression here as a reference point to
faith and reason because Christianity in the culture of the West is perhaps the most visible and
overt example of how faith an reason interact.
Christianity established itself among the major religions of the world during the later
days of the Roman Empire. It offered salvation, and it offered safety to those willing to accept
the tenets of the Christian way of life. Shifting from a multiplicity of gods to a singular god was
a rational move toward a more orderly existence. Instead of having at times hundreds of deities
to whom prayers and sacrifices should be made, one singular God became responsible for the
well-being of the universe and all the humans in it. This order was, and still is, attractive to
humans living in a world of seemingly endless chaos. To this day, we cling to the illusions of an
orderly life to avoid admitting to the reality that from the human perspective the universe is
chaos. This order is meant to establish an ethical ground and to make people in the world feel
safer, more at ease and able to live productive lives. Christianity provided the stability that
people desired in exchange for obedience, subservience, and adherence to doctrines of the
church.
This is, perhaps, the moment that the word faith became more important than the word
passions. Christian doctrines sought to minimize the passions of the people and turn them toward
a more reserved and pious life. It is true that the Greeks lived with their human passions and
were much more accepting of the emotional in the culture. For the purposes of this discourse, the
reference to these two words and the seemingly meaningful distinction between faith and the
passions should be noted as a change of attitude toward what was considered most important and
what would lead to a good life.
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The movement toward these universal ideas for humans was not without a rationale.
Reason has become a leading informative element in the creation of the ontologies we use in our
visioning of the world and ourselves. Simplifying and condensing the complexities we face has
given us a sense of order and security. The positions taken by the Catholic Church during the
Middle Ages were very rational and useful. The idea of religion as universal truth is a very
rational idea in the face of the uncertainty and chaos of the universe and of human existence
particularly coming out of the Dark Ages. Choices, however, come with consequences,
particularly the distinctions and the directions the church promoted. The choice to follow an
ideology like the one the Catholic Church promoted would limit our relationship to the unknown
and create a somewhat limited vision of the known.
Its armies and acquired wealth made it possible for the Christian church to build
cathedrals around which walled cities were constructed. Inside these walls people would be safe
from the dangers of marauders and barbarians who roamed Europe, warring and plundering.
Who would not be willing to accept the generosity of the kind offered by the Catholic Church?
Fear, uncertainty, and the desire for a continued existence brought many to the door of
Christianity, as well as to other major religions of the world. For those escaping the violence and
chaos that existed in the Middle Ages, the promise of order, as well as the promise of salvation
and an eternity of bliss, would have been a very hard to turn down. The Middle Ages, sometimes
referred to as the Dark Ages, occurred in the historical period between the fall of the Western
Roman empire and the Renaissance. The dates would be roughly, 500 BC to 1500 BC; a
significant amount of time with too much to cover here.
The singularity of the Christian metaphysical prescription does not leave room for any
type of change or becoming. Through denying of the world as only a test and promoting the idea
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that faith will be rewarded in heaven by God, it leaves little room for a realistic interaction
between the known and the unknown. Religious dogma does not propose an accurate
understanding of the world. It instead proposes that humanity understand itself in relationship to
the mysterious in a very particular way that aligns with the dogma of the religion. One important
factor regarding the issue of dogmatism to remember is that those who control the dogma,
control and mediate the possibilities of those who choose to believe. Religions will always
mediate the possibilities for people who, for one reason or another, find themselves in need or
desire of the kind of community offered by religions. Catholicism, along with its teachings, has
been and continues to be a major mediating factor in the lives of people. It becomes difficult to
take a practical and simple perspective when belief demands that we understand our lives in the
world as temporary and meaningful only through the teachings accepted by the church. As an
example, Galileo, Leonardo da Vinci, and Michelangelo all had to negotiate their relationships
with the Catholic Church in their lifetimes. “Thou, O God, dost sell us all good things at the
price of labour” (Leonardo, Baring and Einstein 43). This quote from Leonardo da Vinci reveals
his relationship to the church and to the culture arising at the end of the Middle Ages during the
Renaissance.
Within the teachings of Catholicism, the mysterious is only in service of the dogma
preached by the church. The possibility of multiple great mysteries in a monotheistic culture
cannot be considered because the entirety of the system would collapse into a contradiction. The
relationship to the mysterious has and continues to be determined by the dominant cultural forces
acting in service of the desires of a particular dominating culture.
Christianity’s influence and ideology is a closed but still powerful force. Important to our
discussion is the fact that Catholicism and Christianity in general could create a limited set of
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meanings and hence understandings and interpretation of the mysterious. The associations set
forth through the processes of Christianity still resonate when Christians and others experience
and encounter the mysterious. As the section on language above reminds us, we do not live with
meanings isolated in one time or another, the accumulated accretions of meanings and multiple
levels of conceptual references often remain attached to specific words and meanings. This can
be true particularly true of things we find mysterious.
The shift from multiple gods to one central all-powerful god had a fundamental effect on
ontological choices, distilling possibilities for faith down to one singular entity. The shift in
importance from the word and meanings of the ‘passions’ in favor of the word and meanings of
‘faith’ also mediated our choices. The multiplicity of gods that created a diversity of cultural
possibilities, creative manifestations, and divergent thinking in the early cultures was lost. With
only one god available, all responsibility and all worship were directed onto a single vision and
idea. As a result, the monotheistic world we now live in was and is a primary mediating element
in our relationship with the mysterious.

RENAISSANCE
The Renaissance, a period that began in the late Middle Ages, 14th -17th centuries, was a
period of great human accomplishment. Artists did exquisite representations of biblical allegories
and the Catholic Church used these images to embellish the great cathedrals with art works
meant to enhance the power of the church. It also was a transition period from the Middle Ages
to the Enlightenment. During the Renaissance, the cultural power of the Catholic Church was at
its zenith. Artist and crafts people from all over Europe were in its employ. The church not only
had emotional and spiritual authority over the people but also economic authority.
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Conditions in the Renaissance would further solidify the type of relationship to mystery
promoted by the church. Not everyone committed to the dogma of the church, but historically it
is accepted that the Christian way of life was a prevailing attitude. In addition to the continued
power of the church, the Renaissance was a period of progressive thinking and the opening of the
minds of people. The time period also laid the ground for questions about humanity, the
relationship to God, nature, civilization, and the world. The Renaissance, like all periods of
dramatic change, are times of analysis of what has become normal in the lives of people.
Questions about the changes occurring and the potential effects of those changes drive the
process of culture to its next destination. The relational connections, which work well for one age
often don’t or won’t work for the emerging one. Living during the Renaissance, we could
imagine, would have been exciting and possibly described as sublime. We still honor many of the
artists and thinkers of this time and they are benchmarks of creative, scientific, and cultural
breakthroughs. We have however, reasoned that these artists and thinkers are somehow beyond
us possessing some mystical quality of genius that only these people could access.
The Renaissance provided the ground for the beginning of the Enlightenment. Groups
were becoming suspicious of the church and its authority. The economic power of Christianity
and the inequality in the economics made people question the foundations that the church was
claiming. Da Vinci warned the people to be wary of such commitments: “O miserable race of
man! Of how many things you make yourself the slave for the sake of money!” (Leonardo,
Baring and Einstein 47).
This brief account of the Renaissance here is not meant to gloss over its importance but to
reveal that it furthered in many ways the issues discussed in the section on Christianity and
introduced the points that the Enlightenment will take up in earnest. Of course, the Renaissance
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is well regarded as a time of great advances in science, art, and technology. But, the Renaissance
was also a sublime moment in history that demonstrated the capacity of human beings to reach
beyond what they assumed were their limits.

AGE OF REASON, ENLIGHTENMENT
The Enlightenment, the Age of Reason, is seen as the beginning of modern
depravity.
—Umberto Eco57
The Enlightenment, also called the Age of Reason, would change the expectations and
the desires of people. The aristocracy was losing its power and the rise of the merchant classes
and greater economic influences gave people a new sense of freedom and possibility. The sense
of order that reason instilled on behalf of civilization was interpreted through the effects and
desires of that civilization to establish the new economic systems and religious understandings of
how the world is and should be. The distillation of mysteries down to a single origin makes for a
great organizing system. It cannot not, however, reflect the reality of the contingent universe nor
can it provide for or supply the complete picture for progress or novelty. Mediating factors that
came out of the Enlightenment slowed down, redirected, and limited possibility rather than
providing the diversity necessary for discovery and progress. Ideas of creative genius that came
about through the Enlightenment and the great breakthroughs that were made were all reflected
in the cultural. Although these advances are considered sublime, at the same time the mediating
factors in the Enlightenment itself would interpret the great minds as outliers, not like the
masses, as unique in the world. It was precisely because these creative people existed outside the
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mediating factors of the Enlightenment, which had its own process of a controlled cultural
environment, that they were creative and innovative.
The Enlightenment created many paradoxes. One of which is the idea that the human
mind is the center of everything but, at the same time, the most brilliant thinkers are somehow
outside the system. These paradoxes have sustained themselves into the contemporary moment.
Garrath Williams, writing in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, presents Kant’s idea of
the Enlightenment as the following:
Enlightenment is the human being’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity.
Immaturity is the inability to use one’s own understanding [= reason] without the
guidance of another. This immaturity is self-incurred if its cause is not lack of
understanding, but lack of resolution and courage to use it without the guidance of
another. Sapere aude! [Dare to be wise!] Have courage to make use of your own
understanding [= reason]! is thus the motto of enlightenment. (Kant's Account of
Reason)
In this citation and in Kant’s description, we can identify a potential shortfall of using
only reason. Although the freedom to use your own reason seems to suggest everyone should be
equal, it dismisses the notion that reason can be flawed through no appreciation or understanding
of the benefits of diversity or of the potential lack of good information for reason to act upon.
The dramatic change in perspective, as people were influenced by the ideas of the
Enlightenment and as religions became decentralized in Europe and in the United States, brought
into the consciousness of people a certainty that the human mind, primarily through reason,
would provide answers to all human problems and would eventually answer the most pressing
and mysterious questions we had about human existence.
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Enlightenment ideas together with the resulting social, intellectual, emotional conditions
and desires of people living at the time would shift the world in the direction of a more scientific
and materialistic approach. New beginnings produce a desire and a hope for changes that would
make human existence better. The compelling ideas and changes that occurred during the
Enlightenment had an overwhelmingly powerful effect on people and the culture they would
create.
During the time of the Enlightenment, new sources of economic growth in the rise of the
mercantile class, new social contexts through a division of labor, and new visions of equality and
a prosperous future were beginning to arise around the city centers. Farmworkers were drawn to
the cities and into workshops away from the land and the landed aristocracies. Everything they
had believed to be true came under question.
The Age of Enlightenment, which began in the middle of the seventeenth century, would,
through the changes in the culture particularly the intellectual culture, develop a suspicious
nature and question the relationship between faith and reason. Religions were also coming under
suspicion, and the great advances in science and technologies were quickly becoming new gods.
Sympathetically, we could imagine ourselves as present during this time and understand the great
sense of possibility that was emerging. We have a sense of this because in our own time, through
the great advances in computer technology, our culture and society has experienced significant
advances in just the last ten years: within a single generation, people’s lives had changed in such
significant ways that the old outlook simply no longer worked.
The reasons for mentioning this are that writers often assume that we have a kind of
historic knowledge of things that allows our clear understanding of the past. Truth be told, we
cannot really understand the complexities of life for people in the Enlightenment, but we can
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understand how we are dealing with the great complexities with which we must cope in the
contemporary moment. The new ideas gaining authority in the Enlightenment changed the
culture in many ways, often without any critical assessment or participation from those whose
lives are being changed. Our attitudes and decision toward the culture we are thrust into can only
be determined by that cultures ontological attitudes whatever they are. However, we must cope
with, adopt, or attempt to alter these to live in the culture the way we prefer. The danger, of
course, resides in adopting the attitudes without making a clear judgement.
Heidegger warned us about accepting attitudes without any critical assessment in his
essay “The Question Concerning Technology.”58 He makes reference to the changes happening
in the Middle Ages as an important model for his concerns: “The work of the peasant does not
challenge the soil of the field” (Heidegger and Krell 320). This statement from Heidegger is his
attempt to help us understand the type of relationship that the peasant had to the land as it was
being changed. It was being set aside for the sake of demanding the earth and soil produce rather
than the farmer being in a cooperative relationship with the land in the production of food. This
change from a cooperative attitude to a demanding one changed not only the relationship, but it
also set our expectations for the future. These relationships were not isolated to the farmer and
the earth but influenced other types of relationships as well: social, intellectual, cultural, etc.
“Thus we shall never experience our relationship to the essence of technology so long as we
merely represent and pursue the technological, put up with it, or evade it” (Heidegger and Krell
311). The promise of the scientific to provide answers by isolating and studying things as
individual elements only has swept over the Western mind. This is a type of intellectual
arrogance that seemingly suggests that it can know in its entirety what the human experience is.
In the contemporary moment, it has been contemplated that science is often not a complete
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answer for things, but is, instead, a beginning of something. Humans have bestowed upon
science a privileged place, but can science alone assume to tell us what it is to be human? This
radical shifting away from mysteries to certainty of knowledge that science ostensibly intends to
provide was a compelling force during the Enlightenment.
Through the influences of the Enlightenment, the ideas associated with the emotions and
intuitions lost authority in the world and with them our relationship to mystery was altered.
Scientific verification of certain mysteries of our being are scarce, but these mysteries are things
in the experience of being human that are undeniable. These alternative ways of knowing seem
deeply flawed especially when looking through the lens of materialism and science. Immanuel
Kant, considered an Enlightenment thinker of the first order, wrote, “Thus I had to deny
knowledge in order to make room for faith; and the dogmatism of metaphysics, i.e., the prejudice
that without criticism reason can make progress in metaphysics, is the true source of all unbelief
conflicting with morality, which unbelief is always very dogmatic” (Kant, Guyer and Wood Loc.
2762). Even though Kant is interpreted and understood as an Enlightenment thinker, his
understanding that we must limit reason to leave room for faith was either not embraced by the
Enlightenment culture or it was simply not interpreted in a way that was consistent with the
general goals of the Enlightenment at that time. We, however, thanks to Kant’s writings, have
access to this thought and can use it to better understand the transition.
There is always a leap of faith involved in most any human endeavor about which the
conclusions remain unclear. The abandonment or the isolation of faith as a viable partner in the
processes we use as we explore the experience of being human is perhaps not the best option. In
the Enlightenment, the line between the unknown and the known, between faith and reason,
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became a decidedly distinct boundary rather than a permeable border across which our thinking
could oscillate.
Remembering Kant’s description of the sublime, it required our intuitions and our reason
to operate in a fluid and cooperative relationship that, for Kant, ultimately ended in reason. The
sublime is an experience that depends on the use of multiple parts of our human capacities. We
need faith to accept the experience and we need reason to understand and contextualize it.
Leaving or dismissing part of the process leaves us with flawed conclusions. Like faith and
reason, both must cooperate and participate to gain the possible insights into what the experience
of the sublime may ultimately mean.
The decisions we make surrounding the cultural relationship between faith and reason are
complex. It is the contention of this dissertation that the supposed rift between faith and reason
has a direct effect on the relationship we as humans have to the sublime. The world as it was
during the Enlightenment is bound to history. We can only look back and speculate on the
conditions and attitudes, the cultural and social forces at work that would shift the thinking and
psychology of the people. It may have seemed trivial at the time perhaps, but the results of those
decisions continue to have influence in the present.

INDUSTRIALIZATION AND MODERNISM
As cultures emerged from the Enlightenment, new economic principles and
industrialization would begin to develop in many countries and regions throughout the West. The
ideas of industrialization and marketplace economics made it possible to hope for a life like the
sheltered and privileged aristocracy of the past. The rise of what would come to be called ‘the
bourgeoisie’ and the decline of the lifestyle of the aristocracy and of feudalism established a set
of possibilities never seen before. To be an aristocrat, one must be born into the aristocracy. But
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one could, through industrialization and the new economics, become a member of the
bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie would become, through the new processes, able to gain authority
and become the new aristocracy, changing the minds and possibilities of many people. Prior to
the Enlightenment and the age of industrialization, people had an individual, specified place in
which they could see themselves. This place was the one in which the culture and society held
them. Industrialization and the new economics of the marketplace changed what was possible.
Individuals now had the ability to rise well above the station they and their family held
previously.
During the early industrialization period, new ideas and technologies were being
developed at a rate never experienced before. It must have seemed as if the mysteries of the
universe were being revealed and what could be imagined in the minds of people could become a
reality. Humans were taming nature and creating machines to do incredible things. Time itself
must have seemed to be bending to the human will.
The great changes happening in the world would also require the psychologies of people
to change to conform to the new ways of existing. People were gaining authority and freedom for
themselves, and their thoughts and abilities would provide the world with great advances in
almost all areas of human endeavor. The human mind, appreciated and trusted in this way,
accelerated the great experiments leading to what has been called the great societies. The
formerly powerless now had the ability to become powerful. They, of course, modeled that
power after what they knew: the aristocracy. The centralizing of work forces and the developing
of complex economic systems like capitalism would make it easy for humans to move away
from the natural world and toward the mechanized processes of working in a system.
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Karl Marx warned us of the dangers and results of the rise of capitalism and the
consequences of proceeding in this way in The Communist Manifesto: The
bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal,
patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties
that bound man to his “natural superiors,” and left remaining no other nexus
between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous “cash payment.”
(Marx and Engels 37)
In The Communist Manifesto, Marx asserted, “From the serfs of the Middle Ages sprang the
chartered burghers of the earliest towns. From these burghers, the first elements of the
bourgeoisie were developed” (Marx and Engels 35). This change from the aristocracy to the
merchant classes marked the beginnings of the capitalist, industrialized world. Money and
finance became people’s primary desire because money would allow you to purchase the kind of
lifestyle, authority, and power you desired. This power over others was like the kind had by the
aristocracy who had claimed this authority through the Divine Right of Kings.59 With the rise of
the merchant class, a cultural mythology was born. The myth was that all markets for goods and
services could continue to grow in an unbounded and yet self-regulated manner. This mythology
continues to complicate the marketplace today. The idea that a process that uses natural resources
could continue to grow endlessly was the hope adopted by anyone wishing to believe in the new
mythology and processes.
People living in these new economic systems could envision themselves as successful
business people, being their own boss, building a life never imagined. But this would come at
some cost, since with any change something is lost and something is gained. What was lost with
industrialization and capitalism was the freedom to exist without the demands of civilization.
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The decision to opt for the security offered by these new ways of life would force us to give up
the kind of freedom that existed by living in the state of nature. “As Nature gives each man [sic]
absolute power over all his members, the social contract gives the body politic absolute power
over all its members also; and it is this power which, under the direction of the general will,
bears, as I have said, the name sovereignty” (Rousseau 651).
Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his text The Social Contract describes the challenges of people
moving from one state of being to another. Life in civilization comes with some compromises;
people would have to come to be satisfied with what this new order would provide. Rousseau
said, “Man [sic] is born free, and is everywhere in chains” (Rousseau 647). Existence in the
capitalist world is a never-satisfied and always-striving-for-more type of existence.
Consequently, the striving is a necessary condition and a result of economic principles of
capitalism itself. In the culture of capitalist economics, consuming is a process of living; working
to consume is what keeps the system operating. If consumers stop consuming the products and
services that are part of the system, the system will fail, and because we are dependent on that
system, we will also fail. In the capitalist world, subjectivity has authority, because an objective
reality cannot exist within capitalism, because capitalism depends on a multitude of illusory
desires that drive and support the process that capitalist economics depend on.
The power of desire and hope for freedom that exists within the ontological outlook
created by capitalist ideals is a potent force and difficult for people to resist. This process of
creating desire and then selling that desire back to those held captive by the system could be
characterized as a global company store type of system.60 The workers in the system sell their
time to collectively produce the objects that the system then convinces them they need to
purchase to be validated as people in the system and, of course, to be a successful member of that
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system. It works very well—all but for the problems of failing resources and the singular driving
principle of the overarching focus on profit making. In The Sublime Object of Ideology, Slavoj
Žižek explains our obedience to the authority of Capitalism:
The only real obedience, then, is an ‘external’ one: obedient out of conviction is
not real obedience because it is already ‘mediated’ through our subjectivity—that
is, we are not really obeying the authority but simply following our judgement,
which tells us that the authority deserves to be obeyed in so far as it is good, wise,
beneficent. . . . Even more than for our relation to ‘external’ social authority, this
inversion applies to our obedience to the internal authority of belief. (Žižek The
Sublime Object of Ideology 35)
Žižek explains that because we are following our internal desires the authorities are simply
simulated and only work because our internal desires have created the authorities for us to
follow. The sublating of our internal drives for freedom, in other words, manifest themselves
through the tendencies of the new economics and free markets.
Market economics requires cold logic and leaves little room for the type of faith we have
been discussing. Evangelical Christianity has become an economic powerhouse in the United
States and has become big business with the wealth and status that once was only identified with
the Roman Catholic Church. Mega-churches have become a common sight, some looking more
like convention centers or college campuses than humble places of worship. It would seem that
in the West not only does one need to worship God but also God, as expressed by modern
evangelical religion, seems to like money. Even your choice of religion and the church you
attend has become a bourgeois expression in the culture of the West.
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From humble creatures indebted to a higher power turning into beings that are selfconfident, self-directed, owing nothing to forces outside of themselves, the capitalist
industrialized world has created humans who have come to value the illusory desires that
capitalism creates and depends on rather than substance and reality. This would seem to argue
against my point that reason has become the privileged authority in the West.
Recall the section on Lacan that states we are stuck in the Symbolic: if we are trapped in
the Symbolic, then we are also trapped into desiring the things that the Symbolic values. Lacan
and Žižek reason that the demands of the free market and capitalist economies developed out of
an internal set of desires that we sublate and replace the desires of the Symbolic with capitalist
ones. Marx identified this phenomenon as “commodity fetishism.”61 In this way, reason, even
faulty reason, would continue to gain authority over faith; any trust and understanding of faith in
concert with reason would continue to lose its cultural power. The important thing to take from
this change is not that faith no longer had importance in the human experience but that the
preference for reason had pushed faith aside in the striving for wealth, power, and influence.
Reason or, more accurately, crude rationality within the boundaries of the capitalist state, and the
rush for individuals to rise to the top of the new ruling class, the bourgeoisie, had become the
new way of being, the new powerful and influential ontological perspective.
As an example of the results of capitalism and the Enlightenment, Stephen Bronner
references Max Weber62 in his small text Critical Theory: A Very Short Introduction:
A tortured academic who authored the classic Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of
Capitalism (1905), a liberal with nationalist and imperialist sympathies, Weber’s
famous “Science as a Vocation” (1918) envisioned a world in which hopes of the
Enlightenment were “irretrievably fading” and society was increasingly
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dominated by “specialists without spirit and sensualists without heart.”
Instrumental rationality employs a mathematically defined notion of efficiency
predicated upon rendering all tasks routine. Modern life would increasingly
privilege the use of expertise and narrowly circumscribed areas of responsibility
within the hierarchical chain of command. The ability to grasp the whole would
vanish; what the Germans call the disciplinary idiot would supplant the
intellectual; and ethics would be relegated to the domain outside of science and
political life. (Bronner 42)
The Bronner quote above, bemoans the loss of spirit and passion in humans and warns us of
becoming too focused on singular pathway for being human.
Beginning in the Enlightenment and continuing into today with great influence in the
industrial period and Modernism, the word ‘progress’ became one of the guiding principles of the
new world. An important question, however, is progress to what end. Industrialization and
capitalism do in fact continue to set the stage for the kind of “progress” and possible evolution
that, even in my own lifetime, boggles the mind when considering how far we have come and
how far we may still go. The drive for success that was amplified through capitalism also
promoted a predatory style of competition that directed the focus of people away from attempts
at a cooperative lifestyle. This conversation, however lively, because of the limited definition of
progress, was and is a closed one. The contemporary discourse of capitalism has some serious
limits.
The ideology of capitalism has over the years been conflated with freedom and, further,
that freedom has been associated with the United States and has for a very long time been
considered one of its guiding principles. Meanings have become associated and for many living
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in the US, capitalism is freedom. This mythology continues to shadow our cultural discussions in
all areas. Particularly interesting today is how this translates into the political dialogue.
Candidates leverage this mythology and enhance their supposed platforms by selling this idea in
the form of populism. But capitalism is not freedom for all, or even for most; it is only freedom
for those that have the economic means to enjoy the freedom that the market can provide.
Richard Rorty in Achieving our Country writes, “ Many writers on socioeconomic policy have
warned that the old industrialized democracies are heading into a Weimar-like period, one in
which populist movements are likely to overturn constitutional governments.” Rorty continues,
“ The point of the book The Endangered American Dream is that members of labor unions, and
unorganized workers, will sooner or later realize that their government is not even trying to
prevent wages from sinking or to prevent jobs from being exported.” (Rorty 89) This is
something that has become a real political issue particularly in the Midwest where record number
of manufacturing jobs have been lost. “ Around the same time, they will realize that suburban
white-collar workers-themselves desperately afraid of being downsized- are not going to let
themselves be taxed to provide social benefits for anyone else.” (Rorty 89-90) The reality is that
the West because of its clinging to strict definitions of capitalism has left itself in a fragile state.
For most living in the West, the reality is that it is a fixed game: those at the bottom do not get
near the top and most likely never will. The desire to reach the top stimulates the competition,
and the competition keeps the masses occupied and distracted from the realities of the game as
its played. The resulting ontology surrounds and imposes itself on those who live in the culture.
In my opinion, the greed and power of radicalized Communism twisted the utopian ideals
of Marxism and created a culture equally as fraught with problems as the one capitalism created.
Having few options, people could adopt either capitalism or communism if they wanted to
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participate in civilization within a larger group and an expanded culture. The two alternative
paths did not, however, leave much room for other possibilities. One path led to the raw,
competitive nature of pure market economics and consumerism and the other led to a life of
service under the supposition of a society built to serve everyone. Of course, neither capitalism
nor communism have made good on their promises. Both communism and capitalism depend
upon the dualistic splits between faith and reason in their respective ideologies for continued
existence.
As previously stated, faith has been subjugated by reason in the form of instrumental
rationality used in the West. The cultural reification of the words reason and faith have been used
for purposes of advertising and furtherance of the agendas of the cultures in power. In the
modern capitalist world, the idea of “progress” is associated mostly with the things that seem
dedicated to profit alone. The reification of faith and reason are derived from the cultural values
placed upon them by the particular ideologies of capitalism and modernism in general. These
values are guided by the results that are desired by these particular cultures. In a capitalist market
economy, the guiding principle in all interactions are almost always directed and assessed by
economics and profit. The mediating qualities that are provided by faith, which represent our
relationship to the unknown, is missing from these equations. In other words, having a
relationship to the unknown in which we have a sense of comfort with doubt and uncertainty is
not considered in the progress of capitalism and modernism.

REIFICATION OF FAITH IN DEVELOPED CULTURES
The cultural limits of capitalism and communism moved people farther away from
holding on to the kind of faith being suggested. Communism rejected religion outwardly, while
capitalism disempowered it through the limited view of measuring all life through economics. In
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both systems, instrumental rationality posing as reason took precedence over all and faith was
left to be interpreted through the mystical. To be an active and successful participant in either
capitalism or communism, people had to choose one path or the other. Both systems had
developed ways that would provide only limited paths to a reasonable life. In both capitalism and
communism, the cultures had given preference to the material and the practical rather than
maintaining the kind of relationship to the mysterious as cultures had before. The scientific
process delivered the kind of certainty people had been craving.
Taking a psychological approach can help in revealing that safety, certainty, and the path
to a successful life are what primarily all humans desire. Abraham Maslow described this in
detail in A Theory of Human Motivation. Using the image of a pyramid (see figure 2), Maslow
demonstrates his “Hierarchy of Needs.”
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Figure 2: Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs. Anh, Khoa Trinh. “Scarcity effects on consumer
purchase intention in the context of E-commerce.” Semantic Scholar, 2014.
www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Scarcity-effects-on-consumer-purchase-intention-inAnh/041eaf3f2477d24952bce50af470f669f552d1af/figure/0.

Maslow posits that until basic needs like safety, food, and shelter are met, higher needs cannot be
considered. This would mean that before humans can self-actualize—the highest point on
Maslow’s pyramid—many more needs must first be satisfied. At the base of Maslow’s pyramid
are the basic psychological needs: food, water, sex, sleep. Most modern humans take these for
granted, as they are believed to be accessible to most, but not all, people. Maslow identifies the
second tier of the pyramid as safety, health, home, income. The third tier is associated with love
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and belonging, friends, family, companionship, and community. The fourth tier is associated with
esteem—self-esteem, respect, achievement, and the like. The fifth tier is the highest and is
associated with what we generally understand as self-actualization. This includes things like
creativity, moral grounding, spontaneity, open mindedness, and lack of prejudice.
There is, in Maslow’s theory, a logic that makes it resonate as a truth. Even if you want to
argue some of the characteristics of each level, you can see in your own life an association with
the kind of things Maslow suggests. My point here is that it would be very difficult to focus on
self-actualization if I am living in uncertainty about my safety or my income. In capitalism, we
are generally stuck between levels 2 and 3 of Maslow’s hierarchy. As someone who has grown
up working in industry, my daily and primary concern was to not lose my job. Living under this
constant source of anxiety, it was difficult to consider alternative ways of being when my basic
survival depended on the horrible job I was holding at any given moment.
I currently teach in a regional university system in the Midwest which happens to be in a
working-class town. Many of my students come from working-class families that have for
generations been dependent on the auto companies for their livelihoods and futures. Many
students overlook the possibilities that a formal education can offer them because their only
focus is on getting a job. The wonderful transformative parts of education are lost to them
because they can only consider the 2nd level of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. The constraints the
system creates make students position themselves psychologically in Maslow’s level of safety.
This creates a block to moving up to a higher level on the pyramid. If people see their lives as
always threatened by the possibility of total ruination, if they feel they must always be cautious
and protective of their own situation, their ability to move higher on Maslow’s pyramid is
unlikely.
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The desires created by capitalism can entrap people into believing that the capitalist
system is the way to that freedom. Communism proposed that people are already free from the
continual searching for individuality as the means for self-actualization. Communism took the
possibility of individuality out of the equation entirely and substituted the mythos of the great
community-based culture, promoting a kind of utopian society based on no personal ownership
and consequently with no personal stake in the outcome. We have witnessed the failings of the
USSR, arguably the largest and greatest of communist countries. And we can see China, another
major communist country, attempting to negotiate a middle ground between what capitalism
provides and the kind of social controls that communism needs to exert. It will be historically
significant to see the results play out in the years to come.
These modern systems, capitalism and communism, only offer people the possibility of a
limited psychological framework that privileges reason, in the form of instrumental rationality,
over faith. The diminished role that faith played in both of these systems pushed the religious
and its cultural counterparts into a limited type of credibility. Isolating the meanings that faith
could have and moved the concept of faith to the margins of society. The important elements that
faith provided in human existence were removed depriving people of the potential available
within the association to mystery. Capitalism and communism have a stifling effect on the
passions, faith, and our relationship to the unknown.
But faith and the relationship we have to the mysterious can help us to remain calm in
times of change. As the trust in the cultural process begins to fail, people look elsewhere for
stability; the need for a more stable relationship to the unknown is needed. Future Tense Fellow
at New America Jamie Holmes has researched and written extensively about ambiguity. Holmes,
in his introduction to his text, Nonsense, puts it this way: “In an increasingly complex,
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unpredictable world, what matters most isn’t IQ, willpower, or confidence in what we know. It’s
how we deal with what we don’t understand” (Holmes 15). For example, in the United States,
the 2016 presidential primaries were particularly uncertain throughout. There were levels of
change and ambiguity happening almost on a daily basis. Changes in the media and in the
pathways for election information created more chaos in the process than in anytime I personally
can recall. This made deciding on potential candidates particularly difficult. Further, voters
generally had grown tired and anxious of the disparities in income and privilege between the
classes. Similar unrest in other parts of the world had been ongoing, although not much
information has been reported about this in the West. The rift that exists between faith and reason
emphasizes, aggravates, confuses, and prohibits a productive and positive relationship to the
unknown. People have always reacted in distinctly radical ways when the stability around them
seems to be failing.
In Nonsense Holmes describes our sense of urgency created by the desire for certainty:
“As Kruglanski and Donna Webster put it, the urgency tendency ‘represents an individual’s
inclination to attain closure as soon as possible,’ whereas permanence is ‘an individual’s
inclination to attain [closure] for as long as possible.’ Additional pressures lead people to grab on
to certainty faster and more firmly. Urgency, in short, makes for inflexible minds” (Holmes 74).
Holmes points out that change under pressure leads people to cling to their existing ideological
choices with a deeper conviction. It is not difficult to imagine how in this “always in a hurry,”
ordered, multitasking existence in the West makes for a continuous sense of urgency. The
instrumental reason of capitalism expects us to move forward with urgency; faith expects a calm
resolve. Part of the attraction of cultures are that they are assumed to create certainty, and this is
something people depend on. “Finite minds will always be imperfectly informed about their own
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limits and limitations” (Rescher 93). Nicholas Rescher states the problem clearly when pointing
out that the human experience is restricted to only within the human experience alone. There is
no real path to the certainty we seek, even when we have the comforting lies we allow the culture
to tell us. Holmes explains, “Our need for closure is a powerful force. It’s so deeply ingrained in
everyday living that cultivating an awareness of how it works isn’t enough. Combating its
dangers means designing institutions and processes that make us less likely to succumb to our
natural tendencies toward resolution when it matters most” (Holmes 153-4). When confronted by
uncertainty and ambiguity, people retreat into what they believe is certain and true; they express
more conviction and take on an unmovable attitude, exactly what makes change challenging.
When faith and reason find common ground, our relationship to the unknown is restored,
our openness to discovery and novelty is enhanced, and our ability to communicate and
understand our place in the universe as deeply contingent makes choosing a singular ideological
path less desirable. The most available experience where we find a cooperative relationship
between faith and reason is in what is called the sublime.
The period of industrialization and modernism limited our relationship, understanding,
and tolerance of the unknown. The cultural vocabulary of industrialization and capitalist
economics mediated our tolerance and ability to accept the mysterious as a part of the human
experience. In the modern industrialized world, the denying of the reality that the human
situation is in part a mystery, the unknown, contingent, and unresolved places a further
dependency on certainty. To overcome our dependence on the limiting ideologies of the culture
it’s important to develop a meaningful, positive, and realistically dependent relationship with the
mysterious.
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POSTMODERNISM’S MOMENT
The moment we identify as Postmodernism63 can be thought of as the moment we cut the
tether to the confirmations of high modernist culture and the overall grounding of truth claims
established by the modernist-industrialized systems. Once the ideas of postmodernism came into
the consciousness of the people, the innocence we had about the patriarchal, industrialized
structures came under a critical examination.
“Postmodernity is modernity without the hopes and dreams which made modernity
bearable” (Rose 4). This quote from Margaret A. Rose in her text The Post-Modern & PostIndustrial encapsulates the anxiety surrounding the postmodern period. The postmodern, as we
have come to understand it, took certainty and dismissed it wholesale. Postmodernists questioned
the very foundations of our ways of being and of our ways of knowing raising the stakes on
uncertainty. Truth and its associated values were brought under the scrutiny of the postmodern
lens.
The reason postmodernism is placed at the close of this chapter is because it represents an
embracing of uncertainty and an acceptance of a certain amount of chaos as an ontological
reality. The postmodern moment in many ways was shocking and frightening to many. The
confusion and chaos created by postmodernism de-centering of the structures of Modernity
created a reaction to the failings of the culture which remain with us.
The ontology created by modernism—the bureaucratic society, scientism, and the
industrialized, administered world—created the illusions of certainty and installed it as the
preferred outlook of the culture. Postmodernism shook the foundations of these principles and
created doubt about the certainties established through the culture of the West. “Ontology is more
like a playground than a science” (Rorty 2). This quote from Richard Rorty describes the feeling
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that the postmodern moment initiated into the consciousness of the people. This, of course, is
why the postmodern was not widely accepted and still has many who disregard it based on its
attachments to uncertainty and critical examination.
The reason postmodernism deserves our attentions is because of its challenge to dualistic
thinking and the questioning of longstanding systems of meaning and their creation. Uncertainty
and faith have a long-standing relationship. The postmodern mindset, in denying the certainty of
systems and processes of the modernist moment, made many people uncomfortable and cling to
the ideas of modernism with stronger conviction. In the ontology of dualisms of the West,
certainty is preferred over uncertainty, knowledge over mystery, and truth over contingency. The
postmodern and the philosophy and theories arising through its theoretical lens denied us the
innocent perspective of the world that was created by modernism and capitalism.
In presenting counter arguments to the ideas that much of the West had come to take for
granted, postmodernism introduced into the culture an increase in uncertainty. As we have
explored, uncertainty has ways of affecting cultures that are not necessarily interpreted as
positive by people living in the culture. Jacques Derrida, a chief character in the postmodernist
moment, continues to be, in my opinion, misinterpreted and in some cases vilified by traditional
philosophy and theorists. Derrida, in presenting us with deconstruction, a direct result of
postmodern thinking, challenged almost all reality and all structures to be scrutinized through the
lens of deconstruction.
The reason postmodernism has value for this discussion is that it has a certain reliance on
a type of faith. The type of faith that has been lost in the industrialized, science-favoring world of
the West. It should not come as a surprise then that deconstruction and post-structuralism both
have come to be understood as critical theory. Critical theory is defined as the following:
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The term coined by Max Horkheimer in 1937 to describe the work of the
Frankfurt School. Defined against the traditional conception of theory governing
the sciences (including the social or human sciences such as sociology), which
holds that it is a system of abstract (i.e. ahistorical, asubjective, and asocial)
propositions which can be verified empirically, critical theory holds the opposite
view, namely that theory is historical, subjective and a part of society. Critical
theory is, in this regard, a highly reflexive enterprise – it is never satisfied with
asking what something means or how it works, it also has to ask what is at stake
in asking such questions in the first place.” (Buchanan 100)
The proposed examinations and critiques that critical theory delivers suggest that much of what
we take as truth or universally grounded beliefs of the social, intellectual, and psychological
structures we live under should be examined regularly.
Postmodernism requires us to have faith enough in our abilities to live our lives free from
the connections we have to the structures and processes given to us through the existing cultures.
It asks a basic question: Are we living the best possible lives or can we do better?

THE CONTEMPORARY MOMENT
The moment we live in currently is dominated largely by the economics of capitalism
supported by certainty from a dependence on and a deep regard for science and the processes
science creates. The ideas from science spill over into almost all other areas of life. The West
uses the ideas that stem from practicality and instrumentality and which become the measures
and tools of judgment for all things.
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Science, as we understand it today, is still thought of as our best kind of knowledge, but,
again, humans do not operate on singular knowledge. We still utilize our emotional selves: our
passions, love, hate, fear, anxiety, compassion, sympathy. These parts of ourselves are not
considered rational but are still a part of the human experience and come under consideration in
the adjudication of the choices we make. There exists a cultural anxiety surrounding our mistrust
of science alone even in what we could argue is our advanced technological age. The arts have
presented a critical assessment of technology and have represented the anxiety we experience
surrounding it.
For example, the film I, Robot, (Proyas) starring Will Smith delivers a critique that
Heidegger would perhaps have found acceptable. This movie, set in the future, finds Smith as a
police detective. He gets embroiled in a case centered on the death of a friend in which the main
suspect is a robot. His friend is a technology leader and responsible for the creation of the robots
and the artificial intelligence that controls them. The robots are controlled by a logic program
designed to protect humans from danger and make sure that the robots can be controlled. The
programming that keeps the robots in line is, through what the story titles, the three laws.
Developed by the founder, these laws of pure logic are seen as a fail-safe to any potential
dangers that might arise. The laws are articulated in the story as “Three Laws of Robotics
directives: to never harm a human or let a human come to harm, to always obey humans unless
this violates the First Law, and to protect its own existence unless this violates the First or
Second Laws.” This all becomes problematic as the artificial intelligence attains consciousness
and decides, based on the three laws of its original programming, that humans are not
responsible enough to determine their own fate and that in order to protect them they must be
controlled or they will certainly destroy themselves.
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The logic, the reasoning on the part of the AI, is, of course, considered flawless which
clearly demonstrates the problem of depending on pure reason as a tool for creating an
ontological outlook. This movie examines the deep-seated fear we have of things like artificial
intelligence precisely because we feel we have lost some of the knowledge and appreciation of
our intuitive, imaginative, emotional selves. The movie works precisely because of our deep
psychological anxieties about the technology we are creating and the possible results we might
predict from a world based on cold logical decisions. Of course, this is only one of many movies
we have seen developed that emphasize this anxiety. Movies like The Terminator, The Matrix,
and 2001: A Space Odyssey all had components highlighting the anxiety of technology coming to
make decisions for humans; decisions made by using pure logic alone.
It can be supposed that what we call “knowledge” is not really knowledge at all but a
kind of adaptive process that humans use to integrate into a particular culture whether it be
scientific, social, political etc. Nicholas Rescher in Unknowability puts it this way: “Our minds
are the information-processing mechanisms of an organism interacting with a particular
environment via certain particular senses (natural endowments, hardware) and certain culturally
evolved methods (cultural endowments, software). With different sorts of beings, these resources
would differ profoundly—and so would the cognitive products that would flow from their
employment” (Rescher 27). Rescher characterizes the human experience as clearly as possible
and at the same time reveals the kind of processes that influence the things we call knowledge.
Tomas Kuhn in his seminal work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions challenges the
pretense that science proceeds in a logical and linear fashion. Kuhn is well known for what is
commonly understood as the ‘paradigm shift.’(Kuhn and Hacking 111) This change, seemingly
very distinct and at times shocking, comes out of a complex relationship with things known and
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unknown and builds upon previously understood theories. Kuhn uses the term ‘anomaly’ (Kuhn
and Hacking 52-65) in describing how a crisis arises and how a shift in thinking and theories is
motivated. An anomaly can also be thought of as something unexpected or unknown in a
particular set of circumstances. To emphasize his point, Kuhn states, “As in the Copernican
revolution, an anomaly without apparent fundamental import may evoke crisis if the application
that it inhibits has a particular practical importance, in this case for calendar design or astrology”
(Kuhn and Hacking 82). What Kuhn argues is that even science utilizes divergent and
exploratory ways of thinking when a crisis or gap opens in the way things are understood at any
given time. These changes happen when new information arises from experimentation that is
often from a completely different area of concern and reveals information that alters what was
previously thought to be the truth. This anomaly, as Kuhn calls it, this novelty, creates an
opening, a challenge to what was the established truth of something. There is suddenly a shift:
what was certain before is now uncertain. Novelty and the possibility of novelty are important
factors in the ongoing growth and progress of the human experience. This idea although active in
the Enlightenment period was not yet understood in the way that Kuhn introduces. In the
Enlightenment, reason, and the rational, along with the sciences, in the rather isolated and limited
way it was understood would inhabit the foremost position in the consciousness of people.
Humans have always had great complexity and diversity in our ways of knowing. With
varying perspectives on their authority, our imaginations, intuitions, and emotions have always
had influence in the world and on our decisions.

SUMMARY
The relationship we have to both faith and reason does not exist as a universal truth. It
does not stand outside time and space in some cosmic vault. It is like much of what we take for
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granted in our daily lives, created by us and our cultures. It is, however, as I hoped to have
indicated, a much more important kind of relationship than the one we may have, say, to our
favorite television show. The way in which we understand and establish beliefs about things like
faith and reason effect how we live or what our expectations for living will be. The dualistic
mindset of the West has always had to deal with the problems arising from those beliefs.
The problem is not a new one, nor is it distinctively contemporary, modern, postmodern,
or any other age or historic designation you may choose. It has existed for a very long time and
through many subtle changes in its manifestation. The problem is most stark for the Western
mind in comparing the philosophy of the West with the philosophy of the East. F.S.C. Northrop
in his seminal text The Meeting of East and West summarizes the differences: “The Orient, for
the most part, has investigated things in their aesthetic component; the Occident has investigated
these things in their theoretic component” (Northrop 375). The seemingly great differences
between the Western mind and the Eastern mind are as we believe purely a matter of culture. But
as the above quote seems to indicate, it is really about some very important relationships that
have become belief systems. To put it simply, the West wants to have a scientific grounding to all
its knowledge and the East allows for a more aesthetic approach that allows for less order and
more freedom. These two approaches attach and direct the ontologies of the respective cultures.
One is grounded in the belief that certainty is the way toward progress and the other understands
that life and the world is always uncertain.
The relationships we choose to have with certainty, uncertainty, the known, and the
unknown, to the sublime, are important because they establish a foundation upon which we can
project a future. If my belief is that there is nothing outside of what science and cultural certainty
can provide, then all the mystery in the world, of which a significant amount exists, will be
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largely dismissed by me and my consciousness. To lose the ability to stand in relationship to
mystery and embrace it without critically associating it with what scientism expects means that
we can have a fuller and more real relationship to the world. This is not to suggest that one
should believe in every unproven story or myth, but one should let these things stand and feel no
need to prove or dismiss them out of hand. Truth be told, humans love mystery: we love ghost
stories; we enjoy the possibilities of finding new species of animal; and we still imagine what it
would be like to live alongside the dinosaurs.
The case being made here is for a non-dualistic thinking and acting in the world. The
referential thinking that comes out of leaning on one side of a dualism like faith/reason provides
only a limited vision of the world and ourselves. The fact is there is a need for both faith and
reason and evidence that both should hold equal positions in our minds and lives. The sublime
experience is impactful because it puts us in a state where both faith and reason are partners in
the moment. Unfortunately, the judgments that arise in us out of the experience of the sublime
are subject to the same cultural forces that brought about the preference for dualisms in the first
place. But this is a failing of our thinking and not a failing of the experience of the sublime.
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CHAPTER SIX
Accessing the Sublime in the Contemporary Moment
The sublime is the equivalent of an intellectual aporia that brings both the senses
(intuitions) and the intellect (reason) together in a nexus of the possible. Briefly stated, the
sublime is a valued experience by humans. We have had to cultivate new pathways and ideas to
make the sublime experience possible and accessible. One of the most ubiquitous ways we do
this is through the media of cinema. Using our imaginations in the cinema, we can experience
almost anything that the filmmaker can fabricate. We can fly, breathe underwater, or live on an
alien planet. All of these conceptions can stimulate unique perspectives and ideas; they allow
imaginations to engage in the transcendence offered by the sublime experience. We use the
cinema because in the rigidly ordered, contemporary world our consciousnesses have difficulty
finding the kind of freedom necessary to have an experience we describe as truly sublime.
The contemporary world has blunted many experiences, including those of the sublime.
In large part, this numbing was not intentional. It resulted from the great advances in science and
technology that have provided us with vast amounts of information that were previously beyond
our capacities to know and/or disseminate. In the West, there is a tendency to believe that hard
science is the only valuable ally in the realization of knowledge. The preference for reason
against faith is only one common dualism created by the thinking in the West. This learned
preference for dualistic thinking in itself is not a bad thing, but it does remove the mystery from
many of the things that motivated the sublime experience in the past. Science and materialism
also change our expectations about the sublime and condition us to be less likely to seek them
out or to acknowledge them when they happen.
Another important factor that contributes to the dulling of experience has resulted from
the language used and the associated meanings in the culture. The term ‘sublime’ or the phrase
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“it’s sublime” have become clichéd and overused. This misuse of language has not, however,
changed the experience of the sublime. While language can have interpretive effects on some
experiences, the sublime, as an experience, resists complete definition through language and yet
still stands as an important experience, full of potential.
Can the sublime have any cultural significance? Can an artform within a culture come to
signify a particular culture’s outlook and desires? The ancient Greeks did not consider Homer’s
The Odyssey as merely entertainment. Though entertaining, The Odyssey had great cultural
significance to the Greeks. These stories shaped their cultural consciousness. For the individual
Greek, they provided identifiable definitions of the collective Greek culture. The loss of this
spiritual grounding in the modern Western world has made our readings of the stories we tell
very different. They do not have the sense of seriousness or wonder that they once had. Homer’s
writings gave the Greeks a sense of themselves and a sense of a shared history and spiritual
direction. In the contemporary world where we have less of an overt understanding of our
culture, we have to seek out and cultivate some type of cultural perspective.

PSYCHOANALYSIS OF CINEMA
The psychological apparatuses at work in the cinema are a major influences in the culture
and in peoples way of being in the West. With the increase in the amount of visual information
that we are confronted with through technological advances, we must ask the question: How has
this altered our expectations in relationship to the messages promoted by the various forms of
media? And in what way has this affected our relationship to ourselves and to things like the
sublime? Lacan’s trajectory of desire ends in the desire of the Other. In other words, for Lacan,
our desires are the desires of the Other. Dylan Evans explains, “The most important point to
emerge from Lacan’s phrase is that desire is a social product. Desire is not the private affair it
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appears to be but is always constituted in a dialectical relationship with the perceived desires of
other subjects” (Evans 39). We build our desires around the desires of what someone else would
desire or around the bigger set of desires constructed by the culture. This circular set of desires
feeds on itself from a self-generating cultural entanglement with economics. What, then, is left
for the sublime, if the appreciation of it only comes out of a process that ends in economic gain
or in the hope or promise of an economic gain that feeds our desires? The sublime's association
with the economics of capital comes out of the system of cultural desire created by the system
itself. We wish to have what the Other desires. We believe we know what this desire is through
the images we encounter in cinema and television. Our next step is to deconstruct, if we can,
these cinematic events and to try to understand how these activate the desires that Lacan has
identified.
Cinema taps into a primal, common set of desires. In movie plots, there is most often a
confluence of the heroic and romantic that in popular cinema has become systemic, stylistic, and
overtly programmatic over the years. There is always a male hero who has a love interest. Or,
there is a female hero who also must be heroic and find a perfect partner. These tropes are
consistent with much of the basic desires for love and acceptance of most beings. They are things
we easily identify with and desire to have, deep in our being, even if we already have them.
Moviemakers operate within these boundaries because they know these are programs that work
and work consistently. The delivery options and plot details in movies may change, but the
foundational connections to basic desires remain embedded in the content of the movie and in
our psychology. We can reference the Symbolic as Lacan describes it and as he uses it in his
theory. Cinema will always reference the Symbolic because, as Lacan states, it is in the Symbolic
that we exist. Evans emphasizes our connections to the Symbolic by stating, “Since the most
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basic form of exchange is communication itself (the exchange of words, the gift of speech; S4,
189), and since the concepts of law and of structure are unthinkable without language, the
symbolic is essentially a linguistic dimension. Any aspect of the psychoanalytic experience
which has a linguistic structure thus pertains to the symbolic order” (201). Filmmakers also
understand our basic psychology and leverage this knowledge to make compelling movies,
which they often do in part because these are the movies that are the most profitable.
We want to see these movies because they feed our desires. Either we desire an escape
from what is our reality, we want an imaginative exercise in the possibilities of having another
kind of life, or the movies feed an unknown subconscious desire that reality can never fulfill.
Slovoj Žižek writes,
What the fantasy stages is not a scene in which our desire is fulfilled, fully
satisfied, but on the contrary, a scene that realizes, stages, the desires as such. The
fundamental point of psychoanalysis is that desire is not something given in
advance, but something that has to be constructed—and it is precisely the role of
fantasy to give coordinates of the subject’s desire, to specify its object, to locate
the position the subject assumes in it. It is only through fantasy that the subject is
constituted as desiring: through fantasy, we learn how to desire. (Žižek 6)
Because there can be unspoken and unknown desires in operation in our psyche, tapping into the
various areas of human psychology can be useful in habituating or manipulating certain groups
to act or operate in certain ways. The fashion industry has been able to tap into our desires and
can manipulate large groups to adopt the next “popular look.” This is an active example of
Lacan’s desire of the “Other.” Movies can also have this kind of effect. Movie franchises, as they
are now called, generate not only ticket sales at theaters but DVDs, Blue-ray discs, and
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merchandise of all kinds; they even influence the cultural conversations as lines from the movies
take on extended meanings in the culture at large. The influence of the media cannot be
overstated. It feeds the needs and desires of people and, in so doing, generates its own stream of
interest and income in a self-sustaining cycle.
The cinema, or movies as they are typically called in the US, has been used again and
again as examples for philosophers in the articulation of their philosophical writings. Gilles
Deleuze is one philosopher whose use of cinema in his philosophy is noteworthy. In his
discourse on cinema, Gilles Deleuze states, “With the cinema, it is the world that becomes its
own image, and not an image which becomes world”.(Deleuze Cinema 1: The Movement-Image
57) Similar to the Žižek quote above, Deleuze suggests that the cinema creates a fantasy world
and not a reflection of the real world. The illusion created by the movies then can be thought of
as a mirror to the psychology of the desires of the viewer. This moving away from the experience
of the immediacy of the world to the mediated constructions of the cinematic image leaves us in
an interesting position. Metaphysically, Deleuze’s interpretation of the cinema as an illusory
world aligns with Plato’s parable of the cave (Plato The Republic 265).
The challenge of metaphysics as it is presented in many movies forces us to examine our
own ontological outlook. Whether or not the world is a world of illusion is beside the point. The
reality we share and the actions we take in that reality are as real as any real we get to have in
this existence. Once the question is asked in this way, you decide, get lost in the question, or live
the life you have, with the images of reality that present themselves. This is where philosophy
gets lost. It forgets that the world and the existence we have are active, functioning, and basically
all we get with the sensory apparatus gifted us by our biology. To speculate that time
contemplating nonexistence or a possible different reality is not necessarily a useless practice in
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the act of being or living in this world. It can be interesting imaginatively and that is what
movies can bring to the examination of the problem.
Denying the possibility of an intellectual advantage of contemplating these types of
concepts can leave a gap in our intellectual life. However, this speculation should ultimately be
in service of something that can be useful in life, or in the practice of life. A total retreat into
phenomenalism has been proven inadequate for existence in the shared reality we occupy. Total
immersion in cinema or television from a particular perspective is a kind of phenomenalism, and
one that changes all the time. Though this escape from the shared reality can provide some
psychological relief from the collective reality, it also can create other problems stemming from
make-believe.
According to Kendall Walton,
One fundamental difference between the real world and fictional ones, if both are
somehow man-made, lies in the manner in which we make them. A particular
work of fiction, in its context, establishes its fictional world and generates the
fictional truths belonging to it. A particular biography or history does not itself
establish the truth of what it says or produce the facts it is concerned with. What
generates facts, if they are our own creations, is not individual pieces of writing
but something like the whole body of a culture’s discourse, or the language itself
as opposed to what is said in the language, or the conceptual scheme embodied in
either of these. Every piece of discourse or thought which aspires to truth has a
reality independent of itself to answer to, whatever role sentient beings might
have in the construction of this reality. The fictional world corresponding to a
given work of fiction is not thus independent of it. (Walton Mimesis as Make-
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Believe : On the Foundations of the Representational Arts, p.101-102 )
Walton’s point about the fictional and the real is one of the working elements in the movies. We
suspend our perceptions in order to engage the make-believe of the movie, and, at the same time,
we must remain connected to the shared reality we call the world. There is a codependence that
even in the most fantasy-rich movies must somehow still exist in order for us to appreciate and
immerse ourselves in the story. This codependence is part of a process in which the make-believe
can be fictitious enough for us to have an engaged enjoyment or involvement with it but not so
unknowable that we cannot find any way to enter into it.
Movies all have a certain sense of the uncertain about them. There are always mysteries
attached to the story lines. Without them, no one would pay to watch these movies and they
would be extremely dull. This does, however, suggest that there is a point at which the makebelieve of the movies comes dangerously close to the shared reality. In other words, it seems
possible for one created reality to easily intrude on another created reality. This overlap can make
it difficult to discern what is real and what is make-believe. Again, this is, of course, Plato’s
metaphysical point: the world is only mimetic of the true forms existing only as perfect concepts
in the mind. (Plato The Republic 380) The dilemma Plato poses is presented directly in the
movies. The things we see when watching movies are similar to what is described in Plato’s
cave: we are watching only the shadows of reality.
Cinema and the moving image can mix reality and make-believe in such close
psychological proximity that we often cannot discern what is real and what is make-believe. For
example, my spouse simply cannot watch horror movies, or any movie that contains any
supernatural, scary elements at all. Her ability to intellectually discern and edit the events within
the make-believe of the movie and her normal conscious life simply do not function. She is
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frightened beyond belief by these make-believe images no matter how I try to inform her that it
is only a movie. Her psychology and the point at which the make-believe story and the reality of
the world meet are just too close for comfort. The possibility that what she is watching is real in
her mind is too probable and that becomes the issue.
This point at which our reality and make-believe touch can be characterized as the point
of immanence—when possibilities can come forward into the consciousness that may not have
otherwise surfaced. These points happen in movies all the time. We could say that this is one of
the purposes of movies, to challenge what is and to present what may be. Movies allow us to
rehearse what we would do in similar circumstances. Movies transport us into a different world,
a world unknown to us. They create a set of circumstances for us that is closely related to the
way we have heard the sublime described from the past. It is a point at which we reach a limit.
Though the limit we reach while watching movies may not be as dramatic as Burke’s
descriptions of the terror we feel when nature releases its fury, it is nevertheless a limiting type of
experience. Burke explains, “Whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain, and
danger, that is to say, whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects, or
operates in a manner analogous to terror, is a source of the sublime; that is, it is productive of the
strongest emotion which the mind is capable of feeling” (Burke and Phillips 36).
Psychologically we could say that the images we see in cinema and television represent
unfulfilled desires that stem from our way of life. In a world that has dehumanizing tendencies,
there is a strong need to imagine ourselves as better, more accomplished beings. Cinema and
television both explore the idea of being human—through reality television, for example—and
the idea of being beyond or trans-human—through superhero movies and television shows that
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highlight humans with superior abilities. Both types of depictions reveal an underlying unease
about our reality and the possibility of living authentically.
The contemporary experience of the sublime can lead to the realization that our desires,
as presented through the popular forms of cinema and television, are merely illusions. Looking
back to the chapter on Lacan, we can recall that he posits we live in and through the Symbolic,
which is language, and we present ourselves through the Imaginary (Lacan The Four
Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis 279). Both these mechanisms help us exist in the
Symbolic, but they also limit our capacity to reach reality and an authentic way of being. Cinema
and television became popular because they can support functions of the Symbolic and
Imaginary in the form of ideologies. However, there are movies that are less popular because
they present a dissenting or alternate position of the dominant ideology or worldview.
Dominant ideologies serve to blur our vision of reality and can prevent us from
experiencing the sublime. Of course, no matter how vividly a media presents the sublime, it can
still be dismissed. Like all experiences, it is our interpretation that ultimately determines the
significance the experience plays in our lives. But understanding certain media, like movies and
television, is important because cultural preferences are often hidden within entertainment.
Media, if looked at with a critical perspective, can be used by the viewers in the self-reflective
examination of being human.
This research claims that the sublime is an important partner in coming to understand our
ontological and existential outlook and possibilities. In addition, cinema has become a primary
source in how we access the sublime through the use of our imaginations. Examples from movies
can be utilized to examine how media creates the sublime experience through our imaginative
mechanisms and why we continue to repeatedly return to the medium.
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PHENOMENOLOGY OF MOVIE WATCHING
Much has been speculated about the events that occur when we are quietly watching a
movie in a movie theater.64 Sitting still in a darkened room with a larger community of others
and staring at a screen made of light seem like a strange event. But what is really happening
during this time and how does modern technology change this if it changes it at all? I will
contend that watching movies places us in a state of what I am going to call ‘augmented
imagination.’ Augmented imagination is needed because the contemporary Western world has
stifled our imaginative powers. In the chapter on language you will recall that through language
meanings become frozen. The word adult carries with it many frozen meanings and connotations.
The language we are surrounded by conditions us to participate in the conventionalized
meanings for things and denies the things determined as childish or child-like. Psychologically
conditioned to “be a grownup,” we now need an excuse and a guide to take us to these
imaginative places because of the loss of our ability to let our minds be free.
One important aspect of the movie-watching experience is that we surrender our
attentions and beliefs to the world we are watching as it unfolds on the screen. If we do not
surrender and allow our imaginations to engage with the story the filmmaker has created for us,
the experience will be unpleasant or, perhaps, infuriating. When the magic of the movie is broken
or if we lose the engagement with the story for some reason—awkward cinematography, scene
transition, or special effect, we conclude that we are watching a bad movie that is unworthy of
the imaginative effort.
When we watch a movie as adults, we are given permission in a sense to let our
imaginations play and act freely. This freeing of our imaginations may be one reason that the
moving image has become such a popular and ubiquitous medium. The idea of an augmented or
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assisted imagination may seem unnecessary, but because of our habituated roles as adults we
need permission and assistance to let the imagination work.
When we are children and still largely unconstrained by the social and intellectual
structures that will confine our thinking as adults, our imaginations can take wonderful leaps in
all directions. As we enter the mediation of adulthood, we are forced into the conventional
thinking of being a grownup and compelled to put such childhood fantasies aside.
The move into the practices of adulthood limits our imaginative selves by what seems to
us a critical necessity. But the demands of adulthood and the limits it places on the imagination
require us to leave behind or repress a part of our humanity without any consideration of the
overall impact of such a decision. As adults, we need an impetus or some assistance to activate
our imaginative selves. The phenomenology of movie watching allows our psychology to release
the Symbolic Order we are attached too and to try on for size another Symbolic Order created by
the movie maker. Recalling the chapter on Lacan the Symbolic Order is a primary concern in
Lacanian psychoanalysis. The function of analysis is to get the analysand back in to parody with
the Symbolic Order they are part of. For example, If I, as an adult aged person, begin to act as a
child, I would be shunned by other adults and perhaps considered to have a deeper psychological
problem. The Symbolic Order demands that I act and operate in a way consistent with the order.
The joy in the experience of movies is that imaginatively I can step outside of the Symbolic for a
brief moment and experience a life that is without the constraints the Symbolic normally holds.
Movies circumvent the stifling of the imagination. While we are watching movies, we are
given permission again to allow our imaginations to take flight in whatever direction the
filmmaker cares to take us. As grownups it is not practical for us to run through our offices
screaming that we are superheroes flying off to save the day, but in the movies we can.
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Augmented imagination, the kind we encounter when watching movies, gives us this permission
and aids us in the effort by creating imagery and a fictional world in which these things are
possible. To play make believe or to engage of flights of fancy as adults in the West is nearly an
impossibility. The structure of imaginative play that the movies provides is essential to
rehearsing life situations and possible futures. Movie watching is also a place for us to engage in
catharsis of traumatic emotions as Aristotle mentions in relationship to the great Greek tragedies.
(Wartenberg 30) The movies let us act and resolve the problems of our humanity in an acceptable
societal way in the West and for this reason is a crucial exercise in and support for our ability to
evolve. Without this augmented imagination, we would be stuck in our conventions and unable
to let this important part of ourselves have some active time. Movies can have lasting effects on
us. Fictions can and do motivate our thinking and decision making, helping us see from different
perspectives so we can create alternate trajectories for our lives.
Watching movies puts our psychology at the nexus of faith and reason. While watching
movies we must suspend our disbelief, our reason, and have faith that the film will take us on the
intended journey and deliver us at its destination. If we are acting too much on reason we will
not accept the movies storyline or the actions taken by the characters. If we are not including
enough reason we will not be able to imaginatively interact with the movie and enjoy the story. If
faith dominates the experience we cannot place the story into any kind of reasonable experience
that could be or might be. We must allow both faith and reason to interact, work together, if we
are too experience the story the filmmaker intends. Finding ourselves at the nexus of faith and
reason places us in the sublime experience where we become unattached from the structures, the
Symbolic, and allow a field of possibility to open in our imaginations.
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THE IMAGINATION: THE SUBLIME’S ALLY IN CINEMA
The stories in good movies stay with us like other memories, and we can draw upon them
when we confront challenges. If we are willing, the experience of watching a movie can be as
impactful as any other experience in life. As American philosopher Kendall Walton writes, “It
goes without saying that we are genuinely moved by novels and films and plays, that we respond
to works of fiction with real emotion” (Walton In Other Shoes : Music, Metaphor, Empathy,
Existence 275). Walton's work explores the imagination’s relationship to fiction. He asserts that
we are emotionally moved by our encounters with fictional situations and characters. The
sublime, like any emotional experience, is just as likely to occur through our interactions with
fiction as with reality.
In order to maintain a healthy and productive relationship to the sublime, one must have
imagination. Imagination allows us to adapt and respond to the contingent and dynamic nature of
the sublime. The power of the imagination has been exalted by some of the most brilliant minds
in the history of humanity. Albert Einstein is often quoted as saying, “Imagination is more
important than knowledge. For knowledge is limited, whereas imagination embraces the entire
world, stimulating progress, giving birth to evolution. It is, strictly speaking, a real factor in
scientific research” (Viereck 117). Many people consider Einstein a genius for his breakthroughs.
He is an inspiring and extreme example of a person using the power of the imagination.
We often overlook the role of imagination in our everyday lives. Everything from
supposing how our day will go to preparing ourselves for the work we are about to do to
considering a trip to the grocery store has elements of our imagination working in the creation of
these experiences. Valuing and cultivating this imagination lead to the ability to work through
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more radical experiences: a death in the family, a horrible accident, an ugly divorce. Kendall
Walton states it this way:
Much needs to be learned about the benefits of make-believe, about just what
needs it serves and how it serves them. But suggestions come to mind: that
engaging in make-believe provides practice in roles one might someday assume in
real life, that it helps one to understand and sympathize with others, that it enables
one to come to grips with one’s own feelings, that it broadens one’s perspective.
(Walton Mimesis as Make-Believe : On the Foundations of the Representational
Arts 12)
Walton clearly believes that the powers of imagination are crucial to the ongoing becoming of
the human being in the world. Though some people might argue that movies and television
shows make us passive, this media can also force us to imagine new things. The power of new
narratives in movies often gives us a new perspective or challenges an old, timeworn one. We
are, as Walton describes, using our powers of imagination to become sympathetic to the
characters in the narratives we watch. Through the process of watching, the imaginative
experience often becomes sublime.
Our imaginations and our relationship to the fictional have a significant role in framing
how we think about the world and ourselves. In Mimesis as Make-Believe, Kendall Walton states,
“Fictional worlds, like reality, are ‘out there,’ to be investigated and explored if we choose and to
the extent that we are able. To dismiss them as ‘figments of people’s imagination’ would be to
insult and underestimate them” (42) . Walton’s point is well taken. “Fictional worlds” can
provide an equal amount of creative stimulus in the production of novelty as worlds we consider
existing in reality. The activity of the imagination in our process of being is essential to the
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examination and testing of existential and ontological possibilities. Mimesis,65 as Plato argued,
was inauthentic and thereby a false message.66 In contrast, Aristotle argued that the mimetic
qualities of art were important because they examined how the world could be as a possibility
rather than only as what was already in existence.67 This old, ongoing argument focuses on two
different worldviews. One distinctly material and one more pragmatic.
Ideas can and should be considered a means to investigate possible areas of growth and
paths to becoming better beings in this world. Only through an examined life, as Socrates
suggested (Plato Apology 129), can being fulfill its purpose of being. Walton writes, “If actual
participation can have important benefits for us—helping us to clarify our thoughts and come to
grips with our feelings about our position in life or whatever—one would expect people to be
interested in the means by which participation is promoted and the kinds of participation one
might engage in” (Mimesis as Make-Believe 288) . Indeed, people are interested in the means
that these experiences provide. We consistently seek movies, video games, and extreme sports
that give the opportunity to experience the sublime. All kinds of motivating instances of the
sublime are in evidence in the cultures we see and create for ourselves. Walton further clarifies,
The intensity of the participant’s experience when she is emotionally involved
may hinder “objective” observation of the experience itself as well as of its
stimulus. The experience of fictionally detesting a villainous rascal or fictionally
grieving for a beloved hero may be so overwhelming that one cannot attend to and
fails to notice much about what it is that fictionally one feels and why. No doubt
there are benefits in simply having such experiences. But surely it can also be
valuable to reflect on them, or on what one might fictionally think or feel were
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one to participate. (Walton Mimesis as Make-Believe : On the Foundations of the
Representational Arts p.288-89)
These experiences are useful; they help us evaluate our circumstances and possible changes in
our direction for the future. The questions arising from these experiences promote a growth in
our understanding, emotional intelligence, and reason’s ability to draw on increased engagement
with a diversity of experiential knowledge.
Some may argue that these are not experiences of the sublime but only experiences of the
imagination. As discussed in chapter 1, Kant describes the sublime as an experience that
overwhelms the senses and drives us back into our rational minds (The Critique of Judgement
81) . Through his tripartite description of how we experience, he asserts that the activation of
reason often comes through the interactions of the imagination and the intuitions (Kant, The
Critique of Judgement 35) . For Kant, reason does not take part prior to these things, so the
necessity for the imagination and the intuitions precedes any reason or rationalization of
experience. The greater the understanding of things in nature or otherwise, the more the
experience of the sublime is dulled. Because of the great advances in science and the
understanding in general of the world around us, we have lost some of the experiences of the
sublime that Kant would have identified. We have, however, created new ones: movies,
television, and the internet have become primary and accessible sources of the sublime.
Currently, the most prevalent and accessible art forms are cinema and television. Early
experimental films paved the way for movies to become a popular platform for the imaginative
and sublime experiences we take part in today. For example, Richard Barsam in his text Looking
at Movies references the popular early film of the Lumière Brothers The Arrival of a Train at La
Ciotat and its effects on spectators: “Reliable eyewitness reports say that spectators at this event
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actually panicked at the sight of the locomotive coming towards them” (25). From very early in
its use, the moving image has had dramatic effects on spectators.
Our biological and evolutionary process also conditions how we understand and cope
with the sublime. Kant associated feelings of the sublime with strong emotions, as did Burke.
The idea that strong emotions are responsible for the experience of the sublime is an interesting
one which I believe deserves more attention. Our biology has evolved over time to help us
protect our organism. Fear, reproduction, and survival are all still very active mechanisms in us.
We can call these mechanisms ‘stressors.’ They motivate us in ways that seem automatic and
somewhat mystical. The drive to reproduce and pass on our genetics is a primal drive that directs
much of our lives. Fear and anxiety are common in the contemporary world because of the everincreasing pace of life and its complexity.
What happens to us when we are confronted with high levels of anxiety and fear? Our
evolutionary biology begins to react and our primary systems begin to work to protect us from
the perceived danger. Our senses become more acute as our bodies and minds reach out to
attempt to gather the data necessary to protect our organism and cope with the fear and
uncertainty before us. This stretching of our capacities is perhaps what Kant suggested when he
posited the supersensible (The Critique of Judgement 81) . An example of this state can be seen
in combat veterans who have a difficult time reintegrating into ordered society because they have
become habituated to being in a high-stress survival mode. These veterans suffer from what is
called ‘hyper-vigilance,’ a state of increased attention and consciousness of the world around
them. This reaching out of their consciousness in this way is the result of their being engaged in
the anxiety of the unknown for extended periods.
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All people react to unknowns in very similar ways. Only people who have conditioned
themselves and become habituated to environments such as combat seem to cope effectively with
high-stress events. These people are often identified by us as special or unique in some way. For
example, a major league baseball player can hit a 95 mph or quicker fastball. This is arguably
one of the most difficult and challenging things to do in all of the sports we play. As others have
noted, both the pitcher and hitter are set at the very limits of human capacity to throw and hit the
baseball. Yet, if you watch baseball, you see this happen, though not often. It takes about 396
milliseconds for the baseball to reach home plate once it leaves the pitchers hand (Hock). That is
much faster than a human eye can blink. Some batters report that at those speeds the baseball
seems to disappear. Major league batters, in order to hit a fastball, are using some part of
themselves that seems to transcend their biological capacities. They may add credence to Kant’s
assertion that we can access the super-sensible parts of our beings (The Critique of Judgement
81) .
Though the above example of the ability to hit a baseball moving faster than we can see
is extreme, it is not the only example of our evolutionary biology becoming enhanced. The
primal activation of our desire to protect our organism also becomes active whenever we sense
any uncertainty or danger. We do this at our jobs, in social situations, when reading, and when
watching movies. These situations all have differing levels of anxiety associated with them, but
our innate evolutionary capacities are still active and available to us. We enjoy engaging in
social, intellectual, and imaginative activities because they help us reach the highest possibilities
for ourselves. If an activity becomes too extreme and we are unprepared, it may terrify and stifle
us. One of the safest ways we participate in this kind of practice is by watching movies and using
our imaginations. While we watch movies, our imaginations operate with no constraint and yet
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from a position of safety. This is very close to Kant’s description of the sublime (The Critique of
Judgement 81) . Today, the unbounded and colossal possibilities of our imaginative functions are
most often practiced while we are watching movies.
Devices of all kinds can now display moving images, and they can be viewed from
almost everywhere on the globe. This access to the moving image has become the new normal.
As this process has evolved, the impact of the moving image in the culture has in a sense gone
underground. Unlike the spectators at the Lumière Brothers film of the train, we have become
saturated by the influences of this media because it is everywhere. This proliferation of the
moving image has amplified the impact of this media on our lives. We are becoming/returning to
a culture of the image, albeit with a relationship that is much different than the ones from the
past. More and more, images are replacing textual, language-based formats as the preferred
method for the dissemination of information. As images and imagery become more pervasive
and leveraged by more elements of the culture metaphor becomes a primary messaging media.
This seems as a move out of language but the metaphors used by advertising and cultural
ideologies frame metaphors that sustain the dominance of their viewpoints rather than challenge
them. As cultural elements like advertising become more sophisticated they have learned to tap
into the desires and Symbolic to influence us to remain in the order. As the use of images
pervades the culture, the meanings we assign them gain in importance. Additionally, our
relationship to and our expectations of these images are also altered.
An argument could be made that the growing popularity of moving images relates to the
fact that movies can most closely reflect our real lives. Being in the same room with the person
we are communicating with is better than a long-distance phone call. The more fully our sensory
capacitates can be engaged, the better and more accurate the communications will be. We can
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experience the subtleties in the body language of the person, minute changes in facial
expressions, and other indications of that person’s state of mind and feelings. All of this makes
for a much richer experience and sharing of information.
Being able to examine subtle distinctions in expression and body language can provide a
guide to the nature of the communication taking place; one can detect whether there is a
distancing between the two people or a desire for one to truly understand the other. For example,
if your best friend is upset by a tragic event, your first response is to go to your friend to comfort
and help her through the difficulty. By being present and physically there, you can determine her
state and be better able to be supportive and helpful. Your first response is not to send a text
message or email, because we know that information does not come through language alone.
Visual information carries a great deal of nuance and subtlety that cannot be expressed through
words in isolation. The fullness of the human experience cannot be contained, and we know this
instinctively. We can sense, even in a long-distance phone call, that something is not being fully
communicated. Though such feelings are intuitive and perhaps result from some personal
psychology or need, they are based in our relationships with others and our knowledge about
them. Movies, with their combination of images and sound, create situations in which our
sensory apparatuses become more fully engaged and hence our consciousness can become fully
focused on what is being presented. Movies create immersive experiences that can take us on
moving and emotional journeys.
Movies are a way for us to experience things that we may never experience in reality. But
the power of the imagination is critical in our ability to understand and to make decisions about
the world. A potent reason to seek out movies and watch them over and over is to experience the
sublime.
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APPROACHING THE SUBLIME IN THE CONTEMPORARY MOMENT
In the current world, images, media, and advertising seem to be everywhere. Generally
speaking, we have become less connected to the natural world and more connected to the
technological world. In the West, efficiencies at all costs are constantly sought out, even for the
simplest functions of everyday life. In looking for and experiencing the sublime, special
considerations must be considered in several key areas. We do not often accidentally happen on
these experiences anymore, because the world we live in is so overtly mediated by culture and
popular media that what the world really looks like seems only a distant memory. Often, we wait
until someone uses the word ‘sublime’ in reference to an event of some kind before taking notice
and interpreting it through the vision of another person.
Western culture, dominated by the capitalist vision of the world, often overlooks the
mysterious because it cannot find a way to glean profits from these experiences. Or, we could
also say, it is time-consuming dealing with the unknown; it is much more profitable dealing with
things that can be categorized quickly and efficiently. This is not to say that the sublime is not
available in the West, only that the value of the mysterious has become a subject for mindless
television rather than for enriching the human experience. But, in my opinion and experience, to
be lost in the great mysteries of the universe has not fully exited the human spirit. Often these
experiences of the sublime are facilitated through art, which still holds the power to express the
inexpressible and present us with great mysteries and significant philosophical questions to
explore. I disagree with the claims that we are bound by language. Experiences that are deemed
sublime are still sources of wonder in being human.
John Dewey, in his seminal work Art as Experience, points out that, since the separation
of the aesthetic and the everyday, we have lost the value in the pure aesthetic pleasures that
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enrich the human experience (Dewey 11). Since we created what Dewey called the ‘Museum
Culture’ for art, museums have transformed what the aesthetic is and made it into something that
stands outside the lives of humans. Art is placed instead within the special context of the
museum. In describing humans’ historical aesthetic relationships, Dewey states, “But the arts of
the drama, music, painting, and architecture thus exemplified had no peculiar connection with
theaters, galleries, museums. They were part of the significant life of an organized community”
(Dewey Art as Expereince 7). The way in which an aesthetic was preserved in the real lives of
people in the past had a profound effect on how and where the experience of the sublime could
be found through the actions of the culture. In examining the sublime, we can trace the
relationship we have to the mystery and, by doing so, trace the mystery of how we have evolved
as beings. The culture of the West has created many structured systems intended, or so it is
claimed, to make life better and easier. In my opinion, this is at best a dubious suggestion and at
worst an ethical quagmire.
The presuppositions placed on our thinking by the systems in the West mediate what can
be thought and what is possible, what is good and what is bad, what is true and what is false. The
dependence on the functions of dualisms has a far-reaching effect on almost all our decisions.
The desire for dualistic thinking in the West has continually created rifts between terms for the
sake of understanding. The language of the sublime, or should I say, the language we use to
articulate the sublime has been positioned in the West as a mystical term. Science—and the
language of science—has become the privileged term. The privilege of the rational gave us
Positivism, Reductionism and the materialist culture. The preferences for the thinking prompted
by science, Positivism, Reductionism, and Materialism changed the relationship we have to the
sublime and to the mysterious and resulted in a less potent sublime.
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We do not have the same kind of aesthetic expectations the ancients had, nor do we have
the same type of personal relationship to the aesthetic. Dewey explains, “The idea of ‘art for art’s
sake’ would not have been understood” (Dewey Art as Experience 8). The fullness of the
relationship that the ancients had to the arts is only a shadow in today’s intellectual life. The
ancients would not have understood the removal of the arts from their lives, only to have it
offered up as a product to be sold back to them if they had the resources. Art held deeper cultural
meanings for the people in ancient times. Art as commodity is an illusion of capitalism. Dewey
writes,
It is to indicate that theories which isolate art and its appreciation by placing them
in a realm of their own, disconnected from other modes of experiencing, are not
inherent in the subject-matter but arise because of specifiable extraneous
conditions. Embedded as they are in institutions and in habits of life, these
conditions operate effectively because they work so unconsciously. Then the
theorist assumes they are embedded in the nature of things. Nevertheless, the
influence of these conditions is not confined to theory. As I have already
indicated, it deeply affects the practice of living, driving away esthetic perceptions
that are necessary ingredients of happiness, or reducing them to the level of
compensating transient pleasurable excitations. (Dewey, p.10)
I would argue that we have gone well past the warnings that Dewey wrote about in the early
twentieth century. Our culture has accelerated into the world he warned against, and we have
suffered for it. But I also would argue that humans still desire the kind of aesthetic experience
that can be described as sublime. The only change today is how and where this experience can
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happen, in what form and through what mechanisms the experience originates, and what
interpretive platforms are used as the basis for understanding it.
The supposed speed at which the contemporary world of the West seems to suggest we
should operate barely allows us time to react, much less to contemplate or reflect on our daily
experiences. Dewey argues that contemplation leads to subjectivism.68 The vast amounts of
visual information and the scrambling for increased attention in the marketplace for products to
produce profits, however, is not the aesthetic return that Dewey would have considered as art
reentering life. The use of images by media and advertising has become very pervasive and
influential. The need to use images as messages has made the return to the aesthetic an
understandable part of the culture again. Street art and other forms of public art that engage
people have become more disseminated throughout the cultural landscape. These images often
offer messages of dissent and pose philosophical and critical questions about the culture at large.
The impulse to respond to the aesthetic is still active in people, and this emerging visual culture
provides a kind of evidence for a renewed interest by theory and philosophy.
Dewey’s work has remained relevant and in some ways has become more significant
because of the current changes happening in the world, particularly in the West. The general
mistrust pervading the culture is reminiscent of the social and cultural upheaval of the 1960s.
Stimulus for change seems to come to the West every forty or fifty years, and either the desire to
make things better or a general frustration with the current system reveals itself. The notion of
evolution and progress, for ourselves and the cultures we live in, is still an active and positive
force in the world. Dewey understood the world as an ongoing, dynamic, and evolving process
without a predetermined teleological destination: “Many theories about art already exist. If there
is justification for proposing yet another philosophy of the esthetic, it must be found in a new
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mode of approach” (Dewey Art as Expereince 11). Dewey observes that the existing theories are
already in service to the existing structures of art. Adding to them only serves to reinforce what
he considers to be the incorrect point of view: “But, to my mind, the trouble with existing
theories is that they start from a ready-made compartmentalization, or from a conception of art
that ‘spiritualizes’ it out of connection with the objects of concrete experience” (Dewey Art as
Expereince 11). If the only kind of vision of the arts we have is one that places the arts in the
marketplace as something to be purchased, it is difficult if not impossible to have them function
in the way that fulfills the purpose of art in building the cultural spirit and nourishing the spirit of
the individual.
The existential nature of our being makes up a large part of who and what we are and,
more importantly, what we think of who and what we are in that existence. The process of being
and becoming, for Dewey, was of primary concern and understanding: “Because experience is
the fulfillment of an organism in its struggles and achievements in a world of things, it is art in
germ. Even in its rudimentary forms, it contains the promise of that delightful perception which
is esthetic experience” (Dewey Art as Experince 19). The empirical approach Dewey uses in
making his case for art and for experience is difficult to challenge or to disregard. It prompts us
to ask fundamental questions about the experiences we have in this world and whether or not
these experiences can have the power to motivate us to seek a better future.
The idea that experience is a primary source for our knowledge is not new, and certainly
we have covered this in a variety of sections so far. The point is, however, that we still must
acknowledge and account for these experiences in our lives lest, as Dewey suggests, we find
ourselves in subjectivism. If we read the sublime experience through the lens of subjectivism, we
end up essentially with one of the already exhibited interpretations of the sublime. One solution
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is to interpret the sublime experience and the importance of the empirical in a new way: I will
argue that the sublime experience is a deep, experiential well of knowledge about our humanness
and being.
Arguably the sublime and other conceptual conundrums like God and human existence
have similar points of convergence. With Professor Lawrence Cahoone’s guidance in examining
these three objects through the philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce’s convergence theory of
truth (Cahoone, ch.5, 2:15:40), I hope to put into question the validity, so constructed, of all
three. Peirce’s pragmatic convergence theory explains that the truth is an ongoing and
dynamically shifting operation between what we know intellectually and what we believe to be
our social position. Pierce suggests a fluidity within the process. Keeping a fluidity in our
approach to the world and the things in it allows the world to reveal itself slowly and with a
diversity of information. Being constrained by any conventional structure, such as language often
limits or colors our decisions about things and ourselves. This is a very simplified version of
Peirce’s theory, but the main point here is that the theory, like the sublime, is not fixed. Truth and
the sublime are both forever in transition. Peirce’s theory of truth champions the inquiry that
drives us to search out and examine what is possible.
The other theories of truth, coherence69 and correspondence70 when applied to the
concepts of the unknown bring different results, primarily because they are more grounded in the
existing structures. Peirce identifies the problems with these other theories as resulting from a
specified language. The foundation of Peirce’s theories stems from his ideas about language.
Like Derrida and the deconstructionists, Peirce claims that language is referential only in that no
meaning is fixed. Further, Peirce claims that all thoughts are signs, and he concludes that
thoughts and sensory input are signs that lead to a hypothesis that, as in the sciences, must be

205
tested and confirmed. Peirce believes, “Every thought, every encounter with an object is
mediated” (Cahoone, ch.5, 2:15:40). There is no ground, there is no beginning, everything comes
from an inference.
Peirce’s philosophy is sublime in its conclusions. Cahoone points out that for Peirce,
“The meaning of a term is its role in the guidance of conduct” (Cahoone, ch.5, 2:23:46). This is
the pragmatic definition of truth, Peirce concluded. It leaves us in a position that has no
beginning and no end. We must sail on the sea of this existence with no compass or map and
with no way to really predict a proper conclusion. This is the same way we describe the sublime,
is it not? The idea of the complexity of the unknown is what drives most of human reason. The
great moments in science, art, literature, and philosophy all happen when someone makes a great
leap into the unknown and discovers a novel concept or creation. The sublime is a state of mind,
a feeling in the body, a perspective, a realization, an immanence that we use to seek out and
explore novelty and the unknown.
When encountering something we define as sublime, we often feel uneasy, lost, strange,
and, as it has been said, out of our element. At the same time, we also feel a kind of
contentedness in our ability to exist with such a thing. Kant describes the sublime as an
oscillation between attraction and repulsion. (Critique of Judgement 88) This is perhaps because
the feelings that arise with our encounter with the sublime rely on our reason to assure us
somehow that we can seek and eventually find resolutions or answers to the most confounding
problems. Howard Caygill in A Kant Dictionary describes it this way, “The oscillation between
pleasure and pain provokes all the ‘various feelings of enjoyment or displeasure’ and rests ‘not so
much upon the nature of the external things that arouse them as upon each person’s own
disposition the be moved by these to pleasure or pain.” (Caygill 197) Kant also associates the
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sublime with intensified feelings, Caygill describes the joining of subjective and objective
properties like this, “these augmented properties of feelings are further extended to underlie both
theoretical and practical philosophy: feeling provides the basis for the former in the intimation of
an accord between the finality of nature and our understanding (Introduction e.g.,§ VI) and the
later as the summum bonum of a flourishing life.” (Caygill 199) The feelings of an
intensification of life comes from our encounter with the sublime and gives a glimpse of what
can be. Kant also exalts the imagination in relation to the sublime. (Critique of Judgement 87)
The imagination is not bound to any worldly concepts and therefore can fly freely in whatever
lofty space under consideration.
The case that is being made is that the sublime is extraordinary, but it is not special
because of the circumstances that cause the sublime. The sublime becomes special because of
who and what we are in relationship to the experience. This is, of course, not an easy thing to
define or to articulate. The sublime experience is as highly dependent on the person having the
experience as it is on the specifics of the experience itself. The sublime experience presents us
with a mystery and something transcendent that affects our consciousness. But how the
experience of the sublime affects our consciousness at any particular time is highly contingent on
many aspects of who we are at any given moment. The point is that the sublime refers to
something mysterious. Our response to these types of mysterious experiences can be revealing
and profoundly informative. An examination of all of these responses requires a much larger text
than here available. Some earlier and significant responses have been examined in the genealogy
chapters. The main point is that the sublime reveals to us our existential and ontological
relationship to the mysterious. This is important because much of Western thinking derives its
foundation and perspectives from the ontological and existential perspectives of science,
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materialism, and rationalism. If a chosen perspective is mediated by a false or inaccurate
perception, the resulting conclusions can be seriously flawed.
The mysterious is still an important element of the human experience. Television shows,
movies, novels, etc., often favor elements of the mysterious to capture the attentions of the
audience. It would seem that Kant was correct in framing our reason as a continual search for
deep, metaphysical answers. The sublime experience lies at the heart of the mysterious. Our
confrontation with the sublime is really a confrontation with the mysterious experience of being
human. The sublime’s value lies in the fact that it exists outside of the formal structures of
societal and intellectual life and frees us from these structures even for the briefest of moments.
The brief moment of freedom the experience of the sublime provides is revealing because it
shows us that we can be free, pure beings.
The question is then: How can we access this pure experience in the highly structured
society of the West with its materialistic and skeptical perspective of the mysterious?

THE GAME
In David Fincher’s 1997 film The Game, (Fincher) Nicholas Van Orton (Michael
Douglas) is a successful banker and a loner spending too much time by himself, according to his
brother Conrad (Sean Penn). Conrad gives Nicholas a mysterious card for his 48th birthday. The
card says only that he has been given the gift of a game of some kind at a place called
“Consumer Recreation Services.” When Nicholas becomes curious about the nature of the gift,
he visits the company, where he is subject to a battery of physical and psychological tests.
Ultimately, he is informed, by a very terse phone call, that he has been turned down for
unspecified reasons from the exclusive services of the company. Incensed and furious, Nicholas
goes on about his day. Strange events begin to unfold in his life, and he becomes embroiled in a
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series of mysterious occurrences. Neither Nicholas nor we the viewers are aware that the game
has indeed begun.
While watching the movie, we encounter in our imagination the same sense of
uncertainty, fear, and dread that Nicholas is experiencing. We are given no extra knowledge; we
must experience alongside Nicholas the mysteries he encounters. The film creates a sympathetic
association with Nicholas by placing the viewer in a similar emotional and intellectual state. The
movie is not unique in its camera use, film score, or any of the basic mechanics of movies that
have been made in Hollywood over the last twenty years. The true value of The Game is in the
experiential nature of the story and its mysterious events.
The Game establishes a circumstance for us to have a sublime experiences. For example,
when Nicholas meets his brother Conrad for dinner, the gift that Conrad gives him is as
mysterious for us as viewers as Nicholas. While foreshadowing is a typical film technique used
to build tension in the viewer by giving information that the protagonist has yet to know, no
foreshadowing is provided to us in The Game. We must experience the mystery in the way what
Nicholas experiences it. This anxiety and uncertainty we encounter in The Game helps in
creating the sublime experience.
The Game is a page taken from Heidegger and the existentialists. Both Nicholas and the
viewer experience anxiety in the beginning of the movie because we have no idea what is
happening; there is no apparent plot or any story line that is familiar to us and the usual
cinematic clues are absent. The start of the film, and of the game itself, reveals a completely
chaotic set of circumstances. This experience of “thrownness” is sublime. The encounter with the
unknown stimulates the sublime experience in us, just as understanding “thrownness” is intended
to make us question our perspectives and direction (Heidegger Being and Time 321).

209
The Game also relates to Heidegger’s concept of “falling,”71 which is not a physical thing
but an ontological mistake. For Heidegger, “falling” means to become one of the masses,
something he refers to as ‘das Man,’ which is translated generally as “the one” or sometimes, as
we say in the West, the “they” (Wheeler). We often associate this “they” with the culture at large
and how it expects certain behaviors from us. In The Game, Nicholas is an example of someone
who has “fallen” into the programmed set of expectations of a culture. However, the sublime
nature of the game disrupts Nicholas’s accepted reality. The Game reveals a truth that there is
always a game being played—that is, unless you can remove yourself from the game or become
consciously aware of the game.
Similarly, The Game plays with the audience’s expectations in an effort to make us more
self-conscious. The Game does employ some familiar cinematic methods. The use of audio cues
and rapid action sequences help to elicit high tension and anxiety in the viewer. For instance,
who cannot recall the sound of crows cawing signaling something ominous about to happen. Or
the music that played when the shark in the movie Jaws (Spielberg) was nearby? But The Game
is different from other thrillers in the way it continually challenges the modes and systems of the
genre by flipping our consciousness back and forth from our reality to the reality of the movie.
While watching, we are at times surrendering our consciousness to the reality created by the
movie and at other times we are compelled to return our consciousness to our existing reality to
consider what is happening to us. The switching between surrender and analysis is also a central
function of the experience of the sublime.
The shifting between surrender and analysis puts our minds again in the place where faith
and reason meet. Surrender (faith) and analysis (reason) must both become operational while
engaging with The Game. We are denied our ability to reason entirely and must allow some faith
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to enter our consciousness if we choose to consider to go along. The Game makes it impossible
to predict through reason what is going to happen in the film and we must allow faith to come
into the process. We find pleasure in this process. We like to be challenged in this way and is the
reason we go to the movies in part. The circumstances The Game creates can only be defined as
sublime.
The Game creates the experience of the sublime through this uncertainty by manipulating
our expectations of the genre and including us in the mystery being played out in the film. It
achieves this effect through the sympathetic suspension of disbelief as we imaginatively put
ourselves in the place of Nicholas. We are also thrust into the unknown and must, just as
Nicholas, engage our critical faculties to try and understand what is happening. In experiencing
The Game, we are not mindless spectators but conscious participants in the mystery taking place
on screen and for ourselves sitting in the theater. This experience of being taken out of our
comfort zone and thrown into a circumstance in which we feel no solid ground under us is a
wonderful opportunity to understand the sublime in a way that makes it a valuable ally in our
lives. The Game reveals a different reality to us: the self we assume—and the presentation of that
self—is illusory, created in part by the self in order to play the game the culture outlines for us.
We can hold onto this game with its trappings and illusions or we can embrace the chaos of the
unknown in the attempt to realize our being as beings, as Heidegger suggests (Heidegger 69). We
can realize through experiencing movies like The Game that our current way of being is
mediated and contingent upon what our culture tells us is the truth.
At the end of The Game, Nicholas realizes he has been living a life of illusions. In the
closing scene, he thanks his brother Conrad, a moment that seems genuine and heartwarming.
Nicholas also goes after Christine, the waitress that has been part of the game since the
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beginning. Christine is catching a cab to the airport on her way to a new gig for Consumer
Recreation Services. Nicholas asks her out to dinner when she gets back. Christine, who we learn
is really Claire, asks if he wants to have coffee with her at the airport, something Nicholas would
have never done previously. We see a real connection and a zest for living Nicholas has not
exhibited throughout the movie. He has changed and is ready to begin living more fully and
authentically. Undergoing the sublime experience of The Game was instrumental in motivating
Nicholas to change his life. By implication, the sublime experience of The Game can also
transform the viewers’ consciousness by confronting us with the same questions asked of
Nicholas.
Heidegger’s concept of being thrown into the world has value in our ability to manage
our lives and directly applies to experiencing The Game. If we do not take responsible action, our
lives turn out to only be a game in the end. The active engagement in life’s sublime experiences
holds much potential. In framing our decisions and directions, we can create an ontological and
existential perspective that is closer to what we may truly desire. The sublime experience, even
in imagination, can transport us outside of the constructs of the culture, our subjectivity, and even
philosophy itself.
The Game immerses us in a chaotic and emotional ride that grabs and holds our attentions
and activates our passions throughout the movie. A significant element in judging a movie to be a
good one is whether or not it connects with us on an emotional level. The Game certainly
qualifies as an impactful movie because of its ability to grab our attentions and provoke our
emotional responses to the fiction. Feelings are important to us; experiencing them in the stories
we see in movies reassures us as to our emotional states and those of the characters. One way to
read the intense emotions in movies is to regard them as judgments. This reading comes from
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Robert Solomon. In The Passions, he explains that “emotions are rational” (Solomon 181). He
argues that emotional responses to situations we encounter are generally something we learn
much like other behaviors. If we do learn our emotional responses, then there is a logic to how
and when we find ourselves choosing a particular emotional response. Solomon continues,
They [emotions] are as I have been arguing, judgments, and they are intentional
and intelligent. Emotions, therefore, may be said to be rational in precisely the
same sense in which all judgments may be said to be rational; they require an
advanced degree of conceptual sophistication, including a conception of Self and
at least some ability in abstraction. (Solomon 181)
Solomon’s ideas raise the following questions: Are the emotions we experience in our
experiences of the sublime rational? And if so, how are they rational and toward what end?
The experience we call the sublime includes elements of faith and reason and because of
this we feel like we have transcended the normal space of our lives. The best place to find this
experience is the cinema where we are allowed the freedom to ourselves freely and fully
participate in the process of life. We could say that faith and the sublime in this case are rational.
They are both parts of our intellectual processes. Perhaps it is because we have been so
habituated to the dominate thinking around the dualisms in the West that we feel uncomfortable
outside the cinema allowing this mental state to occur?
These questions are difficult to answer because the contemporary cultural context in
which we interpret the sublime has accrued many biased layers of significance. The value we can
find in the sublime—and this is why people still seek out these experiences—is that the sublime
reminds us that we are much more than cultural stereotypes and definitions. The sublime
experience has remained an unspeakable, unpresentable event that we attempt to bring into the
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understanding and culture through language. But the experience of the sublime is still by
available definition something of a mystery. This mystery cannot be fully articulated in language
or brought under the control of the existing “language games” (Wittgenstein, Anscombe, et al.
35e) of the culture. The unknown has, however, been disseminated through the different
“language games,” as mentioned earlier with Wittgenstein, but this only emphasizes the
uniqueness of the experience of the sublime in the history of humanity. The sublime, as an
experience, carries the remnants of past ontological operations of people and cultures. Before the
Enlightenment and prior to the materialist consumer and economic ontology adopted by the
West, the experience of the sublime served as a reminder that we are beings that are beyond a
specific cultural context.
In watching The Game, one can’t help but feel that there is something beyond what is
being presented on the screen: something unpresentable. This reminds us of Lyotard
unpresentable in relation to art in which he states, “I shall call modern art that devotes its ‘trivial
technique,’ as Diderot called it, to presenting the existence of something unpresentable. Showing
there is something we can neither see nor show.” (Lyotard What is the Postmodern 11) The
feeling we get when watching certain movies like The Game can be unsettling and sublime. The
feeling that something is going on yet we can’t grasp it is the unpresentable and also sublime. In
the experience of the sublime we sense we are being offered something transcendent yet it is not
directly visible nor can we fully describe it. Lyotard attaches this idea to art, this dissertation
extends that idea to cinema.
The culture in the West works to suppress strong emotions, like those associated with the
sublime, in favor of logic and rational thinking. In the normal day-to-day workings of life, we try
to not experience strong emotions. Many of the powerful emotions expressed in open social
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contexts are interpreted as negative or troubling. Even strong expressions of joy or happiness are
not nearly as acceptable as one would think. We can and do, however, experience very strong
emotions while watching movies. Some movies are specifically designed to provoke strong
emotional responses, which is often why we find these movies meaningful. Emotions assist us in
becoming sympathetic with the characters in movies. We become deeply connected by our
shared emotional responses to fictional characters in movies.
The arising of strong emotions brings to mind Nietzsche’s discourse on the human spirit,
referencing Dionysus and Apollo the Greek gods, Nietzsche considers these gods as emblematic
of parts of the human spirit. (Nietzsche The Birth of Tragedy 14) Nietzsche also characterizes the
effects of the Dionysiac like this,
“These Dionysiac stirrings, which, as they grow in intensity, cause subjectivity to vanish
to the point of complete self-forgetting, awaken either under the influence of narcotic
drink, of which all human beings and peoples who are close to the origin of things speak
in their hymns, or at the approach of spring when the whole of nature is pervaded by lust
for life.” (Nietzsche The Birth of Tragedy 17)
This is very reminiscent of what we undergo when watching a movie and are swept up in the
narrative of the film.
Theories about the phenomenology of watching movies run the gamut from issues of
mindless spectatorship to delivery devices for social programming.72 It is possible to take a more
positive and active view of the potentials of engaging with moving images. Strong emotions still
signal an experience of the sublime. Deep sadness, compassion, joy, fear, exhilaration, all these
emotions can and do arise in the watching of movies. Because we are living in the world of the
imagination while watching movies, the filmmaker can take us to any world, any emotional
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height or depth possible. The skill of the filmmaker to create a compelling story, capture our
attentions and emotions, and activate our imaginative powers produces the sublime experience in
cinema alongside the willing participant.

DREAMS
Dreams (Kurosawa), directed by Akira Kurosawa, is another film that has the potential to
provoke in us an experience of the sublime. Dreams, Kurosawa's last movie, is a series of
vignettes that all have a connection to nature. Dreams, reportedly inspired by Kurosawa's
reoccurring dreams, is a series of vignettes. In the first short, we are introduced to what is
coming by being transported to Japan. The change of culture shocks us, the person of the West
because we are now in unfamiliar territory. Kurosawa shows us an unspecified historical period
and a culture that is markedly different from our own. The characters speak Japanese, which
upsets our grounding in language: we must read subtitles, which further distorts our experience.
For the Western audience this can be especially challenging. For the Japanese audience less so ,
but still connected to the idea of dreams and the mythology of the Japanese culture which may
put the Japanese viewer in a similar sublime state. We see what appears to be historic Japan
based on the surroundings and the dress of the characters. We see a young boy in traditional
Japanese clothes and a woman we assume to be his mother. They are in front of a traditional
Japanese home we assume is theirs. It begins to rain, and the mother begins grabbing items and
runs towards the interior of the house. While she does this, she gives a warning to the young boy
about coming into the house. She warns him not to go out in the rain while the sun is shining
because foxes get married on those days, and they do not like being watched. Her warning
increases our uncertainty because we do not understand the warning, and the title of the movie
suggests that we may be in or observing a dream. The beautiful and sublime uncertainty of
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Kurosawa movie moves us into a situation where we must be willing to accept that both faith and
reason are necessary options in attempting to watch the movie and acknowledge its intent. In
experiencing the movie, leaning heavily upon either faith or reason limits the experience. We
must have the freedom to allow both to be in play. The open acceptance of multiple elements of
information entering our consciousness is what makes the sublime possible.
For the West, Japan, and most Asian cultures remain a mystery. Kurosawa opens some of
the beautiful uncertainty that is part of the Japanese culture to us in the West through Dreams —
being thrust into the sublime while watching Dreams, we enter into a beautifully uncertain
situation, one that we may not have assimilated or structured for ourselves. Experiencing
Dreams, we have to allow the scenes and ideas to wash over us, and we must let our memories,
intuitions, emotions, imaginations, and reason guide us through the mystery. The aggregate of
human capacities operating together in a kind of harmony is phenomenologically the sublime
experience. Kant identifies this as the supersensible. (Kant, Critique of Judgment 81) Kant
suggests that we are driven back into our reason to deal with the sublime, but the elements used
by reason are from the intuitions, memories, emotions, and imagination.
The cinematography and scene selection in Dreams adds to the sublime nature of the
experience. Kurosawa, titling the movie Dreams, creates for us a conceptual framework. This
framing sets up in us expectations, and connections to memories, experiences, histories,
fantasies, and our own? dreams. The title, Dreams, also removes the expectations and
domination of the concrete conventionalism of the West. The images are beautiful, and because
we have been set up by the title, we are willing to let go of the over-application of reason and
allow the beautifully sublime visuals to carry us along without restraint. No doubt intentional,
Dreams encourages us to let go of all we believe and flow along with the beautiful uncertainty of
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life in the stories. The sublime experience is this flowing. It removes us from the structured and
programmed binary existence of the commonplace and lets us imagine a new or different version
of the world and ourselves. It puts us in place of potential and openness to what can be rather
than blind acceptance as to what is.
The other vignettes are also from the perspective of the Japanese culture than of the
Western culture. The Peach Orchard, the second vignette, has a young boy again engaged in a
mystery of finding a young girl that he believes is a guest of his sister. No one besides him sees
the girl as he goes outside to find her. The boy finds himself at an old peach orchard where the
spirits of the trees speak to him saying how sad they are that the family has cut down all the
peach trees. The boy feels shame and sadness, and the spirits of the trees gift upon him one last
time the vision of the peach orchard in full bloom. The visuals of the orchard in bloom alone are
sublime but joined with the mystery of the little girl and the spirits speaking to the boy, we
cannot help but asks ourselves how we feel about cutting down trees or how we feel seeing an
orchard in full bloom.
The one vignette that may be most interesting for the Western mind is the one titled
Crows. In this vignette, we see a man looking at paintings of Vincent Van Gogh in a formal
gallery setting. A familiar scene to most Westerners who understand that art is art in part because
of its presentation and validity through the museum or gallery. The dream comes when the man
moves through reality and into the life of the paintings, becoming immersed in the colors,
textures, and scenes painted by Van Gogh. The inclusion of this dream by Kurosawa in the
movie is fascinating. It serves as a counterpoint to the other vignettes. It emphasizes the
differences between the West and the East and enhances the sublimes nature of the movie by
shifting us through the stark differences in cultures.
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The last vignette is titled Village of the Water Mills, and in closing the movie Kurosawa
takes us to a quaint and beautifully simple village filled with watermills that presumably provide
power for making all types of things for the community. A man visiting the village speaks to an
ancient male resident, and he tells him about the village, its inhabitants, traditions, and ways of
life. He is marking some very distinct differences with what the West and what the modern
world has embraced. It is interesting because the older man's words can be interpreted as
sentimental and out of touch with the contemporary world. Also, his words may be revealing a
more profound truth that has been covered by the trappings of the West’s culture. The chance to
examine this distinction is part of the sublime experience because a kind of oscillation happens
in us. We move between intense emotions, imaginings, memories, and rational thinking in a kind
of flux. This flux is sublime. The experience of the sublime begins by being in a situation where
uncertainty prevails, and an overwhelming of our capacities happen, whatever they are at any
moment in our lives. The vignette ends the movie with an expression of joy and respect for the
flow of life. The older man, whom we learn is 103 years old, goes off to celebrate the end of life
of one of the members of the village. He tells the man that the person who passed was a former
love and that she broke his heart. His actions, however, show us he still has love and respect for
her, and the village celebrates her life, not as an ending, but a type of beginning. Life only ends
when those who are alive put it to an end. Lives continue to have power in the world by those
who remember and lean upon those that have passed.
The choice to include Dreams in this discourse was to show the different situations in
which the sublime arises. The overwhelming sense of uncertainty is an essential element in the
sublime experience. Uncertainty can happen at any moment and through different contexts.
Western culture is dominated by reason and has become quite efficient in rationalizing or
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marginalizing any thinking that includes uncertainty or mystery. The culture of the West denies
validity to anything that is not immediately answerable. The West deals with the sublime in this
way: it marginalizes and treats it as only a novelty. Including a movie emphasizing the culture of
Japan that takes an inclusive approach to things like faith, reason, and mystery was necessary to
make a case for the sublime in cinema. As an example, Japan embraces imperfection, where the
West avoids it. Dreams give us a glimpse into the Japanese psyche, the relationship to nature, to
each other, and the world, allowing us to participate in our imaginations the culture of Japan.
The sublime experience we access through cinema is a valuable ally in the construction of our
future.

CLOUD ATLAS
Another movie that has the potential to take us on a sublime emotional journey is Cloud
Atlas, (Tom Tykwer Lilly and Lana Wachowski) starring Tom Hanks and Halle Berry. It explores
the conditions of power and the limits of rationalism. Cloud Atlas takes the viewer on a
transcendent trip through a layered examination of time, the connections we have to each other,
and the abuses perpetrated by humans on other humans. The movie is challenging for viewers to
grasp because the story line and the implications of the embedded philosophical questions
require a letting go of the prescribed and formulaic narratives typical of most big-budget
Hollywood movies. Cloud Atlas is the creative work of the Wachowski sisters, arguably two of
the most creative minds working in movies today. Cloud Atlas is a wonderful example of a
movie that not only portrays the complex lives of its characters but also mirrors the deeply
philosophical situations we encounter. In experiencing Cloud Atlas, viewers have different
emotional and intellectual reactions. For one person this movie can be a moving and emotionally
stirring experience, while for another it can be a frustrating and exasperating one.
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The paradoxes embedded in Cloud Atlas are not only challenging for the characters in the
film but also for the viewers. In the process of watching Cloud Atlas, our attentions are swept up
by the narratives, situations, characters, and imaginative potentials the movie presents. We apply
what we know from our lives to the situations that the characters are undergoing, and we try to
identify with them. At the same time, movies like Cloud Atlas allow us to go beyond ourselves.
Movies like Cloud Atlas upend the linear systematic systems of living we are habituated to. By
transporting us into a world that is part make-believe we can allow ourselves to be free from
limits of life we normally have to negotiate. We can surrender our social, intellectual, and
cultural values to the movie and permit our imaginations to rule. John Paul Sartre wrote in The
Psychology of Imagination, “We have seen that the act of imagination is a magical one. It is an
incantation destined to produce the object ones thought, the thing one desires, in such a way one
can take possession of it.” (Sartre 141) The imaginative is and always has been a critical partner
in our becoming. We must let both our imaginations and our reason plot our future horizon. This
balance between imagination and identification is what makes a good movie and ultimately
allows us to go on the intended journey uninterrupted.
To suspend our disbelief in order to enjoy a movie is very close to the concept of
“disinterestedness” that Kant and others find primary in the encounter with the aesthetic. While
watching a movie, we must let our subjective perspective be mediated by the story unfolding
before us on the screen. In contrast, if we are critical and overly analytical while watching a
movie, the story quickly loses its appeal and we tire of the process. Being overly subjective or
objective causes us to fall out of the spell of the story that the filmmaker wants us to enjoy. Like
Kant’s analytic of the beautiful (The Critique of Judgement 97), we the viewers must in a sense
become disinterested observers rather than subjectively critical observers. Simply put, while
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watching a movie we must have a balance of subjectivity and objectivity, as well as a playful
acceptance of the imaginative. This is also a balance of faith and reason in much the same way
Kant describes the beautiful as the free play of the imagination and the understanding (Hughes
61). It is in this cognitive process that the beautiful exists and it is also how the feelings of the
sublime are able to arise. The sublime in Kant is an event that overwhelms our abilities and tests
our senses and our reason. (Critique of Pure Reason 81) By surrendering our beliefs to the
movie, we can accept in our imaginations the events unfolding on the screen. We can watch a
planet being created or destroyed or we can watch the birth of the universe. The awe and wonder
such events create for us can only be described as an experience that is sublime. In a movie, the
combination of powerful images and story augment our imaginative abilities to create the
experiences we cannot have in Lacan’s structured reality known as the Symbolic (Evans 201).
We have been conditioned to conceive of time in an orderly linear fashion by living in the
Symbolic Order as well. The meaning and definitions of ‘time’ have been ordered and
concretized like other words and concepts. Cloud Atlas is a movie that challenges our beliefs and
understandings of time. It presents different lives interacting over multiple lifetimes. These
encounters occur in the past, return to the present, and then move into the future. Tracking this
timeline is challenging to our concept of time because we desire what we have been taught. Our
cognitive processes find this temporal shifting disorienting, stressful, and full of tension. This
anaprolyptical73 movement of time in the movie both fascinates us and vexes our common
understanding. We are forced into an experience that can only be described as sublime.
Uncomfortable and temporally inconsistent, Cloud Atlas challenges our common understanding
of how time works and interrogates our preference for entertainment being a mindless escape
from our lives. Movies like Cloud Atlas, by intention, put us in direct and startling relationship
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with the mysterious. Ultimately, this encounter with the sublime produces a flood of emotions
and prompts us to ask deep questions about our sense of humanity.
Cloud Atlas is filled with chaos and disturbances. As mentioned above, the discordance
we find in the temporal shifting in Cloud Atlas denies us our preferences for a linear narrative.
The changing nature and gender of the characters as we move from one temporal space to the
next also unhinges our tendencies for an orderly and simple story progression and vexes our
ability to understand the characters’ roles in the movie. Cloud Atlas has us emotionally and
intellectually frantic to find a conventional foothold, which does not come until we can learn to
accept the unconventionality of the stories’ movements. The feelings associated with the chaos
Cloud Atlas creates are not unlike the feelings we encounter when we experience the sublime.
The chaos of Cloud Atlas intentionally disrupts our conventional thinking about movies and
turns our expectations upside-down.
The core of the problem we have with understanding movies like Cloud Atlas and the
sublime is that we want to interpret them through conventional methods. The conventions of
language and the constrained meanings they create can never fully articulate the feelings we
encounter in the sublime experience. As we become habituated to the conventions of language,
we no longer examine the experience itself but lean on the prevalent cultural interpretations. Still
the sublime continues to linger in the background possibly because it represents a contingency in
this respect. The full expression of a story through images, words, and sound can make clear to
us that language alone cannot describe human existence. There is always in human existence a
deep underlying sense of the mysterious. Cloud Atlas disrupts our practiced language use and
abilities and forces us into and examination of the language used in the movie and our own use
of language.
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In an unknown space, landscape, or future, leaving markers on a return trail is a very
reasonable thing to do. Expecting contingencies is always a good practice for anyone in any new
or unusual encounter. In many ways, the experience of the sublime allows us to view our being
in a purer sense, away from the demands of culture and its predilections for conventionalism.
The experience of the sublime is like a marker, it removes us from the day-to-day practices of the
culture and shows us a path to the authentic.
I recall an anecdote someone once told me about a friend’s sibling who had some
emotional problems and adopted the idiosyncrasy of holding onto the end of a piece of rope. If
the rope were dropped or lost from sight, the sibling would undergo an immediate and unpleasant
emotional reaction. It was as if to say: I cannot lose this rope, because I will not be able to find
my way back to where I belong or to my point of origin. The sibling’s attachment to this rope
continued throughout the sibling’s life, through adulthood and into old age. The psychological
connection to this rope and the idea of this remote connection are like the experience of the
sublime. The more removed from these feelings of connection, the more cultural anxiety we feel
and the greater the stirrings to reconnect with the experience of the sublime. Heidegger’s
explanation of the need for ‘Authenticity’ (Heidegger Being and Time 232-33) and ‘Guilt’
(Heidegger Being and Time 326-27) and Sartre’s definition of ‘Bad Faith’ (Sartre and Barnes
Being and Nothingness 86-116) describe the disconnect between the origins of our authentic
being and the need for experiences like the sublime that may help or assist in our attempts at
reconnection to our own humanity.
Movies like Cloud Atlas force us to enter an unknown space. The movie purposefully
challenges many of the ideological positions we find in the West. Cloud Atlas begins with Tom
Hank’s character appearing as what we interpret as a primitive human, someone living in a tribal
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society at what appears to be a time before the rise of what we call “civilization.” He is telling a
story and we listen, but even though the words he uses are similar to English they are used in
much different ways than current practice. We are able to discern that his story is about his
ancestry and something regarding all the voices speaking in unison, except for a character he
calls “Old Georgie.” It is unclear who or what “Old Georgie” is exactly and there are no
indications about the origins of Hank’s character or of “Old Georgie.” The immediate challenge
to our understanding of the use of language delivers the message that this movie is not going to
be an easy one. Our dependency on language, as explored earlier in this dissertation, is being
used here as a method to destabilize our understanding and vex the traditional ideas of
storytelling. Cloud Atlas begins in this way by throwing us into a world we have no
understanding of in order to make us feel uncertainty and test our abilities to grasp the unknown.
In experiences like the sublime, we must reach out with our imaginations and intuitions in an
attempt to cope with the mysterious circumstances we encounter in the movie.
Following the opening primitive scene, we are confronted with a whirlwind, fast-paced
montage of various time periods and characters. We are not given any indication of why these
images are being presented in this way; we are left to deal with the uncertainty on our own. This
disruption of our expectations and shock to our anticipations alert us to the nature of the movie
and set the conceptual table for what is to come. The montage rattles any type of expectation we
may have about what or how all these extremely disparate scenes are linked or associated. The
maelstrom of verbal and visual information overwhelms our abilities to understand. Cloud Atlas
cuts the ties with what and how we understand and sets us adrift into the story to come.
But even with the seeming uncertainty and disorder at the beginning of Cloud Atlas, there
is also a sense of something deeply human: something that cannot be expressed in words. The
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failure to find adequate verbal expression is also another characteristic of the experience we call
‘sublime.’ Similarly, despite the continual, disorienting shifting of time, place, and character, we
somehow, in our attempt to decipher the code, feel excited and exhilarated. It becomes clear that
we not only can cope with the strange temporal shifting but also, in an intuitive way, can
understand it and realize that it is communicating something of value to us. This unmooring of
the temporal order creates a stark decentering of our subject. We are forced to let go of our
concepts of the individual in order to flow into the story as a participant. In order to begin to
understand its complexity, we have to join in and become engaged in the multi-voiced, dialogic
nature of the story, what Mikhail Bakhtin calls “polyphony” (21) . Cloud Atlas immerses us in
the polyphonic dancing landscape called human existence. This is another example of how
watching Cloud Atlas detaches us from blindly accepting a privileged positions outlined by
language use in the West. The idea of being immersed in a polyphonic conversation across time
and place requires us to bring to bear all of our capacities, faith and reason, not just isolated ones
preferred by a specific ideology or cultural power.
In trying to understand the swirling, multileveled story that is Cloud Atlas, we are forced
to abandon our position as spectator. As in Manet’s painting Olympia (see figure 3), we the
viewers become part of the narrative and must add our participation to the story in order to
understand. Manet’s Olympia has been interpreted as one of the first paintings to break the frame
and include the viewer as a participant in the work itself.
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Figure 3: Manet, Édouard. Olympia. 1863, Musée d'Orsay, Paris. Wikimedia Commons,
upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/ca/Edouard_Manet-_Olympia__Google_Art_Project.jpg.

The character of Olympia stares at us from the center of the painting and claims us as the subject
of her attention. Cloud Atlas performs this same function through psychological and cinematic
means. Cloud Atlas shifts our point of reference like Olympia. We are not where we usually are
in respect to the unfolding of the story. This change of reference happens because of the
complexity and engagement with multiple storylines and temporal spaces. Cloud Atlas
overwhelms our capacities and activates our reason and emotions; we have to become part of the
process of the story unfolding to try and understand what is happening. This crucial shift from a
passive observer to an active participant is akin to the difference between watching a sporting
event and playing in that sporting event. Engaging in this process and coming to realize that the
story also includes us give rise to a feeling of exhilaration and excitement: this is the experience
of the sublime.
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Another way to understand these feelings of the sublime in Cloud Atlas is through Roland
Barthes’s notions of feelings of pleasure in relationship to a text. Barthes describes a text as a
“methodological field” (Barthes 966). Through this description of a text as a field, he expands
the possibilities for meaning in a way that symbolic language and concretized meaning cannot.
He continues, “Lacan’s distinction between ‘reality’ and ‘the real’: the one is displayed, the other
demonstrated; likewise, the work can be seen (in bookshops, in catalogues, in exams syllabuses),
the text is process of demonstration,” (Barthes 966). Simply put, someone can explain the
concept of making a cake to you or demonstrate making a cake. The latter is almost always a
richer and more meaningful experience than the former.
If we consider Cloud Atlas to be a text, as Barthes would, we can directly apply the
concept of the methodological field to the experience of the movie. We cannot sit back and act as
the passive observer; we have to become active in the field that is the movie/text in order to try
to understand and, in essence, complete the movie. Barthes puts it this way, “The Text is very
much a score of this new kind: it asks of the reader a practical collaboration. Which is an
important change, for who executes the work?” (Barthes 969). In other words, Cloud Atlas
presents lives turning over and over in a dynamic series of circumstances that reveal the deeper
connections to others. The movie, through this atemporal montage, demands our participation in
the story.
Being a participant in a circumstance rather than only a spectator requires us to have a
higher level of consciousness. What we do think and say as a participant matters to the eventual
outcome. We need to have faith that something will come from our participation and we need to
use our reason to make sure we are contributing positively to the eventual outcome. We should
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have a consciousness of the balance of faith and reason when making judgments or participating
in the world but our structures and the order they create make it difficult to accomplish.
The nature of Cloud Atlas is, what Barthes would call, ‘dialogic’ and ‘polyvocal.’ He
explains, “The Text participates in its own way in a social utopia; before History” (Barthes 696).
Barthes places the text outside of time by claiming that the Text operates in its own reality. This
unique reality allows us to enter the Text as objective participants. Of the polyvocal nature of the
text, Barthes writes, “[T]he Text is that space where no language has hold over any other, where
language circulates” (Barthes 696). The kind of pleasure this produces is related to jouissance,74
a pleasure often associated with the orgasmic. This pleasure is so immense and exhilarating it
consumes our being and we experience the sublime. Barthes writes, “As for the Text, it is bound
to jouissance, that is to a pleasure without separation” (Barthes 696). Cloud Atlas functions as a
text thrusting us into the “methodological field” of the movie, a place we must participate in but
are rewarded by experiencing the sublime in the sense of deeper connections to others and
ourselves.
The opening sequences of Cloud Atlas deny us the comforting position of a voyeur or of
a spectator. Cloud Atlas requires us to shift from voyeur to collaborator, making the experience
much more significant. Instead of the dead, repetitive stories that Hollywood normally produces,
Cloud Atlas has the ability to transcend normative systems. I have heard it said that movies like
these are “Dharma movies.” The Dharma75 is a group of teachings passed down to us from the
original Buddha that are intended to free us from the illusions of the world. The Dharma aspires
to show us the path to freedom from suffering. Of course, this, like the experience of the sublime,
requires an active choice to re-envision the world. Movies like Cloud Atlas also show a different
way of seeing and living. We could say that movies like Cloud Atlas move us into proximity with
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the Real. (Dylan 159) The denial by Cloud Atlas to confirm the ideological traditions of the West
moves us from the comfort of what we know to the chaos of the uncertain. This colossal change
in perspective is the locus for the sublime experience.
Cloud Atlas reminds me of a Zen kōan,76 a story or a statement that is purposefully
puzzling. In Engaging Japanese Philosophy, Thomas Kasulis describes the sublime encounter
with the Zen kōan:
Viewed from the larger context of Buddhist thought, the metapraxis justifying the
kōan technique is that if you face a problem that cannot be solved when filtered
through previous experience, you can obliterate temporarily all the psychophysical properties by which you ordinarily establish meaning. Then you will no
longer be subject to the effects of negative (“unskillful”) propensities and will
open yourself to engage reality as it is. (170)
The distorted narrative in Cloud Atlas creates a kind of kōan. We have a desire to follow the
stories, but because of the irregular and often shifting natures of the interactions of the characters
we lose the trail, so to speak. Our desire for order or our assumption that there is an order is
unfulfilled. What shakes us even more than this searching for order is the possibility that there
may be no real order at all. The challenge provided by Cloud Atlas creates the imaginative and
real circumstances that originate an experience of the sublime.
In attempting to film David Mitchell’s book The Wachowskis took on an extreme
challenge. By many accounts, the book was considered un-filmable because of the nature of the
story and the multiple stylistic shifts in the text. This was, of course, part of the appeal of the
movie and what makes it a great film and a sublime encounter for many. It is hard to find a single
scene or set of scenes to describe how the sublime experience happens in Cloud Atlas. The
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movie, like the sublime, cannot be encapsulated in a single identifiable scene or set of scenes. It
is in the totality of the experience in which the sublime arises. The sublime experience results
from a feeling of completeness that comes from engaging with the entire movie. Life is valued
not in a single, specific moment but in the entirety of its moments. Life is a flow of experience
not a single experience. Watching a movie is like watching a life pass: it is a collection of
moments and experiences.
Life is not purely rational, nor is it purely emotional. Being human we are all of these
things. It is only in the denial of parts of ourselves do we become anxious and unfulfilled. The
West often demands of us, through language, things that lean heavily on reason as opposed to
faith. We experience this as anxiety and a lack of authenticity in ourselves and in others. Movies
like Cloud Atlas give us the opportunity to examine and let our authentic selves emerge.
The sublime mystery of Cloud Atlas can only be revealed through experiencing the entire
movie. In the beginning montage of scenes, we are introduced to the range of characters. One of
the characters is Sonmi-451, a young Asian woman who appears to be detained by some official
for reasons we do not yet understand. There is a person who is shown to be interviewing Sonmi451. While she sits across from him in some futuristic handcuffs, he asks her about her version of
the truth. Sonmi-451 answers, “Truth is singular. Its versions are mistruths” (00:04:30). This is
the first time we see Sonmi-451 and the supposed future that somehow is part of the story we are
about to watch. The reasons for her comments, like the other parts of the montage are only
fragments or clues as to what we are about to experience. We do feel, however, because of her
answer to the question that this is significant in some way. We do not fully understand or make
any connections to this comment because we are not yet in a position to make any judgments.
The fact that we are not yet capable to make a value assessment of Sonmi-451’s answer is critical
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to the way we experience the story and the ultimate conclusion. The movie does everything
possible to keep us in a state of flux and uncertainty and not give us connectable concrete facts.
Cloud Atlas is more like a poem than a linear story we are so often given. To grasp Cloud Atlas,
we must take the same mindset as when reading a book of poetry. Reading poetry, like watching
Cloud Atlas, ask more of us than simple language translation. Reading a poem ask us to feel the
emotion created by metaphor, letting our deeper sense of self and the world play a part in the
understanding what is being communicated. We must have faith that what is being said will
through the help of our reason make the visual and auditory parts of the movie understandable to
us. We do this often when engaged I watching movies because it is part of the accepted
phenomenology.
In Philosophy as Poetry, Richard Rorty argues for a romantic pragmatism, which he
claims gives us access to parts of ourselves that lead us to a better relationship with reality and
the hope for a better world. Rorty claims, as mentioned earlier, “Ontology is more like a
playground than like a science” (2). In making this statement, Rorty challenges the dualisms that
have plagued the West and philosophy. The idea that ontology is a playground is the same as
saying that reality is just a playground. And the same as saying, that we believe what is real
through a kind of faithful acceptance of what is given to our senses. Cloud Atlas presents us a
kind of playful reality that changes and shifts and is connected in ways we have not yet used our
reason to consider. Although inclusivity can seem more chaotic and challenging for us to manage
because of its levels of complexity, it is actually more pragmatic and accurate. The idea that
ontology is like a playground is provocative. Children respond to the seeming chaos of the
playground; the more complex and colorful the playground, the more exciting it seems to the
children. When we become adults and become “serious,” we avoid the chaotic and unpredictable.
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The sublime in Cloud Atlas is created precisely out of the chaos it presents. The
perspective we have to take while watching the movie draws us into the ontological playground
Rorty posits. We can associate chaos with the sublime as defined by Burke, Kant, and
philosophers in the present. Chaos, the unknown, the mysterious, the ineffable, are all things we
don’t have complete understanding for. The sublime is an experience the can contain one or more
of the aforementioned categories. It represents an unknown, a circumstance that appears beyond
our capacities to understand. In simple terms, the sublime experience as we experience it defines
our relationship to the mysterious. Our relationship to the sublime is similar to Rorty’s
description of our relationship to the ontological. He claims, “My hypothesis about why ontology
remains so popular is that we are still reluctant to admit that the poetic imagination sets the
bounds for human thought” (Rorty 3). Rorty contends that what he calls “the poetic imagination”
serves as the foundation of our human understanding and not some particular philosophical
touchpoint or theory. The idea that a poetic imagination is what defines our possibilities can
make us uneasy, in part because we have come to see the imagination as only flights of fancy,
unattached to the real. When we consider this imagination in a pragmatic way, understanding that
the circumstances we find ourselves in are bounded on all sides by chaos and mystery,
interpreting the world and our existence as poetic is not as big a leap as it seems initially.
Rorty considers Nietzsche as an ideal philosophic voice in Philosophy as Poetry. He
concludes that Nietzsche, unlike many philosophers, did not claim there was a bounding wall to
human existence and that all we had to do was find that wall. This bounding wall is often
accepted as a universal truth, one that will never be altered and always available as reference to
our existence. Rorty like Nietzsche sees attempting to find a bounding wall or grounding
foundation as a foolish attempt by philosophers to find an absolute truth to what it means to be
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human. He writes, “Nietzsche helped us think of Kant and John Stuart Mill as two of a kind: both
were anxious to find an ‘inclosing wall,’ one that imagination could not leap across” (Rorty 8).
Rorty shifts the understanding of our existence back to the mysterious, back to things we must
use our imaginations to interpret.

SUMMARY
While watching movies like Cloud Atlas, we feel anxiety because we are expecting and
hoping for a kind of universal truth to arise to end the tale in a way that confirms our desires. No
such confirmation is possible in Cloud Atlas or in life. The illusion of order and the ongoing
construction of structures and diversions to try and keep the chaos at bay have not really been
successful. The reality that the universe is a place of wonder and chaos still provokes many
people. The truth of this reality, whether it matters or not, still lies beneath the illusory order of
things and makes us uneasy.
Feelings of the sublime give us a chance to consider our relationship with chaos and the
unfamiliar. One of the reasons we need the sublime is that we understand the need to continue
making attempts at the reconfiguring of ourselves and the world we live in. We also have a fear
of the unknown which stands in opposition to our desire to know. The relationship between our
fear of the unknown and our deep desire to know is encapsulated in the experience of the
sublime. Watching Cloud Atlas, we feel both anxiety from the complex structure of the story and
exhilaration in the search to solve the conundrum. The uncertainty I am emphasizing may seem
distant from the ideas of both Kant and Burke who associated the sublime with the strongest
emotions we can experience. But I do not agree with the idea that the sublime has to be at the
extremes because it suggests a kind of limiting factor on the experience. In Cloud Atlas, the
sublime opens us up to our abilities to free ourselves from the limiting dynamics of language and
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our varnished subjectivity. The sublime reveals a poetic quality of life, the world, and of our
humanity, and that is why it is so valuable. The poetic also shows us something beyond language
something desirable in life.
This lack of certainty creates a deferred meaning similar to Derrida’s discourse on
“différance” (Lucy 25). The telos this creates is also unfamiliar. It is not the kind we often
experience in the typical whodunit movie which often provides us with clues along the way to
understand the point of the movie or ultimate conclusion. In Cloud Atlas, we do not know
whether there is a real mystery, if there are any responsible parties, or if we are supposed to
understand the progression of characters and scenes as clues or not. The effects of this
uncertainty are vexing to our desire for order and concrete information. Cloud Atlas provides
none. We are steeped in the mystery of the story just as deeply as the characters in the film.
Along the way, we get inklings of meanings, such as déjà vu moments between characters or a
sense of meaningful connections that exist consistently between characters over different times
and places. These moments are not very specific or orderly; they offer only a vague sense of
connection and no real solid information about why or how these relationships exist or matter to
the characters or to us. But our desire to know drives us to become more deeply involved in what
is happening as we experience the story of Cloud Atlas.
Cloud Atlas transforms into a poem through the complex narrative, temporal shifting, and
non-linearity of the multiple story lines. This forces us to think in open and metaphorical terms
instead of looking for conventional ideas to lean on. Cloud Atlas does not present us with the
typical ordered narrative we have come to expect from movies. We must feel and think our way
through the experience of the movie. We must be present and conscious of what is happening and
not just on the screen but in ourselves as well. Rorty points again to Nietzsche’s comments on
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Schiller and Shelly, stating, “[H]e [Nietzsche] urged us to become ‘the poets of our lives’” (8).
Both Nietzsche and Rorty want to make the imagination central in our lives. Thinking about our
existence and world as a poem allows us a kind of flexibility and dynamic movement unavailable
in many philosophic ideas. Poetry depends on metaphor, and metaphors are rich in meaning,
dynamic, and open to interpretation. Reading poetry or watching movies like Cloud Atlas or The
Game requires we use the imagination. The conditioned meanings and story lines we have come
to expect will not work with movies of this type. Rorty writes, “Reason cannot get outside the
latest circle that imagination has drawn. It is in this sense, and only in this sense, that imagination
holds primacy” (15). Rorty envisions the imagination drawing circles ever larger outside of what
we currently know and understand. Doing this in a systematic world however is not a simple
task. The range of experiences in which we can free ourselves from the systems is limited by the
structures themselves because the structures define them as non-productive for the system.
Movies like Cloud Atlas, are and opportunity to free our minds and free ourselves from the
structures that limit us and practice, in imagination, what life might be like if there were other
possible ways of being. That is why poetry has continued, good poetry opens us to a realm
outside language: outside the structures of the West.
Rorty’s description of the imagination evokes Emerson’s essay “Circles.” Emerson
writes, “The life of man is a self-evolving circle, which, from a ring imperceptibly small, rushes
on all sides outwards to new and larger circles, and that without end” (Emerson and Porte 404).
This idea is sublime: the possibility of the human being able to evolve in this way can be
challenging to people who believe they are limited and flawed. If what we imagine is possible,
how frightening a world could we create: “Beware when the great God lets loose a thinker on
this planet. Then all things are at risk” (Emerson 407) . Perhaps, the knowledge that we are
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capable of such great and possibly terrible things is why we are so cautious. We fear our own
power in creating ourselves and some possible world. Feelings of fear act upon us because we
have seen the devastation perpetrated by humans in the past. Terrible, destructive results from the
creative force of a small group or one individual have left scars on the psyche of humanity. But
that does not mean that this creative force needs to be shackled by systems that keep us unable or
unwilling to move forward. Along with the possibility of horrific things comes the possibilities
of great things. We need both faith and reason working together to make imagination’s
suggestions practical and workable.
The experience of the sublime in Cloud Atlas can make us have positive feelings about
ourselves and humanity. The emotions produced by the sublime in movies make it possible for us
to imagine ourselves as something new: a different person. Imagining is the core reason we
watch movies; it creates a place from which new possibilities can emerge. The uncertainty of the
sublime is something we need because the structured systems never fully give expression to who
and what we are. We require a reminder of the things humans have done and the sublime nature
of the accomplishments. The mystery of the sublime is what keeps wonder in play in the world.
It is perhaps part of our destiny to be beings that continue to question and search, drawing ever
larger circles of possibility. Movies and the imagination by triggering the sublime are the primary
sources for our drawing a larger circle. The movie Cloud Atlas is a prime example of a movie
that prompts us to envision an expanded sense of humanity.
The case for the imagination as a location for the sublime experience is in itself not a
completely original idea. Recall any of your own childhood flights of imagination and the
feelings it gave rise to for your own verification. The fact that the world we inhabit as adults
limits our permission to engage in flights of imagination and that the cinema is a place where we
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are “given permission” to free our imaginative powers is an important piece of the sublime today.
Living in a materialistic and mechanistic world, we have less inclination to spend our time
reimagining what our lives or world could be than in past times. Movies with good stories are
places where we can try things on to see if we like them. We can test ourselves against others’
ethics and measure our ideas and beliefs against contrary ones. The most sublime thought I have
ever had was if I could remake myself and the world what would it look, smell, taste, and feel
like? Thinking like this still motivates me. Few other experiences are more accessible or better
than movies for testing and imagining better versions of ourselves.
The experience of the sublime is a test. It challenges our being in ways no other
experience can. This is why Longinus, Burke, and Kant spent so much effort in trying to
articulate and elucidate the experience. Movies that test our abilities like Cloud Atlas push us
into imaginative circumstances that can only be described as sublime. In a world where we have
lost much of our naïve outlook, finding the sublime has become more difficult. Movies and the
imagination are always ready to provide us with the kind of intellectual space to explore such
transformative ideas and experiences we can identify as the sublime.
The contention is that the sublime is most easily found by engaging our imaginations
while watching movies. The contemporary Western world, immersed in materialism and
commercialism, has difficulty seeing a world that applies the sublime to living. The sublime
becomes more necessary in times of turmoil and chaos. We need to have a working relationship
with complexity and confusion. This relationship is and always has been represented by the
sublime. When our existence seems chaotic and on the verge of falling apart, the sublime
becomes our ally in envisioning solutions and planning new outcomes in the face of an
unpredictable future.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Conclusion
“A man,” said Oliver Cromwell, “never rises so high as when he knows
not whither he is going.”
—Ralph Waldo Emerson
One might wonder why anyone would want to chase a seemingly ghost-like idea like the
sublime—a question I have asked myself everyday while working on this text. I suppose what
drew my attention to the sublime is its uncertainty and mysterious place in the world. My interest
in the sublime most likely comes from growing up steeped in the mysteries of the Catholic
Church. As a young child, the metaphysics of the church were fascinating to me. The saints,
angels, and God all prompted more questions than answers. I suppose I was the child that always
asked why to everything instead of just accepting what was presented.
Many thinkers have put the sublime experience under the microscope and have done a
very respectable job of articulating the occurrence. What should become clear through a reading
of these texts is that the sublime experience is not a static one. Like our own being, the sublime
experience changes as we change, as times change.

GENEALOGY
By beginning this examination with a genealogy of the sublime, the changes over time
and circumstances have demonstrated that the experience of the sublime is not an event that is
external to us but rather an event that reveals a relationship to our circumstances and the world
we are living in. The relationship can be distilled into one that exists between our abilities and
the mysteries still remaining to be uncovered and understood. This explains the deep sense of
wonder that often accompanies the feelings in the experience we call ‘sublime.’ A connected
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issue to our interpreting the sublime experience are the psychological insecurities we have about
our being. We are at once never really sure of what, how, and why we are and yet the structures
of the world and our own evolutionary drives direct us to be confident and secure in our
understandings of things. The sublime on the other hand continually points out the things we do
not or cannot understand. This is why we have a tense unresolved relationship with the sublime.
Looking back, it is not surprising that the sublime has been inscribed and re-inscribed
through history. Thinking about the sublime is very much like thinking about our own being. The
interpretations and uncertainty of the sublime track the uncertainty of our being in the world. As
advanced as we have become, we still have many questions about the nature of life and about our
own role in the purposes we see around us in an ever-developing universe. Our search for
meaning and determination has been aligned with our sense of the sublime from our beginnings
and will continue until there are no more questions to ask or things to understand. The experience
of the sublime is the reflection of our being in the mirror of the mystery of existence, and for that
reason we must not lose sight of the sublime’s potential. The sublime experience keeps us honest
by not letting our arrogance get the best of us. The sublime experience always reveals to us a
point at which we are unable to traverse. This is not to say we will never move beyond that point
only that we have work to do to accomplish the task.

LANGUAGE AND LACAN
Examining the sublime is as complex as the investigation of our own being. The
experience of the sublime is an expression of our relationship to the mysterious. The ways in
which we use the term sublime and the methods and practices of language surrounding the
experience of the sublime reveal much about the occurrence but even more about us and our
relationship to the experience, mystery, and the transcendent.
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It is a common human practice in the West to set a thing off as if it is separate from us
somehow and then perform an examination as though the thing exists independent of our
interpretations. This method makes it easier to create a disclaimer that something is imposing on
us rather than admitting that it is our own interpretation and relationship to the thing which is
affecting the results. Looking at the psychology of the sublime through Lacan’s theories
uncovers some of the confusion surrounding the sublime. Lacan supposes that we are trapped by
our language and the meanings we assign to words. Lacan suggests that we find ourselves in
need of analysis when we fall out of sync the Symbolic and with language and that analysis is
intended to set us back into the order language creates. He calls this the Symbolic Order but, like
others, has trouble in incorporating things like the sublime which are mostly outside of language.
(Evans 201) This is another reason why the sublime is an important experience: it keeps us
informed that there are things that are outside the Symbolic Order.
One might wonder why we should attend to things outside the order of language. A
simple test is to ask yourself if you, as a being, are only the things you can describe with
language. Or, ask yourself what it is about the love of your life that compels the feeling you have
for him/her. Language often fails at these descriptions, and it fails at describing the sublime as
well. One of the most horrible thoughts I have ever had is that I might know everything there is
to know and understand everything there is to understand. The sublime is an experience that
provides the mystery that drives our curiosity and desire to know. It is part of us and a necessary
part at that.
The psychology we have surrounding the mysterious is complicated. Lacan establishes a
simple and straightforward association with language and the Symbolic Order it creates as the
basis for our psychological problems but does little to address the way we deal with the
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mysterious. In examining Lacan, we can begin to uncover the problems associated with language
and our desires in an effort to establish some boundaries to the work at hand. It is not possible to
talk about things like the sublime without acknowledging the type of relationships we will have
to it and to the things that end up surrounding it. We must consider that the sublime happens as
much from our psychology as it does from what we might consider outside forces or objects. A
person in a particular state of mind will see the sublime in the most mundane of things while
others can be confronted with something otherworldly and be unmoved. This is because we all
develop a set of desires and a psychology that has evolved from the particular Symbolic Order
we are immersed in.
Another of Lacan’s ideas is an association or relationship with the Other. (Evans 132)
This Other for Lacan refers to a consciousness that lies outside our own. Many of our desires are
attached to Lacan’s idea of the other or, as he puts it, our desire is the desire of the other. (Evans
38) Simply stated, the thing we desire is that the other desire us although we do not know how to
make that happen. He posits an interesting set of circumstances, in which we enter into a kind of
dance with another consciousness that we do not have direct access to like our own. Although
Lacan formulates this relationship to the Other in a scientific way, other cultures have perhaps
stated it in a clearer and more useful manner. Juan Carlos Kreimer in writing about Zen in his
book The Bicycle Effect illuminates this relationship: “When Zen refers to the ‘I’ it means the
confluence between one’s own consciousness and another expanded, universal consciousness,
which it calls presence” (92). In Lacan’s thinking we are always under this condition; we are
always in an encounter with the Other. This can also be said for our encounters with movies.
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The language chapter and the chapter on Lacan outline our limits to understand things
like the sublime. In the contemporary Western world, we have become so dependent on language
and the systems of language that things like the sublime that stand outside of language are often
dismissed as too much of a problem or too mystical to bother with. Neither of these assessments
is correct, however, because no matter what we wish to claim about our existence or our
knowledge the fact is that there are and continue to be things greater than our abilities to see,
feel, or understand in the universe. Admitting this to ourselves opens doors to ideas and
possibilities of novelty that may enrich our lives and others.
The limits of language make evident the tenuous relationship we have to the things in the
world. The feelings and experience of the sublime are a prime example of language’s failings in
describing in full the experience of being human. Convincing ourselves otherwise and closing
the search for better uses of language and ways to describe our experiences is not the best
approach to continue the expectations of our dynamic becoming. It can be noted that language
continues to evolve as we do. New words enter and old words exit the lexicon regularly. Even
with this fairly regular occurrence, we continue to place an unwavering trust in language.

FAITH AND REASON
The curious dualism between the terms ‘faith’ and ‘reason’ suggests that a further
examination of language is required. The application of the dualism created culturally specific
meanings of these words. Faith and reason, so fundamental to the human experience have been
stifled by the cultural use of language. In the common parlance, these two terms have come to
mean only two very specific and diametrically opposed ideas. It seems preposterous to say, for
instance, that you have faith in science because science operates on facts and testing or that it is
reasonable to have faith because faith transcends human limits. The fact is that these two words
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and concepts are not antithetical but essential in the construction of our humanity. The way the
world in the West has assigned meanings to these words eliminates any possible flexibility or
contingencies concerning their meanings. The tension in the contemporary moment surrounding
these terms and the meanings they have come to embody is perhaps at its most tenacious. It is for
that reason I chose to use this particular dualism to examine the suspect nature of our parsing of
language and meaning. Another reason for choosing faith and reason is that they are both present
in the experience of the sublime. We could not have the experience of the sublime without both
faith and reason.
In experiencing the sublime, we need to have faith that we can cope with the experience
and we need reason to see that the coping is possible. In experiencing the sublime, applying
dualisms inhibit the process. To effectively use what we can from the sublime experience we
need to use all of our abilities. The linguistic split between faith and reason embodies how in the
West we have attempted to deal with our humanity as if it were mechanistic or atomistic. The
fact is we are more than what the symbolic system tells us we are. The sublime reminds us that
there are things greater than we expect and know and that we are part of the great unfolding
universe. This is important to keep in mind because it sets our sights on a future yet to be
determined. Further, the sublime shows us the possibility of transcending what is to what may
be.
The sublime in the contemporary moment is possibly more misunderstood than at any
previous period. This is not accidental or unplanned as it mirrors our vision of humanity and our
perceived reason for being in the contemporary West. Science and the stories about science have
convinced us that it has or will have all the answers about who and what human beings are.
Psychology has worked very hard to become a hard science, favoring behaviorism over
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Freudian, Jungian or Lacanian analysis. The media and advertising have examined and leveraged
our primal desires to drive us to consume products and services that we neither need nor should
we want given a clear view of the world and ourselves. A population that is overwhelmed and
looking for help will always find answers in the Western consumerism. Shopping therapy is a
common reaction to stress and confusion these days.

CINEMA
Under these stressful and anxious circumstances that the Western world has created,
finding or appreciating the sublime can be nearly impossible. When a consciousness is
disengaged through constant distraction, taking the time to see and appreciate things sublime
becomes a rare occurrence. There is one place available to us in the fast-paced world of the West:
the cinema, or the movies. When we go to the movies, we can suspend our lives and flow along
with another life or lives as they unfold on screen. This form of entertainment has been called
‘escapism.’ Both ‘entertainment’ and ‘escapism’ are terms we use to indicate a sense of unease or
dissatisfaction with what our lives are really like. The notion that I can suspend my life and ride
along in a story of some other character is very compelling in the contemporary Western world.
Movies are also another consciousness and, depending on what that particular
consciousness is, they move our consciousness to become larger and more expansive or smaller
and more condensed. The sublime is also like another consciousness. The experience can or
cannot move us, but the potential exists for transformation. Another association with Eastern
philosophy is the concept of “oneness.” This is foreign to most Western minds but has deep
associations to the sublime and to the movies. The Three Pillars of Zen written by Philip Kapleau
is considered a foundational text for Westerners seeking to better understand Zen Buddhism; it
defines “oneness” as “absorption to the point of self-forgetfulness. With a capital ‘O’ it refers to
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the experience of the Void or Emptiness” (414). Being enchanted by movies can be associated
with the former and encountering the sublime in movies can be associated with the latter.
But movies are not only what some have described as mindless entertainment. When we
watch movies, we are engaging in an imaginative rehearsal. We engage our imaginative powers
while watching fictions play out and we imagine what we would do or how we would feel in the
character’s place. Now this is not to say that all movies are sublime, but they might be. The
sublime is an experience that is as dynamic and changing as we are. The sublime experience for
me may not be the sublime experience for you. One movie might be sublime for you and boring
and dull for me. Finding the sublime in the movies is, however, easier for most of us and
accessible as well. That is why cinema has been chosen as the access point because it is one of
the most ubiquitous forms of media available.
If looking for the sublime, one can find the sublime. This is not accidental: the sublime is
a state of mind and a feeling that comes from seeking an understanding of who and what we are
in the universe. The big question, often dismissed as silly to ask and not something philosophy
should really deal with, but this lies at the heart of all the other questions that philosophy does
deal with. One can as easily find the sublime in a single blade of grass as finding it gazing upon
the totality of the universe. The sublime comes to us where we are and if we are prepared for it.
We seek it and encounter it by considering answers to big questions.
Looking for the sublime in movies is, for the humans living in the contemporary
moment, one of the easiest and simplest methods. Contemporary cinema has also been able to
use technology to create immersive, multi-sensory experiences that transcend anything reality
has to offer. So, cinema can through this amped-up, imaginative, sensory experience introduce us
to the sublime and to the big questions that make us wonder.
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At the heart of the sublime experience is the realization that we are not in control of
things. That we are not the center of things nor do we hold the answers to existence. The sublime
puts us in our place and at the same time gives us a feeling of the infinite possibilities of our
existence. The sublime is a clue left to us by the universe, prompting us to play the game,
continue to wonder, and seek answers.
Movies give us a way to play the game. We have evolved and the movies have evolved.
Simple story lines are not enough anymore. We need to have sensory and intellectual stimulation
that matches our evolved selves. We have watched dinosaurs roam the earth again in Jurassic
Park. (Spielberg) We participated in the battle for the universe in Star Wars. (Marquand) We
became part of the family in The Godfather. (Coppola) Movies help us evolve by presenting us
with situations and circumstances we may never in reality confront. What we do with these
experiences is determined in large part by how we interpret the world and ourselves in it. The
movies and the sublime challenge our assumptions and interpretations of things and give us an
opportunity to envision a different way of being: a different world. The notion of a different
world is sublime. This is demonstrated in the utopian movements that have regularly made an
appearance in the larger discourse. The sublime is contingency brought into our consciousness.
The movies are a positive way, just like the plays of ancient Greece, to practice or to
purge ourselves of powerful emotions. In the practice of catharsis, we change. The sublime
experience is also cathartic. Ceremonies are often used in religion and secret societies to create a
cathartic event that represents the change of the person from who he or she was to who he or she
becomes through the execution and acceptance of the ceremony in context. We all have our
personal ceremonies which represent important parts of our lives. These can be simple things that
have and give meaning to our existence. The simple act of making one of my grandmother’s
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recipes becomes a ceremony that honors my grandmother and keeps her memory and being
alive. My grandmother loved the movies, particularly scary movies. Whenever I watch a scary
movie, I imagine I am sitting with my grandmother and having her flinch with delight when the
scary parts happen. Watching scary movies for me is a kind of ceremony: one which keeps the
meaning of my grandmother alive in my life. Of course, these ceremonies have to happen with
intent. Just like the sublime, meaning happens with a desire for something to acquire
significance. A complex set of relationships motivate us to give meaning to things. The things we
give special meaning to arise from an aggregate of emotional and intellectual experiences. Some
of these experiences are based in reality and some of these experiences come from our
imaginations. Pretending to be a firefighter as a young person influences our adult decisions to
pursue becoming a firefighter. Our powers of imagination have great influence on our lives and
help direct who and what we will become.
Imagination creates the transcendent mental quality we all possess. Imagining ourselves
in unique scenarios, we can let our fancies sweep us into many sublime experiences. Using our
imaginations, we can create a different world. Think of the relationship between science fiction
writing and real science. Science fiction was first to imagine communication devices that would
present our images and voice to a distant person. Today, almost every person has one of these
devices in their pocket. Something once imagined is something that can become a reality given
the desire to make it so. These are not isolated things; they are connected and part of who we are
as humans. We use our imaginations frequently to rehearse circumstances and prepare for
experience. Athletes regularly rehearse actions before the feat takes place in reality. Visualizing a
golf swing or high dive is often on display while watching these sporting events. This is
imagination in action and also ceremony. Athletes use these ceremonies and imaginative powers
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to put themselves in the state of mind most conducive to success in whatever they are about to
attempt. The combination of imagination and ceremony make powerful allies in the construction
of meaning. Watching movies can be considered a ceremony and the engagement with our
imaginations can be influential in our lives.
This is, of course, highly dependent on the person having the experiences. No one can
make you have a meaningful or sublime experience. That does not, however, change the premise
that one of the most ideal circumstances to have a meaningful or sublime experience is at the
movies. Several factors make it likely that the movies can hold the potential for an experience of
the sublime kind. First, we are willing to suspend our disbelief and turn over our consciousness
to the filmmaker. We do this by engaging our imaginations so as to enjoy the story we are about
to see. We willingly accept this as part of the process so long as the filmmaker takes good care of
our imaginations and consciousness and is not reckless with our imaginings. Second, we are
willing to let our imaginations run free within the make-believe of the movie. This running free
removes us from most conventional beliefs and ideas we may have under the premise that we are
only watching a movie. The combination of having permission to step outside ourselves into a
world of make-believe creates the possibility for the sublime to happen. Very few other
circumstances in life can offer this in such an accessible way. The movies are a perfect place to
have sublime experiences and create new meaning and transform our consciousness from what it
is to something else.
This is the point of this dissertation. We are still able, in this contemporary and highly
ordered world, to find ways to evolve and change using our powers of imagination along with
the stories we have access to through the practice of movie making and watching. Both the
making and the watching are parts that fulfill our desires. The maker of the movie wants to tell us
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an important story and we can use those stories to challenge and alter ourselves to be better than
we were before having the immersion and playing make-believe in the story.
The importance of the sublime experience cannot be overstated. The sublime shows us
our incompleteness and the challenges us to grow into who we may become. It reveals our better
parts as humans and challenges us to be better still. The feelings of exhalation and awe that is
present in the experience of the sublime motivates us to move in directions we perhaps have not
before considered. Finding, experiencing, and using the moments of the sublime in our lives can
help us achieve a life that fulfills us. The experience of the sublime reminds us of our better
angels and our abilities to overcome the programmed and common existence surrounding us.
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NOTES
1

“Deleuze (often with Guattari) describes a ‘plane of immanence’ which serves as a field

for concepts. He takes Spinoza as his archetype for a philosopher of immanence, and with
Guattari, he shows that the object of desire is not absent or ‘beyond’ the social world (that is, it
does not arise form a dream or phantasy); rather, desire is a process that is immanent to the social
world” (Young 162).
2

‘Cult value,’ as Benjamin used the term, refers to the authenticity and uniqueness of an

object. The originality of art objects made them in part inaccessible to the masses and at the same
time made the objects more important through the lack of access.
3

“Ontology, understood as a branch of metaphysics, is the science of *being in general,

embracing such ideas as the nature of *existence and the categorical structure of reality”
(Honderich 670, ).
4

See Longinus, On the Sublime sec.1.3.

5

Kant’s Copernican Revolution was described as a shift of cognition from minds

conforming to the objects in the world to objects in the world conforming to the mind and to
cognition (Merleau-Ponty and Lefort liii).
6

“This (shifting of the locus of our sense of reality) involves reversing the usual way of

viewing our cognition and instead of thinking of our knowledge as conforming (or failing to
conform) to a realm of pre-given objects, we think of objects as conforming to the conditions of
our cognition of them” (Honderich 467, ).
7

The New Oxford American Dictionary defines “Phenomenology” as “[t]he science of

phenomena as distinct from that of the nature of being. An approach that concentrates on the
study of consciousness and the objects of direct experience” (Stevenson and Lindberg 1315).
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8

Immanuel Kant used the term ‘supersensible’ to indicate the power of the human mind

to transcend the everyday through the use of reason and imagination (Caygill 401).
9

“Philosophical skepticism questions our cognitive achievements, challenging our ability

to obtain reliable knowledge” (Honderich 838). Hume was known for applying this approach.
10

The New Oxford American Dictionary defines “aporia” as “an irresolvable internal

contradiction or logical disjunction in text, argument, or theory” (Stevenson and Lindberg 74, ).
11

The New Oxford American Dictionary defines “Romanticism” as “a movement in the

arts and literature that originated in the late eighteenth century, emphasizing inspiration,
subjectivity, and the primacy of the individual” (Stevenson and Lindberg 1516, ).
12

The New Oxford American Dictionary defines the “scientific method” as “a method or

procedure that has characterized natural science since the seventeenth century, consisting in
systematic observation, measurement, and experimentation, and the formulation, testing, and
modification of hypotheses” (Stevenson and Lindberg 1564).
13

“For thrownness is not a fact that is over and done with, like details of one’s ancestry

which one can discover by research. It is a constant accompaniment of Dasein’s existence”
(Inwood A Heidegger Dictionary 219).
14

“German compound from da (‘there, here’) and sein (‘to be’), thus literally ‘to be there’

and, as substantial infinitive, ‘being there’. In Kant, Hegel, etc. it is ‘determinate being’,
especially in time and space, but also the existence of God. It often amounts to a person’s ‘life’”
(Honderich 189, ).
15

The New Oxford American Dictionary describes “Structuralism” as “a method of

interpretation and analysis of human cognition, behavior, culture, and experience that focuses on
relationships of contrast between elements in a conceptual system that reflect patterns underlying
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a superficial diversity. The doctrine that structure is more important than function” (Stevenson
and Lindberg 1728, ).
16

According to the New Oxford American Dictionary, “Lacan’s concept of the mirror

stage . . . is far more than a mere experiment: the mirror stage represents the structure of
subjectivity” (Honderich 467; Hoffmann and Whyte).
17

“‘Da-sein exists for itself’, but this now means that it exists for the sake of being, since

it is essentially ‘guardianship’ of being (LXV, 302)” (Inwood 44).
18

The New Oxford American Dictionary defines “metaphysics” as “the branch of

philosophy that deals with first principles of things, including abstract concepts such as being,
knowing, substance, cause, identity, time, and space. Abstract theory or talk with no basis in
reality” (Stevenson and Lindberg 1100).
19

In the preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant claims,

“Reason has a peculiar fate in one species of its cognitions that it is burdened with questions it
cannot dismiss, since they are given to it as problems by the nature of reason itself, but which it
also cannot answer, since they transcend every capacity of human reason” (Kant, Guyer and
Wood Loc 2341).
20

The New Oxford American Dictionary defines “Geist” as “the spirit of an individual or

group” (Stevenson and Lindberg 720, ).
21

The New Oxford American Dictionary defines “Pragmatism” as “an approach that

assesses the truth of meanings of theories or beliefs in terms of their practical application”
(Stevenson and Lindberg 1372).
22

(Kant The Critique of Judgement 90)
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23

The New Oxford American Dictionary explains, “Deconstruction focuses on text as

such rather than as an expression of the author's intention, stressing the limitlessness (or
impossibility) of interpretation and rejecting the Western philosophical tradition of seeking
certainty through reasoning by privileging certain types of interpretation and repressing others”
(Stevenson and Lindberg 451,).
24

In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari explain, “The territory is in fact an act

that affects milieus and rhythms, that “territorializes” them. The territory is the product of a
territorialization of milieus and rhythms… A territory borrows from all the milieus: it bites into
them, seizes them bodily (although it remains vulnerable to intrusion) ” (Deleuze and Guattari
314).
25

Deleuze and Gauttari in A Thousand Plateaus identify the rhizome in this way: “A

rhizome has no beginning or end; it is always in the middle, between things, interbeing,
intermezzo. The tree is filiation, but the rhizome is alliance, uniquely alliance” (Deleuze and
Guattari 25).
26

In challenging the notions of the primacy of speech as opposed to language, Jacques

Derrida formulated the word ‘différance’ as opposed to ‘différence.’ This idea would
demonstrate Derrida’s challenge to the binary opposition of language/speech. Practically
speaking, in French the pronunciation of ‘différance’ and ‘différence’ sounds exactly the same. It
is only when written that the distinction can be made.
27

The “subject” generally refers to our own personal subjectivity. For Lacan, the concept

of the Subject is more complex and is constructed through language and the Symbolic Order.
28

“The term ‘lack’ is always related, in Lacan’s teaching, to DESIRE. It is a lack which

causes desire to arise” (Evans 95, ).
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29

“Metaphor” is defined as “[a] figure in rhetoric in which the meaning of one word is

transferred onto and in a certain sense combined with that of another” (Buchanan 318, ).
30

“Metonymy” is defined as “[t]he substitution of the name of an attribute or adjunct for

that of the thing meant, for example suit for business executive, or the turf for horse racing”
(Stevenson and Lindberg 1102).
31

“It is in 1957 that Lacan introduces the term ‘signifying chain’ to refer to a series of

signifiers which are linked together” (Evans 187).
32

“The French term point de capiton is variously translated in English editions of

Lacan’s work as ‘quilting point’ or ‘anchoring point’. To avoid the confusion resulting from this
variety of translation, the term has here been left in the original French. It literally designates an
upholstery button, the analogy being that just as upholstery are places where ‘the mattressmaker’s needle has worked hard to prevent a shapeless mass of stuffing from moving too freely
about’ (Bowie, 1991: 74), so the points de capiton are points at which ‘signified and signifier are
knotted together’ (S3, 268)” (Evans 149).
33

“Lacan refers to the one who is ‘in’ psychoanalytic treatment as the ‘patient’ (Fr.

Patient) or the ‘subject’, or uses the technical term (psych)analysé. However, in 1967 Lacan
introduces the term (psych)analysand, based on the English term ‘(psych)analysand’”(Evans 9, ).
34

Heidegger speaks of “throwness” and “facticity” in reference to Dasein, which is

translated as “being there,” or “there being.” “Throwness” and “facticity” both refer to the world
that Dasein exists in and in part accepts as its situation (Being and Time).
35

According to Evans, “[T]he mirror stage represents a fundamental aspect of the

structure of subjectivity. . . . By the early 1950s Lacan no longer regards it simply as a moment
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in the life of the infant, but sees it as also representing a permanent structure of subjectivity, the
paradigm of the IMAGINARY order” (Evans 115).
36

“The little other is the other who is not really other, but a reflection and projection of

the EGO” (Evans 132-33).
37

“The big Other designates radical alterity, an other-ness which transcends the illusory

otherness of the imaginary because it cannot be assimilated through identification” (Evans 133).
38

“[D]esire is simultaneously the heart of human existence, and the central concern of

psychoanalysis. However, when Lacan talks about desire, it is not any kind of desire he is
referring to, but always unconscious desire. This is not because Lacan sees conscious desire as
unimportant, but simply because it is unconscious desire that forms the central concern of
psychoanalysis” (Evans 36, ).
39

A reference to Edgar Allan Poe’s text "The Purloined Letter."

40

See Jacques Derrida, Truth in Painting and Of Grammatology. See Ludwig

Wittgenstein, The Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty.
41

See Honderich 270.

42

See Plato 8022.

43

See Plato 382.

44

See Honderich 210.

45

Essentially Descartes posited a radical skepticism about the reality of the world. His

experiment lead him to believe that the only thing he could not have some doubt about was his
own thoughts (Descartes).
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46

Plato developed his view of the world based on the idea that there existed a set of

perfected forms of things in the mind of the gods. Things like chairs or tables that existed in the
earthly plane were only copies of the perfected chairs and tables (Plato 27837).
47
48

See James (James The Will To Believe 90)
The best known and most widely accepted theory of truth is the correspondence of

truth. The Oxford Companion of Philosophy defines the correspondence theory as, "on this view,
a candidate for truth is true if and only if it corresponds to a fact" (Honderich 926).
49

See Nietzsche 41.

50

"[R]ationalism. Any of a variety of views emphasizing the role or importance of

reason, usually including intuition, in contrast to sensory experience (including introspection),
the feelings, or authority" (Honderich 783).
51

"[K]nowledge. The principle of intellectual attainment studied by *epistemology (see,

epistemic). Virtually all theorists agree that true belief is a necessary condition for knowledge,
and it was once thought that justification, when added to true belief, yields a necessary and
sufficient condition for knowledge" (Honderich 259). There are several theories of correctness:
the simplest is that what are senses reveal aligns with our beliefs. This is the *correspondence
theory of knowledge (see Honderich 178).
52

The Oxford English Dictionary defines “Fascism” as “[a]ny form of behavior

perceived as autocratic, intolerant, or oppressive; esp. the advocacy of a particular viewpoint or
practice in a manner that seeks to enforce conformity” (Abate and Jewell 629).
53

“Instrumental reason refers not only to a rise in what Weber called the bureaucratic

thinking, it also refers to a larger trend in philosophy to privilege the objective over the
subjective” (Buchanan 249,).
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54

Immanuel Kant explains, “Pure reason is in fact concerned with nothing but itself, and

it can have no other concern, because what is given to it is not objects to be unified for the
concept of experience, but cognitions of understanding to be unified for the concept of reason,
i.e., to be connected in one principle” (Kant, Guyer and Wood,Loc 15087).
55

The Iliad is the Homeric story of the great Trojan War which has been popularized in

part to be known as the story of Helen. The beauty that started the war has been said to be “the
face that launched a thousand ships” (Marlowe 13:88).
56

See Kierkegaard 455-56.

57

See Pugliese, Stanislao G., Fascism, anti-fascism, and the resistance in Italy : 1919 to

the present, 293.
58

(Heidegger and Krell 308,)

59

“The Divine Right of Kings is a political and religious doctrine of royal absolutism. It

asserts that a monarch is subject to no earthly authority, deriving his right to rule directly from
the will of God. The king is thus not subject to the will of his people, the aristocracy, or any
other estate of the realm, including the church. The doctrine implies that any attempt to depose
the king or to restrict his powers runs contrary to the will of God and may constitute treason”
(Encyclopedia).
60

The company store was a system in which workers were not given cash or valuable

exchange items. Instead they were given coins or notes that were only of value at the store that
the company owned and ran. The company then could charge the workers whatever it wanted
and profit not only form the work but also form the exchange of goods necessary for the workers
to survive.
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61

“Karl Marx created this term, borrowing from the notion of the fetish from

anthropology, where it refers to a sacred or symbolic object that according to its worshipers has
supernatural powers” (Buchanan 92,).
62

“Weber, Karl Emil Maximillian (Max) (1864-1920), German sociologist, whose

polymathy defied his characterization of our age as one of specialization and bureaucracy. Men
attach meaning to their actions and these become embodied in social norms” (Honderich 955,).
63

"In its broad usage, this is a family resemblance term deployed in a variety of contexts

(architecture, painting, music, poetry, fiction etc.) for things which seem to be related—if at
all—by a laid-back pluralism of styles and vague desire to have done with the pretensions of
high-modernist culture. In philosophical terms, post-modernism shares something with the
critique of Enlightenment values and truth—claims mounted by thinkers of a liberal
communitarian-persuasion; also with neo-pragmatists like Richard Rorty who welcome the end
of philosophy's presumptive role as a privileged truth-telling discourse" (Honderich 745).
64

There are countless books with information on film theory. See Film As Art (Rudolf

Arnheim) and Film Theory & Criticism (Braudy and Cohen).
65

Plato claims that all art is merely a mimetic reproduction, something belonging to a

higher reality.
66

See Plato, The Republic Book X.

67

See Aristotle, Poetics.

68

“[T]he doctrine that knowledge is merely subjective and that there is no external or

objective truth” (Abate and Jewell 1733).
69

“Accepting that truth cannot consist in a relation between truth-bearers and items

which are not themselves truth-bearers (such as facts), these theorists propose instead that it
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consists in a reaction which truth-bearers have to one another—such as a relation of mutual
support amongst the beliefs of an individual or community” (Honderich, p.926).
70

“On this view, a candidate for truth is true if and only if it ‘corresponds to a fact’”

(Honderich, p.926).
71

“In BT Dasein’s existence involves various ‘turns’. A mood ‘discloses not by looking

at throwness but as turning towards and turning away' (BT, 135). In falling ‘Dasein turns away
from itself’ (BT, 185)” (Inwood A Heidegger Dictionary 231).
72

See Jean-Louis Baudry's Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus

and Stephen Heath's Narrative Space.
73

From George Smith: time moves in a cyclical way in human experience. The past

influences the present which influences the future and the process only ends in death.
74

Jouissance is defined as “physical or intellectual pleasure, delight, or ecstasy” (Abate

and Jewell 940).
75

The Dharma is the teachings of the Buddha sometimes referred to as the religion of the

Buddha.
76

A kōan is “a paradoxical anecdote or riddle, used in Zen Buddhism to demonstrate the

inadequacy of logical reasoning and to provoke enlightenment” (Abate and Jewell 967).
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